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SUMMARY
MAKING SENSE OF DAESH IN AFGHANISTAN: A SOCIAL MOVEMENT PERSPECTIVE \ K. MIELKE & N. MISZAK 
So-called Islamic State (IS or Daesh) in Iraq and Syria is widely interpreted as a 
terrorist phenomenon. The proclamation in late January 2015 of a Wilayat Kho-
rasan, which includes Afghanistan and Pakistan, as an IS branch is commonly 
interpreted as a manifestation of Daesh's global ambition to erect an Islamic  
caliphate. Its expansion implies hierarchical order, command structures and  
financial flows as well as a transnational mobility of fighters, arms and recruits 
between Syria and Iraq, on the one hand, and Afghanistan–Pakistan, on the other. 
In this Working Paper, we take a (new) social movement perspective to investigate 
the processes and underlying dynamics of Daesh’s emergence in different parts 
of the country. By employing social movement concepts, such as opportunity 
structures, coalition-building, resource mobilization and framing, we disentangle 
the different types of resource mobilization and long-term conflicts that have 
merged into the phenomenon of Daesh in Afghanistan. In dialogue with other 
approaches to terrorism studies as well as peace, civil war and security studies, 
our analysis focuses on relations and interactions among various actors in the 
Afghan-Pakistan region and their translocal networks. 
The insight builds on a ten-month fieldwork-based research project conducted 
in four regions—east, west, north-east and north Afghanistan—during 2016. We 
find that Daesh in Afghanistan is a context-specific phenomenon that manifests 
differently in the various regions across the country and is embedded in a long-
term transformation of the religious, cultural and political landscape in the 
cross-border region of Afghanistan–Pakistan. The direct links between Daesh in 
Syria and Iraq and its branch in Afghanistan are relatively weak, mostly indirect 
and largely symbolic, being performed through public displays of allegiance. 
Daesh appears to mobilize resources mainly through translocal social networks 
established in the past and connect the Afghan–Pakistan border region with 
Gulf Arab countries, not Daesh’s headquarters in Raqqa. The ideology of Jihadi 
Salafism derives from longer-term processes and provides a new framework for 
actors in Afghanistan that is there to stay. Jihadi Salafism is a small but ultra- 
violent part of the large-scale spread of Salafism manifest in the mushrooming 
of Salafi mosques and madrassas, particularly in the east, north-east and north of 
Afghanistan. The Paper suggests that, while Daesh in Afghanistan is not the  
extended arm of Raqqa, it certainly has to be taken seriously. For it is precisely 
this relative autonomy that makes it likely to survive the fall of Mosul and Raqqa.   
2 \ 
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armed and militant Salafis who had fought under the 
umbrella of the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate before the 
emergence of Daesh. In western Afghanistan, especially 
southern Herat and Farah, Daesh was described in  
relation to local strongmen and changing opportunity 
structures resulting from rifts within the Taliban after 
the announcement of Mullah Omar’s death. In Jawzjan 
and Faryab, it was linked to the opportunism of local 
strongmen embroiled in a protracted rivalry between 
Junbesh and Jamiat, two political factions that have 
been competing since the 1990s. Here, just as in Sar-e 
Pul, Balkh and Ghor, local officials again described 
Daesh in terms of a future threat potential (‘Daesh is 
coming’). These could be attempts to seek security  
resources from central government authorities or to 
distract from the failures of the local government to 
maintain local order and security in their area of 
responsibility.
A long-term transformation of the  
local religious, cultural and political 
landscape in Afghanistan–Pakistan has 
prepared the ground for Daesh’s local 
manifestations 
The emergence of Daesh has its roots in a milita-
rized environment and infrastructure that has sup-
ported violent jihadist groups2 in the Afghanistan– 
Pakistan region for thirty years, since the start of the 
anti-Soviet jihad. Concurrently, the religious land-
scape, particularly within the Sunni community, has 
been in an ongoing process of transformation. This 
context created a fertile ground for the appearance, 
partial consolidation and partial expansion of Daesh 
from mid-2014 until today. However, the case of Afghan- 
istan is very different from Iraq and Syria where  
Sunni tribes have been mobilized alongside Daesh 
against the Shia and Alawite/Baathist governments 
of Iraq and Syria respectively.
2 \  The use of the word jihadism, or jihadist, is controversial since jihad 
has a variety of violent and non-violent meanings. In this report, jiha-
dist is used in relation to violence and armed struggle.
Daesh is a context-specific phenomenon 
that manifests differently in various 
regions of Afghanistan 
All regional case studies indicate the popularity of 
Daesh’s symbolism (clothing style, black flag, head 
bands, images of horsemen) and propaganda material 
(video clips, songs, images circulating in social media) 
which, after the initial expansion of Daesh in Iraq and 
Syria, was broadly adopted by Afghans in different  
locations and with different backgrounds. Beyond this, 
Daesh in Afghanistan is not a homogenous entity but 
a complex phenomenon that has manifested itself in 
different forms across Afghanistan, depending on the 
particular local political dynamics, historical path  
dependencies and the conditions and context under 
which respondents describe and interpret its appear-
ance. Daesh’s political ambition extends to all the 
lands it includes within the Wilayat Khorasan1—today’s 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and adjacent countries—but by 
2016 the group’s success in setting up institutions 
characteristic of states, such as courts, prisons and a 
basic bureaucratic administration (incl. tax levying) 
had only been seen in Nangarhar, and to a lesser  
extent in Kunar province, where there are features of a 
rational, bureaucratic administration. As part of its 
larger communication strategy, Daesh’s FM radio Voice 
of the Caliphate was combined with an extremely violent 
reign of terror, with the latter leading to an erosion of 
local popular support.
In other areas of Afghanistan, Daesh failed to con-
solidate its rule. In north-eastern Afghanistan’s Kunduz, 
Takhar and Badakhshan provinces, local respondents 
described Daesh as a covert presence rooted among 
1 \  Note on orthography: The report contains a large variety of local terms 
from four languages: Pashto, Dari, Arabic and Urdu. To ensure a rea-
der-friendly presentation, the authors used a simplified form of Arabic 
transcription without diacritical characters (except for ‘ayn and ham-
za [though not at the beginning of a word] following the IJMES trans-
literation system) for all Arabic words. Pashto, Dari and Urdu words 
were transcribed following existing Persian transcription systems 
with some minor adaptations. Especially names of persons, organiza-
tions and locations are documented as recorded during interviews.  
Topographic names that have a proper and known counterpart in Eng-
lish (e.g., Jalalabad, Achin, Kunduz) and terms designating ethnic 
group-belonging (Hazara, Uzbek, Tajik) or local concepts, but likewise 
with common usage in English (mujahidin, jihad, Taliban), have been 
written in line with the United Nations Editorial Manual. The plural of 
local terms has been anglicized (e.g., mawlawi to mawlawis). 
Main findings
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Daesh’s presence in Afghanistan is  
facilitated by foreign fighters 
Daesh’s presence in Afghanistan is in many ways 
a reversal of the situation which set in following the 
US attacks on the Taliban regime in 2001, a time 
when many foreign fighters supporting the Islamic 
Emirate of Afghanistan fled across the border into 
the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) of 
Pakistan. Pakistani Army operations in different FATA- 
Agencies, especially North-Waziristan, Khyber and 
Bajaur since 2009, accelerated existing organizational 
fractures within the Pakistani Taliban umbrella  
organization Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP) and 
other jihadi groups such as the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU) and pushed them into Afghan 
territory. 
Resource mobilization relies on trans-
local and domestic madrassa networks 
Beyond the effects of Pakistani military opera-
tions which pushed militants from FATA into Afghan- 
istan, cross-regional and cross-border as well as 
trans-local links play a significant role for resource 
mobilization (recruiting and financing). A complex 
landscape of religious schools (madrassas) propagating 
violent jihad in Afghanistan links people on both 
sides of the Afghan and Pakistani border areas and 
provides for a crucial supporting infrastructure.  
Reflecting the absence of a centralized religious clergy 
and hierarchy among Sunni Muslims, madrassas 
propagating extremist violence are not part of a uni-
fied, coherent institutional structure. Jihadi Salafism 
constitutes the dominating force of influence driving 
the emergence and expansion of Daesh in all study 
locations, but extremist violence is also propagated 
by groups which, while sharing many of Daesh’s crit-
icisms and expressed grievances, are not Salafist (e.g. 
Panjpiri who are Deobandi). Furthermore, while 
Salafists agree on common foundations of belief, they 
differ in the extent of their political engagement and 
are not necessarily interconnected. 
Madrassa networks overlap with  
business ties, NGOs and charity  
organizations
Of the multiple Salafi networks that exist, few  
sojourn at the surface and become visible to some  
degree because they have formal political wings or are 
run by famous religious scholars (ulama). Others oper-
ate silently but likely no less efficient in their teach-
ings and propaganda. Importantly, adherence to a 
Salafist creed partly overlaps with tribal, marriage and 
business links. These overlapping networks connect 
Salafi ulama of different ranks, their madrassa- and 
mosque-networks and various forms of charity organ-
izations. The latter complement the network in two 
dimensions: (1) They form the link between well-
known local clergy and their respective mosque- and 
madrassa networks with (2) foreign donors, such as pri-
vate persons, businessmen, bankers/money changers, 
international Islamic charities/ foundations/ NGOs, 
living primarily in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Gulf 
Arab countries. 
International sponsors finance Afghan 
charity organizations, madrassas and 
mosques. 
While relations between Daesh in Afghanistan 
and the IS-headquarters in Raqqa do not appear to be 
strongly institutionalized, private donors living in 
Gulf Arab countries appear to play a more prominent 
role in supporting Daesh in Afghanistan—in particular 
with regard to funding and the popularization of  
Jihadi–Salafist and Wahhabi ideological doctrines. 
These types of funding have a long tradition since re-
sources were mobilized en masse for jihad in the 1980s. 
Local resource generation relies mainly on taxing of 
valuables according to Islamic law. However, evidence 
from the different research locations provides a heter- 
ogeneous picture of taxation practices in accordance 
with the differences of Daesh-presence and actual 
consolidation of its rule. The role of Afghan and Paki-
stani businessmen in fundraising is not to be under-
estimated as is the nexus of Salafi religious authority 
and business. Cursory evidence from looking at some 
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population (more than 46 per cent are below 15 years 
of age), increasing numbers of the population and  
especially youths are exposed to Salafi education. 
However, Daesh’s narrative goes beyond mainstream 
Salafism, as practiced for example by the monarchy 
of Saudi Arabia, towards the millennial prophecy of 
establishing the caliphate. By portraying itself as the 
force anticipated in the primary religious sources 
(Quran and/or hadith) that will establish the caliphate 
according to prophecy, Daesh is providing a master 
frame that introduces a new jihadi narrative to its  
Afghan audience. 
Daesh’s communication strategy  
combines narratives on geopolitics and 
extreme brutality 
Daesh’s local FM radio The Voice of the Caliphate is 
an important medium and plays a key role in spread-
ing Daesh messaging about the Islamic State’s political 
project as well as geopolitical themes but also poetry 
and chants (nasheed) into urban areas of Nangarhar, 
in particular the provincial centre Jalalabad. But 
Daesh’s communication strategy also includes ‘shock 
and awe’ strategy through public acts of extreme vio-
lence and brutality of Daesh in Nangarhar. Daesh also 
employs intimidating language for its declared ene-
mies (media, ANSF, Taliban of the Islamic Emirate) or 
deviants (ulama, tribal elders) and uses examples of 
spectacular violence in its broadcasts to impress its 
audience. This distinguishes Daesh from other jihadist 
groups such as al-Qaeda but also the Taliban.
Lacking counter-narrative to Daesh 
and the larger transformation of the 
religious landscape
Daesh’s success and the larger transformation of 
the religious landscape in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
coincides with the lacking persuasion of alternative 
frames provided by the government, other jihadi 
groups, the Taliban or independent ulama linked to 
the traditional religious authorities including the 
large Sufi networks which played a major role in pre-
war Afghanistan. Simultaneously, the government of 
of the main organizers of trans-local Salafi networks 
suggests a strong correlation of business and religious 
networks. Funds destined for Daesh in Afghanistan 
that are not raised locally are said to be transferred 
mainly in two ways: through money and value transfer 
services such as the hawala system or from person to 
person (cash couriers). From Pakistan, a few such  
hawala operators send money to Afghanistan. 
States that are home to private donors 
of Salafi networks are, at the same 
time, at the forefront of combating 
terrorism
 Many donors and non-state charities are con-
nected to individuals situated primarily in Gulf Arab 
countries and Pakistan. At the same time, these same 
states are at the forefront of countermeasures against 
the financing of terrorism. This complicates interna-
tional relations with states and individuals pursuing 
entirely different policies. 
Jihadi-Salafism provides a new narra-
tive that is there to stay
The combination of violent jihad and Salafism is 
central to Daesh’s ideology albeit not exclusively so 
since there are other armed jihadist groups—such as 
Lashkar-e-Islam and TTP—that propagate similar 
views without necessarily being Salafists. Salafism is 
a relatively recent phenomenon in Afghanistan and 
has thrived visibly since the toppling of the Taliban 
regime in late 2001 after the US-led intervention. 
Only in the provinces of Kunar and Nuristan did 
Salafism have local roots which go back to the 1980s 
and even the 1960s. There, similar to FATA and Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa province in Pakistan, Salafism had 
been influencing the curriculum of madrassas and 
mosques. An increasing influence of Gulf Arab coun-
tries in the religious landscape of the north-east and 
east of Afghanistan since 2001 resulted in a ‘quiet’ 
Salafization, which has manifested itself in the 
mushrooming of Salafi mosques and madrassas 
throughout the countryside as well as in urban cen-
tres. Given the demographic structure of the Afghan 
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Afghanistan and the international community did 
not formulate an effective policy to engage with the 
country’s religious establishment and failed to enforce 
an official religious doctrine and religious education 
reforms. Western development aid organizations 
have meticulously avoided funding community 
mosque buildings in the course of the civil interven-
tion and reconstruction period since 2002. Gulf-Arab- 
funded NGOs have stepped in, constructed mosques 
and madrassas, brought books and hired mullahs and 
teachers of a Salafist orientation. 
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Afghanistan was a novel phenomenon that had come 
from outside the region, imposed by the potent Daesh 
headquarters in Raqqa, Syria. As such Daesh-Khorasan 
appeared to be largely autonomous from domestic  
developments related to jihadism and militancy in 
the Afghanistan–Pakistan region. 
The emergence of Daesh in Iraq and Syria and 
Daesh-Khorasan in Afghanistan and the rampant  
violence it unfolded with highly symbolic terrorist 
acts and gruesome public executions have led analysts 
to rely mainly on the terrorism lens for their explan-
atory frameworks. Under this lens, several strands 
can be distinguished. One approach in political science 
and international relations focuses on organizational 
models (Mendelsohn, 2016; Giustozzi, 2016a,b) or 
state(hood) (Napoleoni, 2014) to explain how jihadist 
organizations (including so-called Islamic State, 
al-Qaeda) evolve and expand within a broader global 
jihadist movement (Byman, 2015). Another strand 
embeds terrorist groups and new traits of violent  
action within a larger historical approach, articulated 
as a theory of ‘waves’ with generations of extremist 
groups rooted in political movements (Rapoport, 2001; 
Neumann 2016). Another approach emphasizes a 
grievance rationale in its search for underlying moti-
vations for the emergence of armed militant groups 
and their use of violence including terrorist acts 
(Demmers, 2012, based on Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). 
This approach does not emphasize organizational 
structures and terrorist groups’ expansion but focuses 
on repression, deprivation and marginalization as 
factors contributing to radicalization, understood as a 
precursor to forms of militancy which may include 
features of terrorism. 
In this Working Paper,5 we argue that these  
approaches to the interpretation of Daesh have analyt-
ical limitations. The authors have coordinated a ten-
month empirical research project on the 
5 \  We would like to thank all those colleagues who have contributed to 
the data collection and analysis and who, given the sensitivity of the 
topic, have to remain anonymous due to security considerations. It 
goes without saying that data collection depended on the trust and 
willingness of the respondents to share their insights into the various 
topics of our research. The analysis owes most to them. Special thanks 
also goes to Christoph Blumert, who assisted with the compilation of 
the initial report and the colleagues at BICC who provided valuable 
feedback on a first draft, in particular Elke Grawert, Marc von Boemcken 
and Conrad Schetter.
When Daesh3 appeared in Afghanistan in 2014, 
their emergence seemed to be a logical consequence 
of the proclaimed vision of Daesh in Iraq and Syria, 
with its plans to expand into all the lands conquered 
by Muslim armies in the 7th and 8th century of the 
C.E. The label ‘Islamic State Khorasan’ makes this  
explicit as it refers to the lands between the Caspian 
Sea and India with Bukhara, Balkh, Samarkand,  
Nishapur and Merv as its major cities (Miquel &  
Laurens, 2004). During Daesh’s quick territorial expan- 
sion and institutionalization in the Middle East, rap-
idly reaching a size greater than Great Britain by 2013, 
so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria was widely 
perceived as a highly potent political formation. Its 
initial success, obvious organizational capacity and 
professional propaganda created an image of efficient 
rule, indicating the existence of top-down command 
and response structures. Moreover, the ambition to 
establish a global caliphate made it only seem rational 
that Daesh in Iraq and Syria was seeking a strategic 
expansion towards other world regions, among them 
to the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, where its Khorasan 
Province was established in January 2015. 
The seemingly unstoppable initial expansion of 
Daesh—according to a UN report of September 2015, 
widely cited by news agencies (AFP, 2015), Daesh ‘flags’ 
had been raised in 25 out of 34 Afghan provinces be-
tween summer and autumn 2015—was paralleled 
with acts of unprecedented violence. Observers 
quickly came to speak of ‘IS-Khorasan’ (here further 
‘Daesh-Khorasan’) as of ‘a new kid in town’—another 
jihadi4 organization besides the existing ones that 
would undermine peace and proliferate further harm 
through armed militancy and terrorist acts. Impor-
tantly, this interpretation suggested that Daesh in  
3 \  Note that ‘Daesh in Afghanistan’ is used throughout this Paper to  
signify (so-called) Islamic State Khorasan (by historical-geographical 
definition comprising at least Afghanistan and Pakistan). The semantic 
limitation to the territory of and actors in Afghanistan was chosen 
because the Pakistan dimension of Islamic State Khorasan was not 
subject to the research underlying the argument of this study and is 
thus not equitably addressed. The preference to Daesh is due to the 
popular usage of the name Daesh for Islamic State (vernacular also: 
Dawlat ul-Islam, Khilafat ul-Islam) in Afghanistan itself. ‘Daesh in 
Iraq and Syria’ is used when speaking about so-called Islamic State in 
Syria and Iraq.
4 \  The use of the word jihadism, or jihadi/st, is controversial since jihad 
has a variety of violent and non-violent meanings. In this Paper, jihadi/st 
is used in relation to violence and armed struggle.
Introduction
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phenomenon of Daesh in Afghanistan, which was 
conducted between March and December 2016 (see 
2.1). Based on the findings of this study, we argue that 
to make sense of Daesh in Afghanistan, a social move- 
ment research perspective is useful and allows us to 
generate valuable analytical insights. This perspec-
tive understands Daesh as a transnational movement 
which partakes in contentious politics constructed 
around processes of claim-making (Tarrow & Tilly, 
2007) oriented towards the realization of a contempo-
rary utopian political order, the caliphate, rooted in 
the model of the early days of Islam. Social movement 
theory broadly speaking provides useful concepts 
which can be used to analyse Daesh and other terror-
ist groups and which allow us to go beyond the limi-
tations of the terrorist lens. However, our approach 
also implies a number of modifications to social 
movement theory which operates with a classic sepa-
ration between state and non-state actors and where 
actors intend to change government policy (Tarrow & 
Tilly, 2007). Daesh is not interested in changing gov-
ernment policy but to replace the existing framework 
of rights and social contract with the political model of 
the caliphate rooted in the model of the early days of 
Islam.
To make this point, the next section of this intro-
duction will now summarize the above-mentioned 
analytical approaches to the study of Daesh (state of 
the art). We shall discuss them critically and identify 
analytical shortcomings and heuristic limitations, 
not least in light of our new data. By contrast, the 
sub-section on methodology highlights the methodo-
logical approach of the empirical study on Daesh that 
we coordinated. It demonstrates the critical impor-
tance of the empirical base for employing analytical 
tools from social movement analysis and thus making 
sense of Daesh. The second chapter introduces how, 
from the standpoint of theory, political violence and 
militancy can be analysed from a (new) social move-
ment perspective. In the third chapter, we apply the 
four dimensions of social movement analysis— 
opportunity structures, coalition building, resource 
mobilization and framing—to the empirical findings 
of the study and discuss the added value of this  
approach, i.e. what the social movement approach 
tells us about Daesh’s lifecycle in Afghanistan. In the 
Conclusion, we reflect on the different approaches to 
making sense of Daesh and armed militancy in a 
wider sense, suggesting that they are characterized 
by genuine complementarity rather than 
contradiction.
State of the art: Analytical approaches 
to interpreting Daesh in Afghanistan
This section briefly introduces the work of eleven 
authors with their attempts to analyse the emergence 
and expansion of terrorist organizations. While some 
address Daesh in Afghanistan explicitly, others have 
a broader purview, for example by focusing on al-Qaeda 
or the emergence of Daesh in Iraq and Syria, although 
their findings are also applicable to Daesh in Afghan-
istan. These lenses can be grouped into three broad 
approaches with emphasis on (1) organizational 
models of terrorism, (2) describing the IS-specific 
form of armed militancy as a particular development 
of older forms of terrorism that are based on a different 
ideological quality and subsequent violent radicaliza-
tion (wave-model), and (3) grievances fuelled by repres- 
sion and marginalization that underlie the emer-
gence of militant ideology, subsequent radicalization, 
and rebel governance. The brief review that follows is 
guided by the question of how the different approaches 
can help to explain or make sense of the establishment 
of Daesh in Afghanistan. Thereafter we will present 
our own approach to Daesh rooted in the framework 
provided by studies on social movements and conten-
tious politics (Tarrow & Tilly, 2007). 
Organizational models of terrorism
Several authors approached the question of ter-
rorism and violent extremist groups by scrutinizing 
the relation of Daesh in Iraq and Syria to Daesh in  
Afghanistan and Pakistan. They debate on whether 
this relation is best understood through the ‘franchise 
model’, as an insurgency along the lines of a patronage 
model, or in terms of aspiration to statehood. The 
Franchise Model as an explanatory framework for 
this jihadist group became popular with Peter Bergen’s 
description of al-Qaeda (2001). Although Bergen’s  
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account is largely descriptive rather than analytical, 
the central idea of his framework is that al-Qaeda can 
be understood as an international organization or 
company that operates on the model of a franchising 
business. A central feature of this model is that the 
franchisee (in this case Daesh in Afghanistan and  
Pakistan) operates largely independently of the fran-
chisor (Daesh in Syria and Iraq). 
Arguing against this approach, Kilcullen (2005) un-
derstands jihadist groups as part of a global insurgency 
best explained through a model of traditional patron–
client relationships. According to Kilcullen, the jihadist 
group is more akin to a tribe, an extended family, a 
criminal syndicate, or a mafia clan, where a “web of 
traditional authority structures, family allegiances 
and tribal honour” (2005, p. 14) is central. As Kilcullen 
states,
Many analysts have tended to see the marriage rela-
tionships, money flows, alumni relationships and 
sponsorship links in the jihad as weakly subordinate 
to a military core of terrorist activity. Rather, this 
analysis would argue, the military activity is actually 
subordinate, being merely one of the shared activities 
that the network engages in, while the core is the  
patronage network (Kilcullen, 2005, p. 14). 
In a localized variation of this reading, Giustozzi 
and Mangal’s account of Daesh in Afghanistan and  
Pakistan adopts a view similar to Kilcullen’s patronage 
model as it operates with an implicit model of the  
Pashtun tribal structures (Giustozzi & Mangal, 2016a, b). 
They interpret Daesh in Afghanistan in terms of the 
segmentary system of Pashtun tribes that constitute 
rivalling sub-groups and engage in a politics of bal-
ancing one tribe off against another. By focusing on 
the impact of targeted killings, particularly drone 
strikes, on the local Daesh leadership, organizational 
structure and factions (and factional rivalries), the 
authors highlight the importance of internal struggles, 
visible in the leadership challenges and struggles 
over leadership succession resulting from targeted 
strikes. This perspective also suggests that Daesh’s (in 
Afghanistan/Pakistan) local leaders are not religious 
authorities (such as Mullah Omar, the late leader of 
the Taliban of the Islamic Emirate) who can transcend 
tribal or ethnic divides.
Mendelsohn’s analysis on the expansion of different 
terrorist organizations is an attempt at systematising 
what seems to be a collection of heterogeneous  
approaches (2016). He distinguishes four main organ-
izational models: branching out (‘franchising’), unifi-
cation, absorption, and umbrella group. Accordingly, 
he argues that al-Qaeda follows the ‘branching out’ 
model, because the organization created a two-tier 
structure with a central command and lower branches 
responsible for different geographical areas. While 
the centre sets the ideological orientation and broad 
political goals and determines strategy, the affiliates 
enjoy organizational and operational autonomy. In 
the unification model, the relevant organizations 
enter into an equal power sharing agreement with a 
high level of institutionalization. Daesh in Iraq and 
Syria is portrayed as example of the absorption model 
in which an organization expands across borders 
without politically dividing its arenas. “Its association 
with other organizations is based on its complete 
dominance, and the organisations that join it get 
swallowed, losing their corporal structure and identity” 
(Mendelsohn, 2016, p. 8). This is in contrast not only to 
the interpretation by Bergen, above, and Napoleoni 
(2015), below, but also to that of Giustozzi and Mangal, 
who—besides emphasizing the tribal dimension of 
Daesh in Afghanistan—claim that Daesh in Afghani-
stan and Pakistan comprises several quasi-autonomous 
groups, which are de facto more akin to the umbrella 
model, which envisages different fronts connected 
through loose organizational arrangements. Although 
these groups appear to maintain de facto autonomy, 
the members of several groups belonging to Daesh in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, including Tehreek-e-Khi-
lafat-e-Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Islam, and further “three 
Baluchi organizations, another Pakistani group led by 
Mullah Bakhtiar, five Afghan groups and one Central 
Asian group” (Giustozzi & Mangal, 2016a, p. 8), have 
pledged oaths of loyalty to the self-proclaimed caliph 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and have in turn been recognized 
as part of the Islamic State. In this reading, those who 
join shed their prior group identity, at least as a matter 
of public display even if they do retain de facto opera-
tional autonomy.
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Napoleoni (2015) is among those analysts who argue 
that Daesh in Iraq and Syria is best analysed as a  
mutation of older forms of terrorism and, crucially, in 
terms of criteria and qualities of statehood. According 
to her, Daesh in Iraq and Syria is better equipped 
than any other jihadist group in terms of resources 
and has a strategy directed towards the aspiration of 
realizing statehood in the form of a caliphate. This 
analysis is based on the observation that Daesh in 
Iraq and Syria controls territory and taxes millions of 
people, which forms the basis of its autonomy from 
the agendas of foreign patrons, be they states or private 
charities. Furthermore, Daesh cadres are largely com-
posed of former Baathists who worked in Iraq’s police, 
army and secret service, with all their experience of 
administering a state. Napoleoni (2015) argues that 
Daesh’s desire to resurrect the caliphate is not a new 
idea but was already proposed by Hizb ut-Tahrir in 
the 1950s.
Wave model
The approaches grouped under the wave model 
see terrorism primarily as a generational problem 
embedded in political movements and employ an  
issue-based, rather linear evolutionary interpretation. 
Rapoport (2001) distinguishes four waves of terrorism, 
starting from the anarchist wave (1880–1914), which 
was followed by a nationalist wave from 1920 onwards, 
then the New Left terrorist activities from the 1960s, 
and the religious wave since 1979. Extending this 
model, Neumann (2016) has identified a so-called fifth 
wave of Jihadi–Salafist terrorism, including Daesh, 
the origins of which he locates not in the 1979 Irani-
an revolution and Afghan war of the 1980s, which 
were at the root of the fourth wave of terrorism, but 
in the Arab Spring. For the Afghan context and the 
Islamic State Khorasan, the argument of the Arab 
Spring falls short. However, there is another justifica-
tion for speaking of a fifth wave which has less to do 
with the specific events but different qualities of 
al-Qaeda and Islamic State. Whereas al-Qaeda had a 
more intellectual and an almost legal-rational  
register of justification for its actions (anti-imperialist 
messages, attention not to kill Muslims, political 
choice not to attack Shia), the Islamic State’s modus 
operandi is guided by an approach which combines  
rational bureaucracy with affects (Beifuss & Scheuer-
mann, forthcoming). Complementing these perspec-
tives through the terrorist lens, representatives of the 
wave model also place Daesh within the broader 
global jihadist movement. For example, Gerges (2014) 
takes the case of Daesh to identify a new (third) wave 
of jihadism. Although this contextualization of the 
ideology of Daesh must be acknowledged; the analyt-
ical value of merely identifying successive waves of a 
phenomenon (whether militant/terrorist or quietist/
religious) is still limited. 
Grievances, marginalization and rebel governance
The third set of authors is concerned with looking 
into the reasons for jihadist radicalization and the 
rise of militancy. The spectrum of works fitting this 
category ranges from classic writings such as the 
Huntington (1993) thesis on the clash of civilizations, 
which assign responsibility for the growth and ex-
pansion of Daesh to a complex framework of geopo-
litical alliances between ‘the West and the rest’, 
through to recent literature on jihadist insurgencies 
(Rich, 2016a, b). However, religious ideology does not 
necessarily play a prominent role in generating such 
grievances. For example, Rogers (2016) describes 
Daesh as a “most dramatic expression” of “revolts 
from the margins, driven by widening economic divi-
sions, rising global elites and dangerous environmental 
constraints”. He suggests that inequality in the inter-
national economic system and climate change- 
induced environmental stress have given rise to 
Daesh in Iraq and Syria. With this view on the broad-
er international context, Roger’s interpretation is dis-
tinct from Gerges’ view, who—besides contextualiz-
ing the rise of Daesh as part of a global jihadist 
movement—also points to the significance of the local 
political environment. He locates the social origins of 
Daesh in Syria and Iraq in “an unholy union between 
an Iraq-based al-Qaeda offshoot and the defeated Iraqi 
Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein” (Gerges, 2014,  
p. 339). 
Stressing the religious factor, Woltering (2002)  
argues that Islamism signifies an ‘ideology of protest’ 
against Western imperialism. Kalyvas (2015) also takes 
up the notion of protest and rebellion arguing that 
Daesh in Iraq and Syria can be seen as a revolutionary 
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should nevertheless carefully scrutinize their theo-
retical approaches and methods used. For instance, 
representatives of the recently evolved field of critical 
terrorism studies (Jackson, 2007; Breen Smyth,  
Gunning, Jackson, Kassimeris & Robinson, 2008; 
Heath-Kelly, Jarvis & Baker-Beall, 2014) have introduced 
a critical theory approach to the study of political  
violence and terrorism, posing, for example, the ques-
tion of how we know what we know about terrorism 
and counterterrorism (Heath-Kelly et al., 2014, p. 1).  
By introducing new perspectives on discursive fields, 
narratives of legitimation, and performativity into 
the debate, they have highlighted how a researcher’s 
own positionality can matter in the study of insur-
gencies, terrorism and the rise of jihadi militancy. 
We acknowledge the value and incisiveness of 
the above studies for comparative political science, 
peace and terrorism studies. However, we argue that 
in-depth studies of local developments, here the  
dynamics surrounding the phenomenon of Daesh in 
Afghanistan, are able to contribute another reality 
that can complement our understanding of non-state 
armed groups, their organization, expansion and  
motivation. As we have seen, existing studies overly 
focus on typologies and categorizations of insurgent/
terrorist groups. They present status descriptions and 
ex-post explanations of their emergence and expansion. 
As such, they tend to be rather static, with limited 
explanatory value when it comes to the internal  
dynamics of the groups in question because they  
neglect the interface of Daesh and local communities 
which is important to understand Daesh’s evolution 
in Afghanistan.
Main argument and methodology
In this Working Paper, we employ conceptual 
strands from new and classic social movement studies 
to the analysis of Daesh’s emergence and evolution in 
Afghanistan. With this approach, we second Kalyvas’ 
point (above) that Daesh can alternatively be seen as 
a ‘revolutionary’ armed group but subject it—for heu-
ristic purposes—to classical movement analysis. 
From a social movement research perspective, political 
violence, radicalization, armed militancy and terrorism 
can be interpreted as forms, manifestations and 
armed group because of its ambition to transform  
society in a deep and radical way. According to him, 
combat, organization and governance constitute the 
key dimensions of revolutionary rebels. He links the 
phenomenon of Daesh to the recent emergence of a 
research focus on rebel governance within the aca-
demic field of comparative civil war studies—a back-
ground that makes him at the same time doubt the 
exact role of religion in Daesh’s ideological worldview. 
Placing Daesh in Syria and Iraq in the context of other 
revolutionary groups throughout history, especially 
revolutionary insurgencies during the Cold War, 
Kalyvas cautions against interpretations that point 
to an overly exceptionalist or unique nature of Daesh. 
This review of the main approaches to making 
sense of Daesh’s rise, organizational structure and  
expansion illustrates the various authors’ preoccupa-
tion with an external viewpoint and an outsider’s  
positionality. Their position is distanced in two  
respects: On the one hand, their writings reflect a  
positioning in the paradigm of the War on Terror, 
that is, their arguments are state-centric—not only in 
their institutional and intellectual links to national 
security projects—and feature a problem-solving ori-
entation (Jackson, 2007). On the other hand, they 
write from the position of the academic observer 
whose angle is determined by disciplinary parochi-
alism. This means that as specialists on couterin-
surgency (Kilcullen, Giustozzi & Mangal), terrorism 
and counterterrorism (Mendelsohn), professors of 
Political Science (Kalyvas), Peace Studies (Rogers) and 
Security Studies (Neumann), experts on transnation-
al terrorism (Napoleoni), co-founders of terrorism 
studies (Rapoport), think tank executive cum jour-
nalist and security analyst with academic assign-
ments (Bergen), they are all inclined to a certain bird’s 
eye view on local developments. Their comparative 
perspective tends to shield them from grasping some 
of the grassroots political and social developments in 
the various contexts in which militancy arises, not 
least due to lack of local access and the  
relevant cultural and language competencies that 
area studies specialists or anthropologists would be 
able to employ.         
While the angle of the authors discussed above is 
valid in all (political and academic) respects, we 
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outcomes of contentious politics. This view yields 
several advantages, which are analytically fruitful. 
The added value here is that it allows us to capture the 
complexity of movement (Daesh’s) trajectories by 
analysing framing, opportunity structures and re-
source mobilization structures in their overlapping 
and reciprocal effects. It opens up a process perspec-
tive that can take account of long-term change—pro-
tracted ‘revolutionary’ processes—from which signifi-
cant social, political and cultural changes have derived. 
Besides grasping ‘the bigger picture’ in temporal 
terms as well as the dynamics on a rather micro- or 
local level, new social movement theory’s considera-
tion of the transnational dimension and networks 
has an added value for investigating the link between 
Daesh in Iraq and Syria and in Afghanistan. 
Empirically, our argument builds on the results of 
a field research-based study on the phenomenon of 
Daesh in Afghanistan, conducted jointly by BICC and 
its partner organization in Kabul, The Liaison Office 
(TLO) between March and December 2016. The ten-
month research was financed by Germany’s Federal 
Foreign Office and resulted in a comprehensive report 
on the findings, including policy recommendations 
for the Department for Crisis Prevention, Stabilisa-
tion and Peacebuilding (S03) at the Foreign Office. Its 
methodological approach relied on extensive field  
research across eleven provinces over a period of seven 
months and a grassroots approach with the aim to 
collect interview data in areas under real and alleged 
Daesh rule. For this purpose, we did not choose terri-
torial entities, with a focus on particular districts or 
provinces as our point of departure, but followed up 
reports (news analysis, rumours, etc.) of Daesh pres-
ence or ‘appearance’ (real or symbolic) in any location 
and worked there with locally appointed interviewers. 
This mobile approach of ‘following Daesh’ reflected 
the fluidity of Daesh in Afghanistan at the beginning 
of 2016 and the dynamics of its appearance, enabling 
us to trace and track Daesh activities and the move-
ments of its followers geographically. 
The objective of this research was to investigate 
the reasons for local Daesh’s attractiveness, strategies 
of rule, funding sources, recruitment patterns, rela-
tions with other groups and with Daesh in Syria and 
Iraq as well as the group’s local manifestations which 
range from a consolidated presence with state-like 
institutions to ephemeral appearance. Due to the 
sensitivity of the topic and the risks involved, we  
relied on qualitative methods, mainly semi-structured 
interviews6 with men and women living in or having 
fled areas under real or putative control of Daesh.7  
Besides interview accounts, the sources for the study 
comprised other primary data, such as recorded radio 
broadcasts by Daesh FM radio aired over different 
time periods throughout 2016 in Nangarhar, audio 
and video material popular with Daesh followers and 
distributed in part through Daesh in Iraq and Syria’s 
media outlets, and several original documents (certif-
icates, cards, etc.) issued by Daesh in Afghanistan. 
Moreover, secondary data sources included a literature 
review, e.g. of reports on Daesh published during the 
research period and an analysis of local media report-
ing related to Daesh (in Pashto and Dari)8, including 
social media sources. 
6 \  The type of flexible approach chosen for this research implied that 
question guidelines and follow-up always had to be tailored, as much 
as possible, to the local context in the different regions and districts. 
Data collection in each research site began with a general/scoping 
questionnaire tailored to the particular research context. After the 
initial fact-gathering period of about two weeks, a separate question 
guideline was elaborated for each data collector and research stage. 
Respondents were chosen based on their proximity and knowledge of 
Daesh-related activities in the respective local context. Overall, twelve 
detailed question guidelines were developed for data collectors in the 
field, including two that separately targeted women and religious 
scholars. Each detailed questionnaire was followed by two or even 
three rounds of follow-up questions. As a result, some of the inter-
views totalled around 80 follow-up questions. Also, expert interviews 
with informed individuals (journalists, analysts, and members of  
security, intelligence and jihadi organizations) were conducted by the 
research coordinator in Kabul and via skype from Bonn.
7 \  Wherever possible, the team aspired to data triangulation, cross-
checking multiple sources. Semi-structured interviews with residents 
in Daesh-activity areas, for instance, were cross-checked with other 
interview data, such as from interviews eventually conducted with 
Daesh-members/sympathizers, with external informed observers (‘ex-
perts’ and focal points) in the area/province of Daesh presence, and 
also with security analysts in Kabul. Furthermore, the local surveyors 
were asked to report observations, which were discussed during the 
debriefing in Kabul. Most importantly, the gradual increase in study 
sites/cases for the project provided opportunities for comparison and 
generated additional questions and incentives to cross-check contents 
across regions.
8 \  The media analysis included taand.com, Pajhwok, Khaama, Tolo, 
Nun-website (Pashto, “Today”), Benawa (Pashto) from Kandahar, Tol 
Afghan, SITE, Long War Journal, Jane’s Intelligence Network, Reuters, 
CNN, AP, BBC different language services, twitter, facebook and YouTube.
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new social movements. Nor have they, on another 
note, engaged in researching Islamist movements, for 
example, as one type of identity-based movement. 
We argue that the question of identity, a process 
of self-and other identification (Brubaker, 2012), is 
crucial to understand Daesh in Afghanistan and  
Pakistan and other extremist violent groups and ter-
rorism. Analyses of Daesh should not solely focus on 
questions of organizational structure but the claims, 
values and ideas which inform the aspiration to realize 
a utopian political order rooted in the caliphate of 
the early days of Islam. As Atran (2010, p.5) put it,  
“terrorists aren’t nihilists, starkly or ambiguously, but 
often deeply moral souls with a horribly misplaced 
sense of justice.” 
Overall, what can be observed in social movement 
scholarship is a striking neglect of movement  
phenomena outside the realm of democratic and 
transitional statehood, combined with a certain  
ethnocentricity, not least because the development of 
theory on social movement formation and structure 
has taken place exclusively in the Global North. In 
addition, violence is met and treated as an exceptional 
phenomenon and has thus remained under-concep-
tualized. So what is to be made of radical Islamists 
like al-Qaeda, the Taliban and Daesh in Syria and Iraq, 
which all exhibit an extraordinary amount and quality 
of violence and employ terrorism as part of their  
epertoire of contention? This brief summary of the 
telos and objective of movement studies as they have 
developed up to this day—along with parochialism 
described above—exposes a reluctance to view such 
jihadist groups as social movements in the narrow 
academic sense. Nevertheless, the Taliban have been 
described in social movement terms. In one account, 
they are interpreted as consisting of four separate 
movements sharing a transformative political agenda 
(Abou Zahab & Evans, 2009). Similarly, Goldstone 
(2016) characterizes Daesh in Iraq and Syria as a revo-
lutionary state-building movement. He argues that 
because of its statehood aspirations, administrative 
performance and global ideology it cannot just be 
called a terrorist organization.  
Social movement studies combine several theo-
retical strands that were developed to explain the 
emergence, organizational capacity and structure of 
social movements. Thereby the concept of social 
movement is not narrowly defined but evolved with 
the real-world phenomena it has sought to explain 
over the last decades. One common denominator of 
the concept is the network structure of durably mobi-
lized non-state groups sharing a joint identity around 
a common issue and seeking some type of funda-
mental social change with claims voiced publically. 
They characteristically stage public protests to make 
their particular message/s heard. Taking into account 
the evolution of so-called ‘new social movements’, 
Martin (2015, p. 5) distinguishes two types of phenome-
na studied by social movement analysts: conventional 
movements, whose activities aim at the integration 
of previously excluded issues and groups into the 
‘normal’ political process, thus being (state) polity- 
centric; and movements that strive to be autonomous 
of the political system and are more concerned with 
identity politics and post-materialistic values. 
A majority of movement scholars are concerned 
with protest movements that belong to the first 
camp and view them as manifestation of politics 
from below. This involves classical civil society  
engagement aimed at political participation to bring 
about some sort of positive change and improvement 
in democratic political systems or fuel a transforma-
tion from authoritarian to democratic political order. 
In such a framework, armed violence and actions 
that can be qualified as terrorist as instrument in a 
repertoire of contention is hardly of significance,  
because the cost of mobilising and organizing violence 
are too high compared with alternative forms of pro-
test (Zimmermann, 1998, p. 59). Terrorism, although 
in the abstract acknowledged as tactic of social move-
ments, has not been prominent among these strands 
of social movement scholarship. Studies on state terror 
(Petras, 1989) and escalating political violence evolving 
from movement protests against the state (Morris, 
1993; Kerbo & Schaffner, 1986) are an exception. The 
followers of the second camp also miss out on violence 
as an effect of mobilization or a form of protest in 
Political violence and militancy from a (new) 
social movement research perspective 
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many real-world contexts show, grievances alone are 
insufficient rationale to account for political violence 
and radicalization. Other necessary conditions have to 
apply for protest and violent action to occur. It is  
opportunity structures, resources and frames that 
provide the organizational impetus.   
Political opportunities
The key idea of political opportunity theorizing is 
that movements—or in our case different types of 
mobilization, i.e. for violent action, recruiting, com-
mitment and resource aggregation—are shaped by a 
wider political environment or socio-political and 
cultural context. Accordingly, the openness or closed-
ness of a formal political system (Martin, 2015, p. 41) 
or even global geopolitical constellations will influ-
ence the choice of contention instrument (strategy) 
by a group or social movement. Moreover, the success 
of, for example, an ensuing mobilization for protest, 
violence or other actions will additionally depend on 
the group’s organizational capacity. For recognizing 
opportunities, effective communication plays a cru-
cial role, thus, successful mobilization also depends 
on framing. As pull-factor behind social mobilization 
in movements, political opportunity structures are 
never static and vary over time. This allows dynamic 
patterns of emergence and (re-)definition of move-
ments or other (revolutionary) collective action 
groups because new donors (resource mobilization) 
might appear after a change in political context, or 
different frames might become available. Thus, political 
opportunities affect the movement’s organizational 
structure because a group might perceive opportune 
conditions and decide to strengthen its efforts to  
mobilize material resources and upscale recruitment 
in line with a planned strategy for interest articulation, 
whether in the form of protest, terrorist acts or similar. 
In this regard, it is pertinent to note that even the 
perception of an opportunity may motivate collective 
action. Beck (2009) has pointed out that transnational 
terrorism and radical militancy are affected by specific 
changes in opportunity structures, such as the inno-
vation of modular collective action and movement 
diffusion.    
By recognizing how civil war, terrorism, revolu-
tions and social movements interlink and cannot be 
treated as disparate phenomena, political violence 
and militancy now appear as an essential repertoire 
of contention—albeit not studied as such in traditional 
social movement scholarship but as an outgrowth of 
contentious politics elsewhere (see State of the art, 
Section 1). On the other hand, there are increasing 
calls for cross-pollination and more interdisciplinary 
exchange of conceptual frameworks of social move-
ment, civil war and terrorism studies. 
For the purpose of our analysis, we borrow from 
four theoretical strands of movement theory—coalition- 
building, political opportunity structures, resource 
mobilization and framing—to interpret our empirically 
derived insights into the emergence, structure, ideo-
logical underpinning and (non-)expansion of Daesh 
in Afghanistan. Although the four theory strands 
constitute disparate fields in movement studies, they 
are closely interrelated and represent complementary 
mechanisms that explain9 collective action dynamics. 
We shall now elaborate the main traits of each field 
and point out their overlapping and reciprocal effects 
(at the theory level, before being applied to the empir-
ical data in Section 3).
Coalition-building 
Based on the assumption that collective action is 
formed around common interests, social movements 
can be understood as actor coalitions, often featuring 
only a modest level of organization and organizational 
capacity and held together by an abstract collective 
identity (Kern, 2008, p. 121). In particular, new social 
movement theories emphasize networks of collective 
actors as actor coalitions. The common interest is  
derived from some sense of deprivation and thus has 
its roots in certain grievances. These can be real, con-
structed and/or manipulated. However, as endured re-
pression, social inequality and marginalization in 
9 \  In their complementarity, the four strands can be seen as interdependent 
mechanisms with no single one being found to have a direct causal 
relationship, meaning for example that neither framing nor resource 
mobilization would explain the emergence or a particular dynamic of 
the group or network in question. Instead, the mechanisms connect 
certain causal factors with outcomes in an indirect way. (See Mayntz, 
2003, also Sayer, 2010, pp. 113–17)..
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Resource mobilization theorists debate the extent 
to which one type of resource can be substituted by 
another (e.g. ideological commitment by paid, ideo-
logically unattached recruits, for instance mercenaries) 
or whether they yield mutually amplifying effects 
(Zimmermann, 1998, p. 55). This point is indirectly  
related to the question of hierarchies and political 
entrepreneurs (see above). Evidence from terrorist 
and insurgent groups as well as modern social move-
ment organizations shows that they tend to have a 
professionalized core that masterminds the strategy 
and attacks, generates external resources, and provides 
overall leadership to a broader base of followers. The 
lattter’s motives for joining the group might signifi-
cantly differ from the core group members’ interests. 
In this regard, movement scholars have investigated 
the processes of stimulating and influencing emotions 
(e.g. anger triggered by deprivation and perceptions 
of inequality) for mobilization purposes. This means 
that success in stirring up emotions can change the 
preference sets of potential joiners and increases 
their readiness to protest or contributes to their 
radicalization.       
Framing
Framing is crucial for resource mobilization,  
recruitment and the recognition of political opportu-
nities by movement leaders. Framing can be described 
as a process and pattern of interpretation through 
which actors categorize and organize situations, 
events or experiences (Goffmann, 1974). Actors frame 
situations through a process of self-and other identi-
fication including collective self-identifications 
(“we”) which serves to identify others and oneself 
and to speak about and for others (Brubaker, 2012, p. 2). 
Similarly, cultural interpretation models are produced 
and reproduced through effective framing. These 
models  prove most effective in mobilizing if they  
optimally resonate with the existing cultural disposi-
tions of potential followers. It is by producing and  
reproducing compatible meaning that collective ac-
tor groups and social movements actively construct 
realities (Berger and Luckmann 2001). Among 
Resource mobilization
Resources of different types are deemed crucial 
for the emergence, structure and dynamics of social 
movements and insurgencies. Whether material or 
social in nature, internally or externally generated, 
they can empower (movement) groups and enable 
mobilization and collective action (Zimmermann, 1998, 
p. 55). The spectrum of resources comprises money/
finances, human resources (followers, experts, train-
ers, communication specialists, fighters, etc.), labour, 
specialized knowledge, information, communications 
infrastructure, legitimacy and moral resources, in-
cluding collective memories and myths. The latter are 
articulated and most efficiently employed through 
successful framing. The mobilization of resources is 
dependent on both, framing and political opportunity 
structures. On the flipside, it is decisive in determining 
the trajectory (structure and lifecycle) of a social 
movement. Recruitment and the commitment of  
followers to the cause of a movement will depend on 
the availability of resources (incentives), be they an  
appealing ideology, a salary or other benefits. In this 
logic, the diminishing of resources would cause groups 
to compete harder over the remaining resources avail-
able and potentially result in radicalization (mani-
fested in political violence and increasing militancy) if 
that is what qualifies them in the eyes of donors.
As resource mobilization depends on organiza-
tional capacity and opportunity, many authors stress 
the role of political entrepreneurs who are able to 
generate material resources for redistribution and, in 
this way, recruit large numbers of followers. Moral  
authorities, for example religious scholars, recruit 
through indoctrination that can be either based on 
an appealing political vision (caliphate) or just on  
respect or even fear (passive support). Especially the 
appeal of collective identity frames—like the Muslim 
community of believers (umma)—helps to recruit and 
to establish commitment. Likewise, social networks 
based on some collective identity trait, for example 
tribal belonging, kinship, shared education or army 
service, will play an important role in recruiting and, 
more generally, in building mobilization/participation/ 
commitment. 
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different networks one master frame might exist that 
represents a common ideological denominator.
Movement actors articulate their goals to the 
public through media. Thus, communication and 
agenda setting are key dimensions of framing. Insur-
gent groups, terrorist organizations or other movement 
actors spend much time and effort in explaining 
their actions. Increasingly, social media is taking on a 
key role in dissemination across affiliated networks. 
Framing not only comprises verbal action but also 
symbolic action as the impact of high profile attacks 
and performative violence (Juergensmeyer, 2003), or 
success in the form of, say, territorial expansion by 
Daesh in Iraq and Syria, have shown. The public display 
of violence and the use of religious ideological frames 
serves to self-empower the respective group, for  
example by mobilizing recruits.
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governor’11, “just three months after reports that senior 
elements of the Taliban in both Afghanistan and  
Pakistan had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State 
and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi” (Panda, 2015). By February 
2015, groups apparently affiliated to Daesh manifested 
themselves in several other areas of the country, such 
as Kajaki (Helmand), Farah/Herat, Khak-e Afghan  
(Zabul) and Logar (Osman, 2016c), with Kunduz, 
Takhar, Kunar, Nuristan, Faryab, Jawzjan, Ghor, and 
Sar-e Pul soon to follow. 
East: Nangarhar–Kunar–Nuristan. Presence and 
statehood ambition of Daesh
Daesh’s move from Pakistan’s Tirah Valley into 
Nangarhar seems to have anticipated Pakistani mili-
tary operations in Khyber Agency in March 2015 (Ali, 
2015) after the area had become a gravitational centre 
for militants fleeing the prior operations in North 
Waziristan. Pakistani military operations in Khyber 
Agency then pushed militants across the border  
into Afghanistan (Osman, 2016c). First, Daesh was 
able to gain and then hold territory in Nangarhar’s 
south-eastern districts located on the northern slope 
of the Spin Ghar Mountain Range bordering Pakistan 
(Osman, 2016a). From December 2014 to December 
2016, Daesh held territory in a highly dynamic context 
with military victories against and defeats suffered 
primarily by the Taliban linked to the Islamic Emirate 
of Afghanistan in combination with an effective 
campaign of Afghan air force and US drone strikes. By 
the end of November 2016, the territory controlled by 
Daesh had expanded and then shrunk from a maxi-
mum of eight to four districts in Nangarhar, and the 
 
11 \  By default, Daesh Khorasan was established as the province of a  
caliphate without (national) borders, i.e. a unified Islamic state based 
on sharia law in accordance with the prophetic model of Salaf al-Salih. 
This proposition already entails more than one contradiction: A pro-
vince is an administrative–territorial entity whereas the caliphate, 
which it is part of, is imagined to be borderless—in no need of territo-
rial (and social) boundaries. At the same time, it is supposed to be an 
Islamic state of Salafi adherents, but until its final establishment 
when all non-adherents have either converted or been killed, it will 
necessarily have to engage in territorial boundary drawing. These  
interventions aside, the motivation of Daesh in Iraq and Syria to  
accept the Orakzai TTP commanders’ pledge of allegiance to Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi in January 2015 was a logical consequence in their long-
term ambition to consolidate Daesh and gain a foothold outside its 
core area of Syria and Iraq.  
In what follows, we interpret the findings of our 
2016 research study on Daesh in Afghanistan through 
the conceptual lens of actor coalitions, opportunity 
structures, resource mobilization and framing. 
Many Daeshs in Afghanistan:  
The significance of political opportunity 
for emergence and expansion 
As outlined in the methodology section, our  
research investigated the phenomenon of Daesh in 
Afghanistan by ‘following Daesh’, that is, we traced 
the appearance of Daesh wherever evidence of its 
presence or emergence appeared from first-hand  
accounts, media reports and rumours. This resulted 
in research activity in eleven provinces of Afghanistan, 
which can be described as four regional clusters: The 
east (Nangarhar, Kunar and Nuristan provinces, 
which all share a border with Pakistan), the north-
east (Kunduz, Takhar and Badakhshan provinces), the 
west (Herat and Farah provinces) and the north 
(Jawzjan, Faryab, Sar-e Pul provinces10). The main 
finding, that Daesh in Afghanistan is a highly localized 
phenomenon manifesting differently in different  
areas, shall be elaborated here as a first step to illustrate 
the different trajectories of Daesh’s putative appear-
ance and disappearance, short-term expansion and 
consolidating presence in the four focus regions. As 
will be shown, political opportunity structures largely 
created the scope for Daesh to go beyond an ephemeral 
appearance and consolidate its presence by setting 
up local structures of authority with pretensions to 
statehood.
Daesh appeared in Afghanistan in the summer of 
2014 as a force led by Hafiz Saeed, a member of the  
Pashtun Orakzai tribe and former leader (amir) of the 
Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP) in the Orakzai 
Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of 
Pakistan. By December 2014, Daesh had pushed the 
Taliban of the Islamic Emirate out of some areas of 
southern Nangarhar Province. In early 2015, Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi recognized Hafiz Saeed as the ‘Khorasan 
10 \  On the situation in two other northern provinces, Balkh and Ghor, we 
carried out a few additional interviews but did not follow-up with  
actual field research.
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In areas controlled by Daesh, a system of judges 
and courts has been installed and seems to operate 
on the level of villages or clusters of villages. The 
judges were described as having an Islamic education, 
with most of them having graduated from the Ganj 
Madrassa in Peshawar. Conflict resolution has so far 
mainly entailed punishing offenders, listening to 
complaints about Daesh fighters or solving family 
and money-related disputes. The thornier issues of 
land conflicts have not been tackled systematically, 
likely due to a highly dynamic conflict situation that 
includes population displacements and redistribu-
tion of lands from the government to Daesh 
supporters. 
In areas under their durable control, Daesh levies 
taxes on all valuables taxable under Islamic law (live-
stock, agricultural produce, gold, silver, jewellery),  
including some war tax on wood stripped from the 
houses of people who have left the area because they 
had links to the Afghan government. The cultivation 
of hashish and poppy is prohibited. Daesh also seeks 
to regulate the social sphere, including religious wor-
ship and prayer practices, drinking, smoking, gam-
bling and communication by mobile phone. Many 
shrines have been destroyed. It prescribes the wearing 
of hijabs, prohibits women from working in the fields, 
and bans certain local practices related to dowries. 
Public schools have been shut down, and the local 
people are ordered to send their children to madrassas 
for ‘true’ Islamic education. Daesh has introduced its 
own Islamic curriculum and installed loyal mullahs 
in areas under their control; these may be locals or 
outsiders, but they have to be Salafis. 
Allegations of misconduct by Daesh members 
have been frequent. For example, wealthy people are 
accused of being spies as a pretext for confiscating 
their assets and valuables. In particular, after drone 
strikes, Daesh proceeds to undertake harsh interroga-
tions of locals to identify potential spies, resorting to 
corporal punishment to extract information. The sys-
tem of institutions described above seems to be very 
organized, but the information provided by local 
respondents suggests that in practice the ways in 
which Daesh works are more ad hoc than centrally 
population under Daesh control had fluctuated con-
currently (leaving aside the fact that many residents 
have fled the area). Daesh first established a presence 
in the Mamand area of Achin district and, by early 
September 2015, had expanded into other parts of 
Achin, Nazian, Deh Bala (Haska Mina), Shinwari 
(Ghanikhel), Kot and Chaparhar (Johnson, 2016). In 
the autumn of 2016, this territory had shrunk to 
Achin, Deh Bala, Nazian and parts of Kot.12 As of June 
2017, Daesh has lost much territory in Achin and Kot 
but pushed further west and, in a large-scale assault, 
captured the famous Tora Bora mountain fortress 
constructed by Osama bin Laden.13 
In parts of southern Nangarhar, Daesh has set up 
a basic but well-organized administration and bureau- 
cracy with commissions, courts, prisons and various 
departments including education, justice, security 
and taxation. Local respondents also referred to a 
Council (shura) akin to the Amr Bil Maruf (Department 
for the prevention of vice and promotion of virtue) 
and the so-called ‘Oghaz Shura’. The Oghaz Shura is 
reportedly responsible for deciding death sentences 
and other penalties and is composed of, among others, 
local and non-local Salafi religious scholars. Daesh’s 
governance structure is not run by functionaries 
comparable to Iraq’s Baathists who form a backbone 
of ISIS and who dominated the police, army and secret 
service under Saddam Hussein and have extensive 
experience in the ways of administering a state. 
Nonetheless, where Daesh has installed itself durably, 
it does exhibit a rational, bureaucratic administration 
of its extremely violent reign of terror, currently con-
centrating on local capacity building and training 
and aided by its FM radio Voice of the Caliphate. 
 
12 \  When Daesh initially emerged in Nangarhar in late 2014 and 2015, the 
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) did not engage in direct figh-
ting. However, since February 2016, the Afghan government and the US 
military have significantly stepped up their war efforts and have be-
gun to attack Daesh with drone strikes and ground operations (O’Don-
nel, 2016). As a result, Daesh supporters have concentrated their forces 
in four southern Nangarhar districts but also shifted to new areas, 
particularly in Kunar province and attempted to infiltrate the Nangar-
har provincial capital Jalalabad. Respondents indicated that after the 
Nangarhar operations, targeted killings in and around Jalalabad city 
were on the rise.
13 \  See The Guardian, 14 June 2017.
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In a few cases, women of government-related families 
were apparently captured to enforce the release of 
Daesh fighters in government custody.
However, Daesh have also abducted women from 
influential local families to pressure those families 
into not fighting Daesh and leaving the area in ques-
tion to them. Women in the custody of Daesh were 
sometimes temporarily married (with nikah) by force 
to one or several fighters, in most cases raped, beaten, 
malnourished and otherwise abused, if not killed. In 
several cases, Daesh fighters killed their husbands in 
front of them before taking them to a Daesh compound. 
Another often-reported practice is the raising of 
white flags by Daesh members on houses inhabited 
by girls/ women of marriageable age or widows. In 
some cases, a Daesh follower would then formally ask 
to be married to the woman/girl; if this offer is rejected, 
he or somebody else might simply abduct her, and 
she would become a sex-slave for several fighters  
before giving birth in custody or dying due to mal-
treatment. In one case, where a woman refused to 
marry a Daesh commander, he returned and threw 
acid on her face before killing her.     
The public beheadings of tribal elders and the 
disregard for the lives of civilians, including women, 
has led to the erosion of support among many locals 
who, regardless whether they were Salafis or not, wel-
comed Daesh initially. Many of them had sought  
material gain or the opportunity to take revenge on 
Islamic Emirate loyalists who had harassed them. 
Initially, the main bulk of Daesh in southern 
Nangarhar consisted of Pashtuns from the FATA 
tribes (Orakzai, Afridi, Mehsud, see also Johnson, 
2016) of Pakistan. During the time of Hafiz Saeed’s 
leadership, the Orakzai greatly influenced Daesh 
structures, but since then many of them have been 
killed on the battlefield or in drone strikes. Shortly  
after Hafiz Saeed was killed on 26 July 2016, most of 
the Orakzai families living in Laghergy and Standar 
villages of Kot and the Mamand area (manteqa) of 
Achin started to leave those areas and moved back 
across the border into the Tirah Valley. Drone strikes 
were at a peak, and they feared to be the primary  
targets of these attacks. 
controlled. Commanders are reported to judge and 
execute sentences on the spot without always going 
through the court system, an observation which is 
likely linked to the fluid and dynamic situation of war. 
Initially, Daesh introduced itself to communities 
with the message that they would root out and deal 
with the Taliban of the Islamic Emirate, which they 
considered spies of Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence 
(ISI). Part of the local population was susceptible to 
this message, and the first beheadings of people 
were deemed to be punishment of Taliban loyalists. 
Increasingly, however, Daesh seems to have moved 
towards beheading soldiers of the ANA who had come 
to visit their families during their leave. Thus, fear 
spread and the narrative on Daesh conduct turned 
from ‘punishment of Taliban loyalists’ to ‘killing  
innocent people’. This has since turned into opposition, 
visible for example in the tribal Uprising Forces in 
Kot district of Nangarhar.
The interviews with women who had fled areas 
controlled by Daesh revealed that Daesh fighters  
attempted to kidnap female family members (wives, 
daughters, sisters) of pro-government elders or men 
active in the Uprising Forces or other people with  
relatives in the government and/or ANSF in a move to 
force the government to release arrested family 
members of Daesh followers. For example, Daesh 
fighters kidnapped thirteen females of local Uprising 
Forces’ members in Sepai village of Kot district in  
autumn 2015 and negotiated with the government on 
the release of their wives from government custody. 
Under pressure from the local Uprising men, the  
Afghan government reportedly accepted the deal, and 
after a week, females of both sides were exchanged. 14 
The interview accounts suggest that the government 
forces strategically arrested wives of Daesh followers 
to stop them from taking action against the govern-
ment and that the Daesh kidnapping and abuse of  
females was a reaction to this government ‘policy’. 
Moreover, Daesh have also kidnapped wives of non- 
involved men to generate additional pressure on the 
government to release the Daesh-related womenfolk. 
14 \  According to the women interviewed for this research, women released 
from Daesh custody often either commit suicide upon their return to 
their own families, or they are killed by their families for shame (in 
local perception/tradition to re-establish the family’s honour).
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Daesh support in Nuristan was built around Taliban 
commanders who had broken off from the Islamic 
Emirate. Most of these commanders were Salafis, but 
some ‘converted’ when switching. Nuristan also has a 
longer tradition of Salafism than the other areas of 
Afghanistan, going back at least to the 1960s. More  
recently, in the years before Daesh publically declared 
its rule in Nuristan, local supporters had been prepar-
ing the ground for its reception on arrival. Respondents 
described how several young people who had returned 
from Islamic studies in madrassas in Peshawar and 
Swat would advocate Daesh. Others were happy with 
the progress of Daesh in Iraq and Syria, who they 
considered initially to be a purely Islamic and ‘honest’ 
group. Local advocates of Daesh would argue against 
the Afghan government, police and military, calling 
them apostates (murtad) and slaves of the Americans 
and declaring that working with them was forbidden 
by Allah (haram). Besides financial and religious  
motives, fear has also been a significant factor in 
strengthening Daesh in Nuristan. Mullahs accept 
Daesh’s orders and share their message regardless of 
whether they are convinced or consent to the order, 
simply for fear of being punished or even killed. 
Hence, they asked people to join Daesh. Members 
have been recruited from Nuristan, Kunar and  
Nangarhar (Achin) as well as among Pakistanis from 
the areas of Dir, Swat, and Orakzai Agency. 
In all three provinces, Daesh emerged in a specific 
context. The political and military weakness of the 
Afghan government, the Taliban of the Islamic Emirate 
and local tribal structures alike was a key condition 
for Daesh’s success in capturing and holding territory 
in southern Nangarhar. Besides a weak government 
presence in the areas where Daesh first gained a foot-
hold, the Taliban and local elites had suffered from 
infighting and as a result were highly divided and 
fragmented. This had—prior to the arrival of Daesh—
facilitated the ability of various militant groups to  
establish themselves locally as a powerful force. Most 
prominently, Lashkar-e-Islam and Tehrik-e-Talib-
an-e-Pakistan (TTP) had a strong presence. 
The research results suggest that Lashkar-e-Is-
lam was important as an entry point for Daesh into 
By autumn 2016, Daesh’s largest social base of 
support consisted of so-called Kunaris, individuals 
and families originally from Kunar who either live in 
Kunar or Nangarhar province. Over the last few decades 
of war, many Kunaris have moved to Nangarhar for a 
variety of reasons including war, drought and economic 
opportunity. Some Kunaris have lived in Nangarhar 
for decades, while others have arrived only recently. 
Many Kunaris are of Salafi religious orientation, 
which has a longstanding tradition in the area going 
back at least to the 1970s, and which is of importance 
since most former Taliban commanders who 
switched to Daesh also happen to be Salafis. Daesh 
supporters in Kunar include Afghans and Pakistanis. 
Among the latter, there are many former affiliates of 
the TTP from Bajaur Agency, Kurram Agency, Swat 
and Dir. Among the Afghans there is a similar pattern: 
Daesh’s main support base in Kunar province has 
been built around Salafi Taliban commanders and 
their loyalists who broke away from the Islamic 
Emirate and pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi. Ini-
tially, Daesh appeared in the mountainous border 
areas of Kunar, such as Tegha in Khas Kunar, Shengaray 
and Maya from where it expanded successively into 
other districts of Kunar province. By the end of 2015, 
Daesh had a clear presence, visible in public declara-
tions of allegiance and the raising of the black flag in 
the districts of Watapur, Sarkano, Marawara, Nurgal, 
Shigal aw Shultan, Tsawkey and Khas Kunar. Respon- 
dents from Kunar suggested that out of 22 major Taliban 
commanders in Kunar’s Pech Valley only two were 
considered to be ardent supporters of the Taliban’s  
Islamic Emirate, while the others leaned towards 
Daesh. This is linked to the heavy presence of Salafis 
among all the Kunari tribes. 
In Nuristan, Daesh emerged visibly in late 2015/
early 2016 in the districts of Waygal and Bargi Matal. 
From then on, the group officially announced its 
presence, sent night letters to people and attracted 
attention with wall chalkings in Arabic. In the two 
districts, they became the strongest armed opposition 
group as many people joined them, leaving the Taliban 
unable to prevent Daesh from gaining a foothold. 
Similar to the dynamics in Nangarhar and Kunar, 
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here. Moreover, the fact that many Kunaris came to 
settle in Nangarhar also extended the Salafi influence 
to Nangarhar, where the presence of a variety of Salafi 
networks provided, voluntarily or under pressure, local 
fighters (Osman, 2016; Johnson, 2016; Baczko & Dor-
ronsoro, 2017). As described in more detail in the sec-
tion on the transformation of the jihadi landscape,a 
complex cross-border landscape of religious schools 
(madrassas) propagating violent jihad in Afghanistan 
turned out to be crucial in this regard. It links the 
eastern provinces of Nangarhar, Kunar and Nuristan 
with the north-eastern provinces of Kunduz, Takhar 
and Badakhshan on the one hand, and FATA and Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan on the other.
North-east: Kunduz, Takhar, Badakhshan. Covert 
presence of Salafi/ Daeshi Taliban
In the north-east alone, we observed different 
manifestations of Daesh across the various locations 
that reported Daesh presence. According to interview 
data from all three provinces, a creeping influence of 
pro-Daesh preaching and propaganda had been tan-
gible since March 2014. Support was driven by the 
news about growing expansion of Daesh in Iraq and 
Syria and the spreading of propaganda, about and by 
Daesh, of the group’s exploits in the Middle East and 
the activities of like-minded groups on a global and 
local scale. Young men started sharing video clips 
about the war in Syria and Iraq and about training 
and listening to online sermons and songs of praise 
for the Islamic caliphate and its followers. Especially 
youngsters were, reportedly, engaged in emotional 
discussions of the latest events in Iraq and Syria (or 
what they knew of them). Across generations, the  
appearance and successful expansion of Daesh in 
Iraq and Syria, including the prospect of the estab-
lishment of an Islamic caliphate, became topics of 
everyday conversation from mid-2014 onwards. In 
Dasht-e Archi district of Kunduz province, this popu-
larity manifested itself in a change of fashion in 
clothing, as people started to dress in black clothes, 
cover their faces and wear wide headbands featuring 
the Kalima Taiba (the Word of Purity17). Some would 
17 \  "There is no god but Allah, [and] Muhammad is the messenger of  
Allah".
southern Nangarhar, because it operated strongly 
along the lines of a patronage model and had sunk its 
roots there by building on pre-existing marriages, 
business and cross-border trade networks between 
specific Shinwari and Afridi subtribes living in south-
ern Nangarhar and the Tirah Valley in Khyber Agency 
of Pakistan. Thus, when Lashkar-e-Islam’s Mangal 
Bagh was chased out of Bara as a result of tribal war-
fare with other Afridi subtribes (as a result of the  
destruction of shrines and beheadings of local tribal 
elders) and Pakistani military operations (Sirat-e-
Mustaqeem) from late June to early July 2008, he fled 
to the Tirah Valley and then moved into southern 
Nangarhar. In 2014, after a vast influx of TTP militants 
into Tirah from Waziristan and Orakzai as a result of 
Pakistani military operations there, Lashkar-e-Islam 
facilitated the move of the emerging Daesh into Nan-
garhar. Some of Lashkar-e-Islam’s members are Salafist 
and while its leader Mangal Bagh is not, he does 
share many of Daesh’s inclinations, particularly its 
violent anti-Sufism directed at religious practices 
such as visiting shrines. 15 Since 2007, Lashkar-e-Islam 
has practised some of the things in the Khyber Agency 
of Pakistan that Daesh would later do in Nangarhar. 
Notable examples are the destruction of shrines and 
threats against and physical attacks on local political, 
economic and social leaders, including the tradition-
al authority of tribal elders, the Sufi brotherhoods and 
Sufi masters (pirs).16 In this way, Lashkar-e-Islam and 
the TTP, which likewise operated in Waziristan, pro-
vided models that Daesh could adopt and build on. 
Besides the described proximity to areas in Paki-
stan with a distinct jihadi landscape—Tirah Valley, 
Khyber Agency [Lashkar-e-Islam] and Orakzai Agency 
[TTP])—Daesh’s emergence and initial expansion 
could rely on a strong Salafist social support base. In 
particular, Kunar and Nuristan had been traditional 
Salafi strongholds from the 1980s. The existing Salafi 
networks mainly facilitated the expansion of Daesh 
in Kunar and support in Nuristan we have outlined  
 
15 \  Respondents estimated that about 40 per cent of Lashkar-e-Islam’s 
members are militant Salafis while the others are militant Deobandi- 
style Hanafis, both of which advocate and practice violent jihad.
16 \  Baczko & Dorronsoro (2017) highlight the same process of violent  
social revolution launched by the TTP in Waziristan, which consisted 
of physically eliminating tribal leadership.
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loudly in the mosque, how prayer practices changed, 
funerals started following different rules, and visits 
to the Sayed Zaino Agha shrine in Dasht-e Archi’s 
centre were prohibited. These developments peaked 
when the Daesh-sympathizing Taliban asked other 
Taliban to announce their full support for Daesh.  
Several Taliban commanders and appointed shadow 
administrators of Dasht-e Archi are reported to have 
pledged allegiance to the Khorasan Shura’s leader 
Hafiz Saeed after the news of the Shura’s establishment 
spread between February and August 2015. The rise of 
Daesh in Dasht-e Archi and Kunduz from among the 
Taliban rank and file is unique in that, first, they set 
up several groups and found agreement among them 
before going public and taking the oath (bayʿa) to 
Hafiz Saeed, the amir (leader) or wali (governor) of 
Daesh’s proclaimed Khorasan Province.21 One individual, 
a thirty-year-old highly educated veterinarian who 
had been working for an educationist NGO in the 
past, besides being one of the known al-Qaeda and 
later Taliban affiliates, went to Achin after the procla-
mation of Daesh’s Khorasan branch to pledge alle-
giance to Hafiz Saeed. Reportedly, his oath (ba’ya) in 
front of the Khorasan Shura was video-recorded to 
use this as a recruiting tool for other Daesh sympa-
thizers from Kunduz province. In the same meeting, 
this person was announced as a representative of the 
Khorasan Shura for Kunduz province and given the 
authority to accept others’ oath to Daesh and accord 
joiners a ‘membership’ status. Respondents empha-
sized the role of this video clip in attracting many  
followers to Daesh in Kunduz and Takhar province. 
For several weeks before the takeover of Kunduz 
by Taliban militants on 28 September 2015, this acces-
sion to power by Daesh did not seem to have any par-
ticular effects or to create conflicts of interests with 
the Taliban leadership at the provincial level or beyond. 
The data shows very clearly that Daesh at this point  
 
21 \  Looking at this in hindsight, it is not is not entirely clear how this 
was possible then and why it did not meet with resistance from other, 
higher, charges of the Taliban. One plausible explanation may be that 
the Taliban were busy preparing the Kunduz operation for September 
2015, and that the local Taliban leaders did not counter or necessarily 
openly contradict Hanafi/Taliban norms, practices and programmes, 
etc. Thus, an open clash was not visible. 
decorate their vehicles—mostly motorbikes—with 
black banners of different sizes. At some point, the 
uniforms (palangi clothes) of Daesh fighters in Syria 
were copied and came locally into fashion, too. In 
several locations, the flag of Daesh was raised, e.g. in 
Chahar Saraka area of Dasht-e Archi for four days in 
spring 2015, in Takhar province’s Darqad district in 
the summer of 2015 and in Eshkamesh district at the 
end of September 2015. 18
Reportedly, this gradual impact of a symbolic 
Daesh presence was accompanied by the send-off of 
youngsters from Kunduz for training to Nangarhar 
province and Pakistan. By the time these youths 
came back to Dasht-e Archi they were—in the words 
of locals—looking like Wahhabis” and completely 
“brainwashed into the ideology and mentality of 
Daesh”.19 Moreover, they would no longer pay respect 
to the elders’ authority and their fathers’ guidance, 
even regarding their father, a figure who usually  
enjoys the utmost respect in every Afghan family, as 
an unbeliever and non-Muslim (kafir). They also started 
calling non-Salafis innovators (bidatyan).  20While the 
change in fashion and the active distribution of prop-
aganda by locals represents an expression of support 
for Daesh as a new global power contender (‘revolu-
tionary’) with a ‘Muslim face’, the effects of training 
brought the first tangible signs of the major impact 
Salafi ideology might yield on everyday life in the  
local communities. 
The data indicates that aspects of Salafi ideology 
(as observed among returnees from training camps) 
and active admiration, as well as imitation, were 
most strongly proliferating among local Taliban. For 
instance, in summer 2015, sympathies with Daesh in 
Iraq and Syria were openly discussed in Dasht-e Archi 
among, above all, the local Taliban as Salafi practices 
continued to spread. Interview accounts are consistent 
in recounting how more people started to say ‘Amin’ 
18 \  According to interview accounts, ‘Daesh’ flags were seen once in 
Jurm district’s Khastak Valley in Badakhshan in 2015, attached to  
vehicles that passed through the main valley. However, according to 
Obaid Ali, it was a Jundullah flag, which looks similar, the same black 
but has a different logo (personal communication, 13 November 2016).
19 \  Interview in Kunduz, November 2016.
20 \  Such as those who were not adhering to their idea of strict Wahhabi/
Salafi Islam, e.g. who continued to pay alms at funerals etc.
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They banned Salafi ideological content, such as 
talks about bidʿa and shirk, and prohibited loud proc-
lamations in sermons at mosques and all kinds of 
Daeshi propaganda, such as video clips, music, or 
trailers from mobile phones. Several madrassas were 
closed, especially those which were known as spring-
boards for locals, especially young people, to go to 
Nangarhar and enlist in Daesh’s ranks of fighters.  
According to one version of the accounts, this caused 
widespread discontent among Salafi Taliban sympa-
thizers and triggered the conflict between Hanafi and 
Salafi/ Daeshi Taliban that escalated in a split. Salafi 
Taliban were henceforth intimidated, exiled and 
purged by the Taliban leaders. Those who did not 
agree to be disarmed and subject themselves to house 
arrest in Dasht-e Archi escaped to Nangarhar and 
joined Daesh; some went to Kunar, others were killed 
immediately. Reportedly, one cohort of Daeshi Taliban, 
under the leadership of their Daesh-appointed local 
leader, went from Dasht-e Archi via Nangarhar to Syria. 
Among the housebound Daeshis were several previ-
ously high-ranking Taliban. They had been disarmed 
and could not go anywhere as, should they escape, 
the Taliban would intimidate and harm members of 
their family who had stayed behind in Dasht-e Archi. 
Given that the Taliban had been able to gain unfore-
seen strength over a period of roughly 18 months  
until November 2016, they were able to counter and 
subdue the Salafi sympathizers and Daeshi Taliban 
among their ranks completely. Throughout 2016, they 
strictly enforced sanctions and bans on travelling, 
preaching, Salafi madrassa activities, training camp 
activities, military training in local madrassas or the 
spread of propaganda. 
As a result, the Taliban established themselves as 
a hegemonic actor throughout Kunduz province in 
2016. Daesh activities were largely sized down, although 
strong connections apparently do exist between exiled 
Daesh followers, including those fighting far away in 
Nangarhar and Syria, and their friends and family 
members in Dasht-e Archi. They maintain real-time 
contact through phone/ Viber, the Internet, facebook 
and skype. Syria-based family members and friends, 
of time operated under the umbrella of the Taliban 
and was consequently nurtured on Taliban funds and 
infrastructure. However, once the Taliban leadership 
became more aware of the growing Daesh constituency 
in Kunduz, the Daesh followers fled to Nangarhar.  
Cleavages between Salafi/Daeshi and Hanafi  
Taliban—in the form of ideological divisions, perceived 
competition about legitimacy and followers and prac-
tical everyday interactions—became apparent only 
after the Taliban insurgents withdrew from Kunduz 
city in early October 2015, having captured it for sev-
eral days. This ‘victory’—manifested in the capture of 
substantial war ‘booty’, including vehicles and weap-
ons—seems to have emboldened, in particular, the 
Daesh followers among the Taliban (‘Salafi Taliban’). 
They arguably now felt confident enough to enforce 
Salafi ideas openly. For example, Jundullah—a Salafi 
organization trying to break free from the Taliban 
umbrella—denounced and condemned the Taliban 
behaviour towards the Islamic Movement of Uzbeki-
stan (IMU) in Chardara district and Zabul province. 22  
The ban on visiting the popular Sayed Zaino Agha 
shrine of Dasht-e Archi was fully enforced; the shrine 
was closed and even came under threat of destruction. 
According to one interviewee, Daesh’s black flag was 
raised over the shrine. Recruiting for Daesh became 
even more widespread and open, indicating that the 
Taliban’s ‘success’ in Kunduz was mainly interpreted 
as a further step towards gaining more influence and 
approaching the final battle against ‘the armies of 
the Western crusaders’ as announced by the propa-
ganda channels of Daesh in Iraq and Syria. Rumours 
were spreading that a massive inflow of Daesh in the 
province would be imminent. Moreover, ideological 
differences became manifest in Salafi thought-infested 
sermons and preachings in several mosques across 
the province. According to our interview accounts, 
Taliban-supporting Hanafi mawlawis increasingly lost 
attendees in their mosques. After some mullahs  
reportedly started to openly oppose the Taliban in 
their sermons only a few days after the ‘fall of Kunduz’ 
and quickly gained popular support, the Taliban  
decided to retaliate. 
22 \  This support for IMU is rooted in ethnic solidarity because both 
groups have a majority Uzbek constituency.
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conduct/actions carried out by supposed Daesh mem-
bers or followers) and thus presence, Badakhshan 
seemed to be less affected than Kunduz and Takhar25  
by the end of 2016. This can be ascribed to the dynam-
ics of the Taliban insurgency in Badakhshan’s districts 
from 2012/13, especially the ability of the Taliban pro-
vincial shadow governor to thwart the efforts of his 
(Salafi) deputy and main contender to gain more  
influence and institutionalize his Salafi group (as of 
November 2016). In contrast to Kunduz, the subsequent 
ousting of Daesh (sympathizers/followers) from 
Takhar took place without large-scale violence,  
because Daeshi Taliban and Jundullah reportedly  
followed the call of Salafi authorities in Takhar and 
voluntarily moved to Nangarhar to ‘do jihad’ for the 
Islamic caliphate.26  
In Badakhshan, growing Salafi influence corre-
lates with a reported Daesh presence, possibly even 
more significantly than in Takhar and Kunduz.27  In 
Takhar, religious Salafi influence was reported to 
have come mainly via Badakhshan. Interview  
accounts pointed out how several Salafi scholars who 
initially hailed from Badakhshan and had received 
their religious education in Saudi Arabia or Pakistan 
began settling in Takhar’s districts fifteen years ago 
and established mosques and madrassas with Saudi 
funding. By roughly 2012, they had not made effective 
inroads into local areas, mainly populated by Uzbeks 
and Tajiks. However, since then observers have noted 
the allegiance of locals from the most diverse political 
group backgrounds (e.g. Hizb-e Islami or Junbesh) to 
‘the Taliban’ and their involvement in anti-government 
25 \  The first-time appearance of Daesh in Eshkamesh in summer 2015, 
before the fall of Kunduz, is undisputed and mentioned by intervie-
wees as well as documented by Ali (2016b). Given that there is in-depth 
Afghanistan Analysts Network-coverage of Jundullah’s turning-in-
to-Daesh in Ishkamish and Burka (see previous sections on Kunduz), 
this study did not follow up the case of Eshkamesh. The report’s as-
sessment does consider Eshkamesh-events, but this regional section is 
solely based on empirical data collected specifically for this study.
26 \  Reportedly, only in Baharak district (key Taliban members were 
discharged from their positions and left) and in Yangi Qala Salafi Tali-
ban were particularly intimidated.
27 \  It is important to mention that the Salafi organization Hizb ut-Tahrir 
enjoys huge popularity among educated Badakhshanis, especially 
among university teachers and students. Hizb ut-Tahrir aims to estab-
lish an Islamic caliphate by non-violent means. Latest reports also 
indicate a strong presence of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Takhar’s provincial 
capital Taloqan. See: “Hizbut Tahrir turning youth . . . ”, 2017.
but also the Daesh ‘governor’ of Kunduz, who resides 
in Achin/Nangarhar, were actively but secretly  
recruiting among their close relatives and friends via 
social media (sending clips, telling about the greatness 
of Daesh or sharing songs) up to the end of the research 
period (December 2016). A second cohort of Salafi  
Taliban and Daesh sympathizers was reportedly pre-
paring to leave Dasht-e Archi for Syria via Nangarhar 
in September and October 2016. According to interview 
accounts, their preparations involved heated and 
lengthy discussions about whether individuals 
should be allowed to leave their families behind or 
take them along.23 Reportedly, the Khorasan Shura 
ended the debate by deciding that going alone would 
also be allowed. However, by the time the preparations 
for leaving had apparently progressed, another notifi-
cation arrived from the Khorasan Shura in late October 
2016, ordering its followers to stay in Dasht-e Archi 
and ‘start activities’ there. 24 
While the emergence and popularity of Daesh in 
Kunduz was largely facilitated through personal net-
works linking individuals with Salafis in Nangarhar, 
it also has strong roots in a longer Taliban presence 
in the province (for more background on this, see the  
Section on the transformation of the jihadi landscape). 
The comparative lack of progress of Daesh’s expansion 
into Takhar and Badakhshan is mainly owed to the 
comparative young history and lesser degree of matu-
ration of Taliban (‘Talibanization’) there, which only 
intensified after 2015. 
The appearance of Daesh in several districts of 
Takhar (Khwaja Ghar, Darqad, Baharak, Dasht-e Qala, 
and Yangi Qala) and Badakhshan (Warduj, Yurm, 
Yamgan) is similar to the trajectory laid out for Kunduz 
above. However, regarding intensity (in quantity and 
 
23 \  The issue of core family members being disconnected from their kin 
evolved into an important issue because not only were those who stayed 
behind vulnerable to Taliban pressure once they found out that their 
close relatives had left to join Daesh. They also had to witness wives 
and children of members of the first cohort who left Dasht-e Archi 
being left stranded after their husbands had been killed in Syria.
24 \  While this could be interpreted as reaction to Daesh’s losing ground 
on the battlefields in Aleppo, Mosul, etc., it is not inherently rational 
from the Daesh perspective as Daesh should welcome more fighters 
ready to become martyrs of the caliphate. So we can deduce that the 
Daesh-related events in Syria and Iraq do not actually influence the 
dynamics related to Daesh in Afghanistan. 
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trying to subvert the local Taliban leadership, as 
seems the case with the deputy provincial governor 
of the Taliban.31 
West: Herat and Farah. Opportunistic flirting with 
Daesh came to an end
In the western region, Daesh presence was fol-
lowed up by our field research in Shindand district in 
southern Herat province and adjacent areas of northern 
Farah province on the one hand, and Obeh and Koshki 
Kohna districts in north-eastern Herat province with 
spillovers into Badghis and Ghor provinces on the 
other. The local context involves significant political, 
military and social (tribal) connections to Kandahar 
and Helmand provinces. Regarding the emergence of 
Daesh, three observations stand out: 
First, as opposed to other areas of Afghanistan, 
Daesh’s emergence in early 2015 in Shindand district 
of southern Herat province did not follow the breaka-
way of Salafi commanders operating under the Taliban 
umbrella. In this area of Afghanistan, the number of 
Salafis among the Taliban ranks was negligible. Taliban 
members in Shindand district of Herat province and 
neighbouring parts of Farah province were educated 
in madrassas of Kandahar or Quetta, Pakistan, which 
are not Salafi in orientation but follow the legal 
school of Imam Abu Hanifa (Sunni Hanafi school of 
thought). The significant influence of Salafi thinking 
is restricted to Herat city where Salafi madrassas and 
mullahs exist. A second observation, which makes 
the case that western Afghanistan is distinct from 
other areas of Afghanistan, is that Daesh’s emergence 
and strengthening have been primarily linked to the 
opportunism of local commanders. This is not to sug-
gest that opportunism is absent elsewhere but that it 
 
31 \  What is interesting, however, and would contrast with the evidence 
of close links maintained by putative Daesh on both sides of the Afg-
hanistan–Pakistan border, as described in the section on East Afgha-
nistan, is that there are reportedly no Pakistanis and Arabs among the 
foreign residents. The possibility that the foreign residents are not 
related to Daesh could indicate that the local Daesh group as such may 
not have the viability and Arab support commonly ascribed to it, or 
that we have ‘several Daeshs’ in Afghanistan and that Daesh is a very 
localized phenomenon showing, again, an entirely different face. All 
interviewees denied that anybody from Badakhshan had left for Syria 
or Iraq to join Daesh in Iraq and Syria.
operations ‘as Taliban’, i.e. under the ‘umbrella’ of the 
Taliban of the Islamic Emirate. Given this heteroge-
neity of origin, it would be misleading to see the ‘Taliban’ 
in Takhar or Badakhshan as a homogeneous or coher-
ent group. Instead, they comprise several different 
groups, and their putative members are also politically 
active in their other affiliations. This includes Salafi 
sympathizers from Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin (Pashtuns, 
Tajiks, Uzbeks) and Junbesh28 (Uzbeks) or Salafi-sym-
pathizers who had not previously belonged to any of 
the traditionally dominant groups (Jamiat-e Islami, 
Hizb-e Islami, Junbesh). 
Consequently, the rise of a heterogeneous Taliban 
movement in the various districts facilitated a hybrid- 
ization of the local insurgency in the name of the Tal-
iban. It also included the presence of foreign fighters 
from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, said to belong to the 
IMU, who had lived among and operated jointly with 
the Taliban in previous years. The concentration of a 
large number (hundreds) of foreigners in Khastak 
(Jurm) with unclear affiliations to Daesh and appar-
ently controlled by the local Taliban, distinguishes 
the situation in Badakhshan from that in the other 
north-eastern provinces. According to local accounts, 
foreign fighters with their families—mainly from  
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan or with an Uyghur background, 
and fewer from Russia and Turkmenistan—settled in 
Badakhshan after they escaped the Pakistan Army 
operation in North Waziristan in 2014. They are likely 
to belong to numerous smaller insurgent groups, 
such as the IMU (Tahir Yuldash/Juma Namangani 
group) 29  and al-Qaeda, but it is unknown to what ex-
tent they have lately pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi 
or Daesh.30  It is also unclear whether they are actively 
 
28 \  One interviewee suggested that many previous Junbesh commanders 
become Taliban-supporters only on the surface. By aligning with  
Salafis they, reportedly, actually intend to eliminate the Taliban. One 
anecdote corroborating this theory refers to reports that Junbesh  
Taliban commanders (sic!) confiscate land by force in Yangi Qala to 
establish a pool for land distribution to Salafis who arrive from 
Badakhshan in order to attract more Salafis to their area.
29 \  Respondents for this study denied that the Uzbek foreigners operate 
as IMU but instead claimed they work under the name Dawlat-ul Islam 
(Islamic State) and Taliban.
30 \  In his publication of September 2015, Obaid Ali cites one respondent 
stating that the foreigners in Khastak would strongly isolate their  
families, which suggests that they are likely Salafis (p. 7).
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Mullah Mansoor. 33 After local infighting forced the  
Rasool group to either escape the area or surrender to 
the government, whatever presence and rather  
opportunistic local support Daesh had in southern 
Herat evaporated. The Taliban of the Islamic Emirate 
(Mansoor faction) have since been able to consolidate 
their ranks. Also in Farah, following a similar situation, 
the two main opposing Taliban commanders declared 
their loyalty to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.       
North: Jawzjan, Faryab, Sar-e Pul. Claims of Daesh 
presence as surrogate for effective governance
Despite reports of a Daesh ‘presence’ in the northern 
provinces of Faryab, Jawzjan and Balkh, the research 
carried out for this study was unable to find such evi-
dence. Local conflicts over access to any possible type 
of resource, be it posts in government, (grazing) land, 
the right to levy taxes locally or others are common in 
the northern provinces. In a context of overall resource 
scarcity, high unemployment, lack of public services 
and general insecurity, the various little fiefdoms of 
strongmen, group leaders and warlords with various 
(pro- and anti-government) affiliations have estab-
lished themselves over the last decade. The ensuing  
rivalries between Junbesh and Jamiat-e Islami over 
resources and local power as well as a simultaneously 
expanding Taliban insurgency—not least facilitated by 
the latter’s disunity—contributed significantly to inse-
curity and uncertainty throughout the north. The local 
representatives and commanders of the established 
Jamiat and Junbesh parties pursue their personal  
interests at any cost, including siding with anti- 
government groups such as local Taliban against  
another when needed, until some other arrangement 
promises to be more opportune, and allegiances shift 
again.  
There are enormous numbers of armed forces in 
Faryab, Jawzjan and Sar-e Pul, among which the  
irregular (arbakee, private paramilitary units of com-
manders) and anti-government forces (mostly various 
local Taliban groups) clearly outnumber the ANSF 
33 \  One major point of contention among the Taliban factions was their 
strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan whose involvement in protecting the leader 
of the Islamic Emirate was now apparent to all. Mansoor strongly 
rejected any Pakistani influence.
has been more central in the local dynamics of south-
ern Herat. A third finding is that Daesh emerged in a 
context where the Afghan government, the Taliban of 
the Islamic Emirate and local tribal structures were 
weak. A fourth point here is that Daesh’s emergence 
in southern Herat was significantly slowed down  
because of a growing working relation between the 
Taliban of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and 
Iran, based on the common perception of Daesh as a 
threat. 32 
For empirical illustration, we shall now present 
the case of southern Herat and adjacent areas of Farah 
Province. This region is quite remote, and the Afghan 
government seems to focus its attention on protecting 
the most vital infrastructure, such as the Shindand 
air base, without having much wider control in the 
districts. The situation here resembles other situations 
in which (putative) Daesh finds entry points where 
the presence of the Taliban is weak. In Shindand, the 
weakness of the Taliban was primarily due to internal 
disagreements and rivalries over leadership and  
resulting fragmentations. Three local leaders quar-
relled over the question of who should be the Taliban’s 
primary leader in Shindand, and this weakened their 
overall position, providing such entry points for 
Daesh. This came after it was announced, in 2015, that 
the leader of the Taliban of the Islamic Emirate,  
Mullah Omar, had already died two years back. The 
subsequent infighting among the Taliban leadership 
played into power struggles among local Taliban 
groups. Thus, in Shindand, divisions appeared between 
the two rival Taliban factions: the Mansoor and Rasool 
followers. The commander following Rasool raised 
the black flag of Daesh to symbolically signify the 
physical presence of fighters loyal to Daesh and to  
express his group’s opposition to the newly dominant 
Taliban faction led by Mullah Mansoor, the one chosen 
to succeed Mullah Omar. The raising of the flag was 
thus a statement of his local ambition and power. He 
was symbolically aligning himself with the new potent 
jihadi patron that was believed to be stronger and 
more adept to the jihadi cause than the Taliban who 
had once followed Mullah Omar and were now led by 
 
32 \  See: “Afghan Taliban’s top dissident Mullah Rasool . . . “, 2016.
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in Jawzjan. It was, however, reported that the heavy 
pressure exerted on Daesh after the ANSF and US 
forces intensified their operations and drone attacks 
against Daesh in Nangarhar had prevented these 
preparations. Irrespective of whether such accounts 
are true or not, they hint at low-level relations between 
Jawzjan and Nangarhar/Daesh. But these accounts 
still do not furnish sufficient evidence for us to speak 
of a Daesh ‘presence’ in Jawzjan or Faryab, at least by 
the end of 2016. 
Similarly, in Sar-e Pul, the research followed up 
news about Daesh’s emergence in Kohistan district 
and the central Sar-e Pul district from late 2015.  
According to interview accounts, in both cases, influ-
ential local commanders—a Tajik affiliated with 
Hizb-e Islami in Kohistan and an Arab described as 
Salafi Taliban—had independently ‘invited’ Daesh to 
their respective area to increase their power base. The 
information that the Hizb-e Islami commander’s 
guest/s came from Zabul while the Taliban contact 
arrived from Kunduz province indicates that not 
even a link had been created with Nangarhar and the 
Daesh Shura because neither came from there. More-
over, it is entirely possible, that a contact from Zabul 
belonged to remnants of the dispersed IMU group36 . 
As to the motivation for extending the invitations, 
the data points to a compelling rationale given by 
one of the interviewees. According to the interviewee, 
the main reason was that Daesh is considered one of 
36 \  In November 2015, the IMU leader Usman Ghazi, who had pledged 
allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, recognizing him as valid leader of 
the faithful (amir al-muʾminin) instead of Mullah Omar, was killed in 
Zabul—together with his followers and the aligned separatist Taliban 
faction of Mullah Dadullah—by those Taliban who were loyal to Mullah 
Omar’s appointed successor Mullah Mansoor. Analysts often mention 
this Zabul massacre as the incident in which IMU was completely 
crushed. However, if one considers that the IMU members and their 
leader killed in this incident represented only those mainly foreign 
Uzbeks trying to make their way up north into areas of Uzbek settle-
ment—after having been pushed out of North-Waziristan as a result of 
the Pakistan Army operation Zarb-e Azb—it does not seem unlikely 
that separate IMU groups existed and still operate in the northern and 
north-eastern areas of Afghanistan. This is also supported by news sur-
facing in the media since June 2016 that IMU operations have not 
stopped; IMU admits its former leader’s oath to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, 
yet says he is not the caliph of all Muslims, rather amir of Daesh in 
Afghanistan/Pakistan. This quasi-withdrawal of the previous oath was 
followed by an announcement on 10 June 2016 about the new IMU’s  
loyalty to the Taliban, al-Qaeda and other traditional jihadist groups 
operating in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia. 
(ANA, ANP and ALP) and National Uprising units. 34 
The provincial governments’ inability to control the 
security situation and the armed groups, on the one 
hand, and the predatory criminal behaviour of many 
of the armed groups, on the other, have created an 
anomic situation where all kinds of weapons and am-
munition are widely available at local bazaars35, arbi-
trary violence is common, and underlying conflict 
dynamics are highly complex. Especially in Sar-e Pul, 
Taliban fighters join the peace process and regularly 
defect again because the Afghan government is unable 
to keep its material promises. In this context, ascrib-
ing insecurity incidences to a putative Daesh presence 
presents a welcome scapegoat for local officials that 
distracts from actual causes of violence and local con-
flict—and their inability to prevent those. Reference 
is made to a particular ‘idea of Daesh’ without any 
sign of real relations, let alone physical presence. After 
the state of insecurity and arbitrary violence in the 
three provinces had provoked large-scale public pro-
tests in October 2016, Vice-President Abdul Rashid 
Dostum—in what could be interpreted as a move to 
distract from his failures to provide security—publicly 
warned that Daesh is planning to bring 7,000 fighters 
to northern Afghanistan.
Foreign fighters in Jawzjan (Darzab and Qoshtepa 
district) and Faryab (Almar and Qaisar district) are 
largely operating as or with local Taliban. They are 
likely to belong to IMU-cells and thus share a Salafi 
outlook with Daesh. In March 2015, Uzbeks of a local 
IMU group reportedly pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi (Ruttig, 2015a); however, this was possi-
bly a reaction to local Uzbek women being arrested 
and the government’s refusal to release them. Never-
theless, particularly foreign Taliban are often labelled 
as Daesh followers in the perceptions of ordinary 
people. Clashes between Daesh sympathizers and the 
Taliban were reported along with rumours that 
preparations had been underway in Nangarhar to 
provide a fully-fledged and organized Daesh presence 
 
34 \  On paramilitary forces in Faryab, see for example, Pannier & Sarwar 
(2016), or Human Rights Watch (2016).
35 \  In Faryab and Sar-e Pul, government-commissioned forces are reported 
to sell their ammunition and guns to Taliban and illegal armed groups 
or whoever is ready to buy them. Local weapon markets are thriving.
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to a vague proxy with sufficient deterrent potential 
to excuse their own non-action or inability to deliver 
and govern well.                
To sum up, this outline of case studies of Daesh 
appearance illustrates an uneven and non-simultaneous 
process. It varies between consolidated presence, 
appearance and mere symbolism. In many cases it 
would thus be more correct to speak of sympathy to-
wards, imitation of and sporadic allegiance to Daesh 
instead of a full-scale ‘emergence’ or durable presence 
of Daesh. By reflecting on the opportunity structures 
that facilitated the emergence of Daesh’s presence, 
its mere ‘appearance’ or just its symbolism, we can 
identify four factors which have shaped the overall 
context in which Daesh’s real or putative presence 
emerged. The individual factors strongly intersect 
with each other and overlap with other mobilization 
motivations, which will be elaborated in the relevant 
sub-chapters further below. 
1\ The rise and initial success of Daesh in Iraq and 
Syria in 2013–14, where the group gained territorial 
control and established state-like structures,  
paired with an aggressive global propaganda  
outreach that proclaimed the goal of establishing 
a global Islamic caliphate resonated with Salafist 
sympathizers hitherto operating under the Taliban 
umbrella. The symbolism of Daesh was adopted 
by locals in different locations and of different 
backgrounds particularly among Salafi 
communities. 
2\ The advance of Pakistani Army operations in 
 various Agencies of the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA), especially North-Waziristan, 
Khyber and Bajaur since 2009, accelerated existing 
organizational fractures within the Pakistani  
Taliban umbrella organization of the Tehrik-e- 
Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP) and other jihadi groups 
in Pakistan. As a result, TTP, Lashkar-e Islam, sec-
tions of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
(IMU) along with several other jihadi groups 
sought refuge on Afghan territory.
3\ After the death of the unifying figures Mullah 
Mohammad Omar as leader of the Taliban of the 
Islamic Emirate and TTP-leader Hakimullah 
the wealthiest groups. In this reading, the main attrac-
tion for establishing contact was, in one case, the eco-
nomic incentive and, in the other, the role Daesh 
could play as part of a local commander’s business 
plan. This seems particularly plausible because Taliban 
resources are very slow to reach Sar-e Pul and they 
only arrive as a trickle because of its geographically 
distance from Pakistan where the Taliban leadership 
is based. The interaction is reported to have ended 
when the guests (‘Urdu-speaking Pakistanis’) left the 
province again after about a month (destinations un-
known), reportedly after high-ranking Taliban com-
manders of the Islamic Emirate had declared that 
there is no place for Daesh in Afghanistan. 
Although two other northern provinces, Balkh 
and Ghor, were not covered in the research, selective 
interviews hint at a very similar situation there. A  
respondent from Balkh spoke of ‘fake Taliban’, that is, 
of armed groups conducting illegitimate activities 
that would usually only be ascribed to Taliban fighters 
but would legitimate processes the initiator of the 
‘fake Taliban’ could benefit from (e.g. instigating inse-
curity to then present yourself as the only guarantor 
of security). Ata Mohammad Noor, the governor of 
Balkh, used the same strategy when he alluded on 
several occasions to a Daesh presence.37 In complete 
contrast, in Ghor, local officials used the label Daesh 
to attract the government’s attention.38 Thus, the  
opportune usage of the label Daesh by government 
and security officials is very common. By claiming a 
presence or ‘advance’ of Daesh, they allude to potential 
or real insecurity that has to be contained with the 
help of those in power and local government officials. 
Alternatively, they intend to shift the responsibility 
for certain developments, notably security incidents,  
 
37 \  Sources suggest the evidence of Daesh presence in Balkh in March 
and April 2016: “Daesh surfaces in Balkh: Atta Noor”, 2016; “Daesh  
expands activities in Afghanistan: Noor”, 2016; “ISIS rapidly expan-
ding activities in Afghanistan, . . . “, 2016.
38 \  During events in Ghor province in October 2016, more than 30 people 
were killed by local criminals with Taliban and government-links;  
however, local officials and the media (e.g. TOLO and Pajhwok news 
agencies) linked the incidence to an unverified Daesh presence.  
Osman (2016b) is correct in his assessment that this claim is an inten-
tional act to mislead the public. Most of the media agencies, rather 
than verifying the claim of a sudden appearance of Daesh in Ghor, 
took it up and even magnified it.
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religious landscape. The rise of Salafism in Afghani-
stan over the last fifteen years seems to be only the 
latest manifestation of these developments, which 
are not only linked to more long-standing and wide-
spread developments in Pakistan since the 1980s but 
are also rooted in religious ideological traditions that 
have developed in the Indian sub-continent since 
late 19th century (Reetz 2001).   
In the Afghanistan–Pakistan region, Salafism as 
an idea manifests itself in several currents, the lowest 
common denominator of which is their accordance 
with creed (ʿaqida) and shared educational networks 
(Wiktorowicz, 2006, pp. 208, 213). Up to the 1970s, the 
Salafi current of thought was dominated by a purist 
faction, apolitical and conservative in nature, focus-
sing on non-violent religious mission (daʿwa), purifi-
cation (tazkiyya) and religious education (tarbiya) 
(Wiktorowicz, 2006, p. 217). Isolation from the corrupted 
elements of society was preferred over any political 
activism, and there was no automatic connection  
between daʿwa and attempts to form an Islamic state 
(Mousalli, 2009). Jihad was restricted and bound to 
certain conditions in Salafi thought and tended to 
take the form of defensive jihad. During the Soviet in-
tervention of Afghanistan in the 1980s, Salafis inter-
nationally, and particularly those from Saudi-Arabia, 
left the sphere of quietism and turned to practical  
jihad.39 Wahhabi influences and activities by the Mus-
lim Brotherhood resulted in the politicization of 
Salafism and the Salifization of politics, i.e. political 
Islam became salafisized (Hassan, 2016). Accelerated 
by subsequent events that further delegitimized purist 
Salafi thought, a fairly coherent ideology of Jihadi- 
Salafism formed only in the post-9/11 and post-2003 
Iraq invasion period. 40
39 \  According to Kepel (2002, pp. 219–220), Jihadi-Salafism was born in the 
wake of the Afghanistan insurgency in the 1980s as a “hybrid Islamist 
ideology” that consisted of a puritanical approach to religion com-
bined with “an absolute commitment to jihad.”
40 \  According to Hegghammer (2009), terms like Salafism or the neolo-
gism Jihadi-Salafism only encompass theological aspects but do not 
tell us anything about a political agenda. Various characteristic forms 
exist within the Salafi label that might even be opposed to each other. 
Since the appearance of Jihadi-Salafism it has become obvious that an 
increasing hybridization of theological doctrines and political ideas 
and an overlapping of orientations is taking place within militant Islam. 
Ideas from political Islam act as a complementary cornerstone along- 
side transformed and radicalized Salafi doctrines. Together they build 
a hybrid political ideology (Hassan, 2016).
Mehsud in 2013, leadership struggles aided the 
popularity of Daesh and the Khorasan Shura that 
promised new prospects in ideological but also 
material and practical terms. The changes in  
opportunity structures were accompanied by a 
geo-politically informed narrative framing the 
Taliban and the Afghan government as puppets 
of foreign masters, principally Pakistan and the 
United States. 
4\ Finally, the limited capacity and likely unwilling-
ness of Afghan government forces to tackle Daesh 
and other jihadi groups on its territory have opened 
inroads that explain the persistence, contraction 
or expansion of Daesh within its territory. After 
the large-scale withdrawal of international mili-
tary support to the Afghan National Security 
Forces (ANSF) at the end of 2014, jihadi fighters 
were able to establish local strongholds in ‘open 
spaces’, particularly in Nangarhar, where both 
the Afghan government and the Taliban of the  
Islamic Emirate lacked influence and legitimacy. 
Transformation of the jihadi landscape: 
Path dependencies and coalition  
building
To examine many of the described opportunity 
structures elaborated in the previous section, we 
shall focus in the following paragraphs on the under-
lying transformations of the local religious, cultural 
and political landscape that are not only limited to 
Afghanistan but concern the historical constellation 
in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region with the respec-
tive external influences of foreign actors. We will  
analyse how long-term transformations in the Sunni 
community have led to a fragmentation of the jihadi 
landscape and triggered the emergence of violent  
jihadi groups whose fluid alliances add a great deal of 
complexity to contemporary coalition building. 
Since the outbreak of war in Afghanistan at the 
end of the 1970s, Afghanistan’s society has been 
shaped by an increasingly militarized environment 
and infrastructure supporting violent jihadist groups 
and a concurrent ongoing transformation of the 
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commanders such as Mawlana Fazlullah (TTP), Maw-
lana Faqir Mohammad (TTP) and Mawlana Sufi Mo-
hammad (Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi). 
Panjpiri madrassas in Pakistan and Afghanistan 
are linked to the Dar ul-Quran seminary in the town 
of Panjpir in the Swabi district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 
located east of Peshawar, Pakistan, but they do not 
have a Salafi orientation. In terms of Islamic jurispru-
dence (fiqh), the Panjpiri madrassas, as do the Afghan 
Taliban of the Islamic Emirate, follow the legal school 
of Imam Abu Hanifa, which Salafis/Wahhabis do not 
accept.42 Hanafism is the oldest and most widespread 
school in matters of Islamic jurisprudence today. In 
practical terms, the so-called Panjpiris and Salafis/
Wahhabis oppose each other on questions of prayer 
style (raf ul-yaddain, pointing with hands in prayer or 
saying the word “Amin” with a loud voice) or on how 
many wives one may marry. The former often accuse 
the latter of introducing new things into religious 
practices and thus creating social strife, while the  
latter claim to have returned to the origins of Islam. 
This said, several positions also point towards com-
mon ground between Panjpiris and Salafis, in partic- 
ular, the opposition to a certain number of religious 
practices which they consider to have no basis in the 
Quran or the hadiths, thus representing an innovation 
(bidʿa) or idol worship (shirk). From the point of view 
of Panjpiris who practice a Deobandi-style Hanafism 
and Salafis, such practices are largely due to the influ-
ence of Sufism in local culture and religious practice 
or to a Hindu conspiracy (see Gul, 2009, on the latter 
point). As will be shown below, Salafis also consider 
Pashtunwali and local cultural traditions to be gener-
ally responsible for such ‘deviations’, suggesting they 
have distorted and spoiled Islam. 
42 \  The discrepancy between the legal school founded by Imam Abu  
Hanifa and Salafism revolve around which corpus of texts can be used 
as legitimate sources for legal rulings. The Hanafi school of thought is 
based on a compilation produced by Abu Hanifa and his students, who 
documented thousands of cases and judgements by a companion of 
the Prophet Mohammad, Hadra Abdullah ibn Masud, and the fourth 
Caliph of Islam, cousin and son-in law of the Prophet Mohammad, 
Imam Ali. In addition, several companions of Imam Abu Hanifa pro-
duced books on Islamic jurisprudence that are taken as references for 
reasoning in legal matters (ijtihad).
The hybridization processes against the back-
ground of increasing Wahhabi41 influences and the 
evolution of Jihadi-Salafism have made the relation-
ship between Salafism and the political project of 
Daesh highly complex. Some Salafi groups and 
schools of thought see violence, also against other 
Muslims, Shias or Sunnis, as a legitimate means to 
establish the Islamic caliphate, while other Salafi 
currents refuse political engagement and renounce 
violence altogether (e.g. Hizb ut- Tahrir). Some Salafi 
organizations, such as Jamaʿat al-Daʿwa (full name  
Jamaʿat al-Daʿwa ila al-Quran wa-l-Sunna), have pub-
lically distanced themselves from Daesh. Moreover,  
besides the purely Salafi tendencies that base their  
reasoning solely on Quran and Sunna (hadiths), the 
heterogeneous cross-border madrassa landscape com-
prises various ideological hybrids that evolve from 
the presence of other religious movements, such as 
the Panjpiri, Pirparast and Tablighi schools. Of par-
ticular relevance to the Afghanistan context is the 
Panjpiri school, because it gave birth to the pioneer 
Salafi movement in the Afghanistan–Pakistan region. 
Several well-known militants and heads of movements 
who ‘flirt’ with Daesh to various extents were educated 
at Panjpiri madrassas. They include Mangal Bagh 
(head of Lashkar-e-Islam) and key Pakistani Taliban 
 
41 \  Wahhabism is a one type of Salafi current, but Salafism does not 
necessarily follow the Wahhabi doctrine. The concept of takfir (‘excom-
munication’) plays a more aggressive and significant role within the 
Wahhabi creed (though varying through time [Firro, 2013; Crawford, 
2011]), which indicates that Wahhabism can be seen as a stricter variant 
of Salafism that differs in form and degree from other Salafi currents, 
but not in content. Daesh in Iraq and Syria presents itself as a guardian 
of the Wahhabi mission and constantly refers to the Wahhabi creed 
while using the Wahhabi doctrines as a basis for legitimation of its 
actions and strategy. Formally, Wahhabism is considered to belong to 
the Hanbalite school, the most literal and scriptural of all four Sunni 
schools of law and therefore does not reject Islamic jurisprudence. 
Wahhabism emerged and continued as a revolutionary jihadi move- 
ment until the 1920s and altered drastically with the formation of the 
modern nation state of Saudi-Arabia, which turned Wahhabism into 
an institutionalized daʿwa movement. Jihadi-Salafism (as an idea) in-
creasingly sees itself in the Wahhabi tradition because through merger 
and hybridization with radical Islamism, Wahhabism has been re- 
discovered as revolutionary jihad (‘Neo-Wahhabism’) (Moussalli, 2009). 
As a result, Jihadi-Salafi groups or movements identify themselves 
with Wahhabi teachings and rely on the scholarly work of Wahhabi 
Salafis (Bunzel, 2015, pp. 9–11). In Afghanistan, Salafism and Wahhabism 
are discursively conflated and designate the same ideological content.
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Jamaʿat al-Daʿwa was rooted primarily among the  
Pashtun Safi tribe in Kunar province’s Pech Valley 
and the Nuristani people of Nuristan province. These 
areas subsequently became the main centre in Kunar 
for various groups resisting the Taliban during the 
time they governed Afghanistan and the first decade 
after that. Jamaʿat al-Daʿwa never accepted Mullah 
Mohammad Omar as the leader of the faithful (amir 
al-muʾminin) in those years. Much of this division can 
again be seen today in the emerging schisms between 
Salafi Taliban commanders as they switch to Daesh 
and pledge allegiance to Daesh. 
Hence, parts of Kunar and Nuristan44 have a 
longer history of interaction with Salafi ideas and 
people—ever since the jihad against the Soviet Union—
than most other areas of Afghanistan. As Rubin writes: 
[…] Jamil al-Rahman, a Panjpir educated mullah 
from the Safi tribe, left Hizb-Hikmatyar in 1985 to 
form a strict Salafi party, the Jamaʿat al-Daʿwa. 
With extensive support from private Saudi and  
Kuwaiti sources, Jamaʿat al-Daʿwa grew to be even 
more powerful in the area than the seven parties [ 
Peshawar seven]… Jamil al-Rahman received large 
Arab donations, and many Arab volunteers joined 
him (1995, pp. 242, 261).
A different Salafi influence with some tradition 
in Afghanistan stems from al-Qaeda’s presence in 
various parts of the country. In contrast to Jamaʿat 
al-Daʿwa though, al-Qaeda recognized Mullah Omar 
and his successor, the late Mullah Mansoor, as well as 
the 2016-appointed Mullah Haibatullah as leader of 
the faithful (amir al-muʾminin). 45
The Taliban of the Islamic Emirate—like the  
majority of the Afghan population (excluding Shias)—
follow the Hanafi School of Islamic law. The Hanafi 
school has deep roots within the Central Asian 
44 \  In Nuristan, the second Salafi proto-state was established by Mawlawi 
Afzal in the 1980s. Called Islamic Revolutionary State, it opened consu-
lates in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan at that time.
45 \  Al-Qaeda rejected the authority of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi who proclaimed 
himself as leader of all Muslims (amir al-muʾminin) thereby contesting 
the claim of Taliban leader Mullah Omar at that time. This rejection by 
al-Qaeda also signified its separation from Daesh in Iraq and Syria and 
its entering into global competition with so-called Islamic State. In 
2016, al-Qaeda intensified its activities beyond the Middle East and 
established, for example, a regional sub-chapter called ‘Al-Qaeda in 
the Indian Subcontinent’. 
A Panjpir-educated mullah, Sheikh Jamil ur-Rah-
man (aka Mawlawi Hussain), established the first 
Salafi proto-state (‘Islamic Emirate’) in Kunar’s Pech 
Valley in 1985. 43 He began to purge the area under his 
control of what he considered un-Islamic influences. 
Such campaigns, albeit in a more radical and ex-
tremely violent fashion, would later be implemented 
by others, including the TTP in Waziristan (Baczko & 
Dorronsoro, 2017), Mangal Bagh’s Lashkar-e Islami in 
Khyber Agency, and Daesh. Rubin (1995) writes: “He 
[Jamil al-Rahman] engaged in a campaign to remove 
flags and raze monuments erected over tombs, icons 
that he claimed were un-Islamic, as had that arche-
typal tribal puritan Mohammad ibn Abdul Wahhab 
before him” (p. 261). 
However, Jamil ur-Rahman’s split from Hekmatyar’s 
Hizb-e Islami Party and his foundation of Jamaʿat 
al-Daʿwa also signalled a desire to break with the cor-
rupt Afghan mujahidin parties. The phenomenon of 
Jamaʿat al-Daʿwa is an interesting entry point for dis-
entangling some of the links between Salafi groups or 
organizations, the madrassa networks on which they 
are built, and the particular political project of Daesh. 
Jamaʿat al-Daʿwa is also important because it set a 
historical precedent of a Salafi proto-state and dis-
plays several elements that are relevant for under-
standing Daesh’s relationship with the Taliban of the 
Islamic Emirate. Although Jamaʿat al-Daʿwa exists to 
this day as an organization by the name Jamaʿat 
al-Daʿwa ila al-Quran wa-l-Sunna (JDQS), it was 
largely defeated as an organized military force in 1991, 
after a bomb attack by the Hizb-e Islami of Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar killed the core of Jamaʿat al-Daʿwa’s lead-
ership. Shortly thereafter, in the summer of 1991,  
Jamil ur-Rahman was assassinated in Peshawar by 
an Egyptian national (Ruttig, 2010, p. 3), and many 
(but not all) Jamaʿat al-Daʿwa commanders later 
joined the opposition to the Taliban in the 1990s,  
before purportedly pledging allegiance to Mullah 
Omar, the Taliban’s leader, in 2010 (Ruttig, 2010, p. 1). 
43 \  Interestingly, Jamil ur-Rahman never moved his proto-state govern-
ment’s headquarters into Kunar or Nuristan but remained in Bajaur, 
provided for by Jamaʿat ul-Mujahidin the roots of which go back to the 
early 19th century jihad movement of Syed Barelvi. For further details, 
see Rana & Gunaratna, 2007, pp. 31f.
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with Salafi ideas (so-called Salafi Taliban) but are  
active under the Taliban umbrella, which is per se 
Hanafi in outlook, and armed Salafis without a Taliban 
past or background serving as members of an extrem- 
ist Islamic group. An often-overlooked phenomenon 
is, however, the Salafi and Deobandi fusion that mani-
fests itself in the Pakistani Taliban (TPP) who were  
socialized and educated in Deobandi madrassas, joined 
the TTP and have successively moved to Daesh in  
Afghanistan and Pakistan. The graph below (Figure 1) 
represents an attempt to visualize the complexity of 
overlapping influences, ideological path-dependencies 
and loyalties in the religious landscape of Afghanistan/ 
Pakistan. In this context, it is insightful to remember 
that Jamil ur-Rahman, who founded the strict Salafi 
Jamaʿat al-Daʿwa, was socialized as a student of the 
Panjpir School. Moreover, this student of Sheikh  
Ghulamullah Rahmati, who runs the leading Salafi 
madrassa (Taleem ul-Quran wa-l-Sunna) in Kunduz, is 
said to have a Panjpiri background, as do most of the 
Lashkar-e-Islam members and, allegedly, their leader 
Mangal Bagh.
What this points to is actually an even higher 
complexity that the graph (Figure 1) cannot capture. 
On the one hand, we observe cleavages among jihadi 
groups on both sides of the border, especially with 
conflicts between Taliban of the Islamic Emirate, TTP 
and Daesh. On the other hand, the evidence presented 
so far illustrates strong overlaps and intersections in 
terms of personnel continuity among the various 
groups. Thus, we would caution against equating ide-
ology with organizational affiliation, as the frequent 
shifts in allegiances point to a dynamic that does not 
reflect changes in “mental programming”. Put differ-
ently, coalition building revolves more around oppor-
tunities for resource mobilization than ideological 
premises. This can be gleaned in exemplary fashion 
from the targeting of Shias by various jihadi groups. 
Although anti-Shia attitudes are usually attributed to 
purist Salafi and Wahhabi ideology, Deobandi reli-
gious scholars have been much more vociferous in 
their proclamation of takfir against Shiites, and affili-
ated groups such as TTP and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi have 
spearheaded the violence against Shiites.
societies. Up to the 1980s, ever since Islamization 
took a foothold in the mid-8th century BC in the  
regions that constitute Afghanistan nowadays, the 
Hanafi school combined with Pashtun cultural mark-
ers and pre-Islamic traditions was a hallmark of  
social evolution and undisputed in theological affairs. 
By contrast, Salafism is a recent phenomenon in  
Afghanistan, dating back to the 1980s. Part of the 
Hanafi school is the revivalist Deobandi movement 
which emerged from the 1860s onwards, primarily in 
India, as a counter- concept and reconciliation with 
modernity and colonialism. Gradually expanding 
into the Afghan borderlands, the Deobandi movement 
gained momentum from the 1980s when international 
Wahhabi–Salafi supporters provided financial backing 
during the time of the Soviet intervention in the con-
text of a Cold War proxy war. The Deobandi School 
happened to be an effective vehicle for promoting 
Wahhabi ideology, which allowed the Hanafi school 
to be penetrated with Salafi thought. In principle, the 
Hanafi school with its emphasis on reasoning and 
elaborating legal opinions (ijtihad) in theology adopts 
a rather ‘cautious’ approach to the issue of excommu-
nication (takfir) and reflects religious and societal  
development; this is diametrically opposed to what 
Salafism promotes on the basis of its core ideology. 
The complexity of today’s Islamic landscape in  
Afghanistan and adjacent areas stems from the his-
torical, issue-based and opportunistically motivated 
intersecting of Hanafi and Salafi actors. Figure 1 
maps their primary relationships and overlaps. It  
departs from the observation that armed and civil 
groupings can be distinguished among Salafis and 
Hanafis alike. For example, all Sunni political parties 
in Afghanistan, except for JDQS, can be subsumed 
under the Hanafi political parties cluster. The non- 
political, ordinary Sunni population can be grouped 
under ‘Hanafi civilians’. Moreover, the Deobandi  
influences described above were instrumental in  
establishing specifically Deobandi-style madrassas 
and Deobandi-influenced armed groups, such as the 
Taliban. As stated previously, not all Salafis take up 
arms or lean towards violent extremism. Yet, Daesh 
thrives on both tendencies, Taliban who sympathize 
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Between presence, appearance and 
symbolism: Resource mobilization and 
social networks
We have seen how the expansion of Daesh into 
different locations across Afghanistan, most signifi-
cantly in southern Nangarhar’s districts where it has 
established a stronger presence to date, has obviously 
been facilitated by different types of social network. 
This section presents an overview of the most obvious 
connections between some of these Salafi networks. 
After this first step, we shall look at the material  
underpinnings of Salafi mobilization and analyse 
what is known so far about local and transnational 
generation of funding by these networks. Thirdly, we 
shall discuss recruiting efforts that do not primarily 
involve either Salafi missionary activity or financial 
inducement.   
Salafi clergy (ulama) and networks 
The research confirmed that a complex cross-border 
landscape of religious schools (madrassas) propagates 
More recently, as illustrated in the previous section 
'Many Daesh in Afghanistan', the jihadist landscape 
has been shaped by fissions and fusions of groups fol-
lowing the deaths of Mullah Omar (Islamic Emirate 
of Afghanistan) but also of TTP leader Hakimullah  
Mehsud in 2013. 46 This shows that the fragmenta-
tion of the jihadi landscape has to be seen not only as 
a long-term process but as one that is continuing. 
The whole notion of religion has been under debate 
in Afghanistan society and has arrived at a cross-
roads today. Consequently, Daesh in Afghanistan has 
not evolved in a vacuum. Rather, it has built on the 
institutional, motivational and personnel continui-
ties/legacies of other jihadi groups and Salafi reli-
gious- ideological path dependencies. As will be fur-
ther corroborated in the next section, which will 
focus on translocal social networks and identities, it 
is the long-term transformation of the local religious, 
cultural and political landscape in Afghanistan–Paki-
stan that has prepared the ground for Daesh’s local 
manifestations.
46 \  See Iqbal & De Silva (2013) for a case study on the terrorist lifecycle of 
the Pakistani Taliban umbrella organization (TTP).
Figure 1  
Hanafi–Salafi intersections in Afghanistan/Pakistan 
© BICC, 2017
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2\ they connect with foreign donors, such as govern- 
ments (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, etc.), businessmen, 
bankers/money changers, international Islamic 
charities/foundations/NGOs, and so on. 
While all Salafis agree on common foundations 
of belief (besides ʿaqida), they not only differ in the  
extent of their political engagement or—by contrast—
their concentration on the search for religious purity 
but also, more importantly, they are not necessarily 
connected and do not consider it relevant to position 
themselves among their numbers. Thus, we have an 
indeterminate mass of Salafi schools and ulama (with 
their networks of students, charities, links to donors, 
madrassas and mosques) who do not relate to each 
other beyond ‘being Salafi’ (adhering to the Salafi 
creed). So although they may come together in sup-
port of a particular jihadi current, it is more a question 
of overlapping interests than any structural cohesion. 
Thus, what follows from our research is a tenta-
tive and to date highly incomplete insight into differ-
ent Salafi networks encountered during the survey. 
Our findings by no means reflect the de facto image of 
the Salafi landscape either in Afghanistan or across 
the border with Pakistan. The analysis is limited to 
few outstanding sections of the Salafi landscape at 
the cost of neglecting others. Nevertheless, the pattern 
that emerges from looking into the connections  
between various nodes in the networks allows us to 
deduce several insights into the scale of Salafization 
in some areas of Afghanistan and the crossover  
between Salafi ideas and militancy. 
From our data, the primary nodes in the network 
comprise
1\ on the Pakistani side:
   \ the Ganj (Jamia Taleem ul-Quran-wa-l-Hadith) 
Madrassa, formerly under the leadership of 
Sheikh Aminullah at the fringe of Peshawar;
   \ the Madrassa of Sheikh Ghulamullah Rahmati 
in Peshawar;
   \ Badhbeer (Dar ul-Tafseer Jamaya Arabiya)  
Madrassa in Peshawar;
   \ Anayat Kilay Madrassa in Bajaur (FATA);
   \ Jamil ur-Rahman Madrassa in Toor camp area 
of Bajaur (FATA).
violent jihad in Afghanistan. It links the eastern 
provinces of Nangarhar, Kunar and Nuristan with  
the north-eastern provinces of Kunduz, Takhar and 
Badakhshan, on the one hand, and FATA and Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan, on the other. 
While tribal affiliations and marriage networks play 
a role, Salafi networks constitute a unifying factor of 
influence and determine the emergence and expan-
sion of Daesh in all the locations we studied. Besides, 
they largely overlap with tribal, marriage and business 
networks. Despite this evidence, next to nothing is 
known about a recognized Salafi ulama that is clearly 
affiliated with Daesh. Anecdotal evidence of a ‘Daesh 
mufti’ issuing a fatwa against the Afghan Taliban, or 
unverifiable tales from the field, including name 
dropping, do not suffice for the presence of a certain 
Daesh-related ulama, let alone THE Daesh ulama. Most 
likely, a Daesh uluma does not exist in a manner 
amenable to analysis by outsider researchers. For it 
does not correspond to the usual frames through 
which a clergy is envisaged, i.e. organized in line with 
clear (administrative or other) principles and hierar-
chies. If anything, the data points to a very fragmented, 
rhizome-like structure that does not comply with  
hierarchical, regional or even individual sponsor-  
induced47 rationalities of organization.  
What can be gleaned from the range of replies 
from the different types of interlocutors is a hunch 
that, of the multiple Salafi networks that exist, only a 
few operate at the surface and become visible to some 
degree by having formal political wings or being run 
by famous ulama. Others operate silently but are prob-
ably no less efficient in their teachings and propaganda. 
These networks integrate Salafi ulama of different 
ranks, their madrassa and mosquenetworks and vari-
ous forms of charitable organization. The latter com-
plement the network in two dimensions:
1\  They form the link between relatively well-
known domestic ulama individuals and their  
respective mosque and madrassa network, and/or  
47 \  Even charitable organizations cannot be clearly affiliated to one or 
the other donor and client because usually donors diversify their port-
folio of charitable organizations into separate branches with mostly 
different names to evade restrictions and sanctions.
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Aminullah, and some of them he had actually taught 
at the Ganj Madrassa. As described in the section 
'Many Daeshs in Afghanistan', such networks facilitated 
Daesh’s move from Nangarhar into Kunar. 
For the north-east and north, Sheikh Ghulamullah 
Rahmati emerges as the most important figure and 
famous influential scholar according to interview  
accounts. He hails from Dasht-e Archi (Kunduz 
Province) and emigrated with his family to Pakistan 
during the Soviet invasion. He has until now resided 
in Peshawar (with reportedly no plans to ever return 
for good) where he runs a famous Salafi madrassa by 
the name Dar-ul Quran al-Hadith al-Salafiyya at 
which hundreds of students are enrolled. He attracts 
mostly Afghan students because of his reputation as 
a famous religious scholar all over northern Afghani-
stan. Respondents suggested that he is the head of a 
vast madrassa network inside Afghanistan that com-
prises madrassas in Nangarhar, Kunar, Nuristan and 
Kunduz. He is said to be the founder and patron of 
the main Salafi madrassa in Kunduz city by the name 
Taleem ul-Quran-wa-l-Sunna, which is run by one of 
his students and another local counterpart. Reportedly, 
this madrassa serves as the informal centre of  
Jamaʿat al-Daʿwa ila al-Quran wa-l-Sunna (JDQS) in 
northern Afghanistan. According to some accounts, 
Rahmati had studied in Saudi Arabia; others stated 
that he and his student have visited Saudi Arabia  
numerous times. The fact that his seminary is  
presented in Arabic-language online videos points to 
funding links with Saudi Arabia or other Arab countries. 
Rahmati’s lectures are also available online in Pashto. 
He is known to have been the teacher of Sheikh Abu 
Yazid Abd al-Qahir Khorasani (locally aka Mawlawi 
Abdul Qahir), mentioned as the main Daesh ideologue. 
The information available online on Qahir Khorasani 
says that he is an Islamist preacher and a website 
proprietor from Kunar Province, known for his online 
sermons in praise of jihad and martyrdom. He is also 
the author of books that reaffirm Jihadi-Salafi inter-
pretations of Sharia law. His books and his fatwas 
(which are available online) consider all Muslim 
states as apostate and those working with them as 
legitimate targets that can be killed.
2\ on the Afghan side:
   \ the JDQS headquarters in Jalalabad, under the 
leadership of Rohullah Wakil Najibi;
   \ the Naranj Bagh Madrassa in Jalalabad, led by 
Mawlawi Ahmad Shah;
   \ the Madrassa Taleem ul-Quran wa-l-Sunna in 
Kunduz; 
   \ an undefined number of local madrassas mush-
rooming in Dasht-e Archi district of Kunduz.
Each of these madrassas or nodes must be consid-
ered as having cross-border and domestic ties with 
several other madrassas, mosques and charities. Of 
particular importance is the Ganj Madrassa in Pesha-
war (official name Jamia Taleem ul-Quran-Wal-Hadith 
Madrassa)48 , which has popularized and advocated 
violent jihad and Salafism in eastern Afghanistan. An 
estimated 20 per cent of Salafis in Nangarhar have  
attended the Ganj Madrassa, and most of the ulama 
related to Daesh have received their education in 
Ganj. Sheikh Aminullah headed the madrassa until he 
was arrested in Saudi Arabia following the inclusion 
of the Ganj Madrassa on the US terrorist list and the 
imposition of sanctions by Washington and the United 
Nations in 2009 on those supporting terrorism 
through the facilitation of flows of finances or fighters 
from Gulf Arab countries.49 On 20 August 2013, the US 
Treasury added Ganj Madrassa to the designation list, 
noting that it an institution supporting “al-Qaeda, 
the Taliban, and Lashkar-e-Taiba [… that] serves as a 
terrorist training center where students, under the 
guise of religious studies, have been radicalized to 
conduct terrorist and insurgent activities” (Joscelyn, 
2013). Hailing from Kunar’s Khas Kunar district, 
Sheikh Aminullah is highly regarded as a religious 
authority across Kunar, even among non-Salafis.  
Madrassas in all Afghan provinces are linked to the 
network he established from Ganj Madrassa. In several 
other Kunar districts, Marawara, Tsawkey, Shigal aw 
Shultan, the emergence of local groups pledging alle-
giance to Daesh was due to relations that former 
Salafi Taliban commanders have or had with Sheikh 
 
48 \  See: “US sanctions Islamic school in Pakistan, . . . “, 2013.
49 \  The blacklisting occurred after he had published a book that argued 
that jihad against foreign forces in Afghanistan is legitimate. Aminullah 
ranks as the central advocate of militant Salafism in eastern Afghanistan.
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(Khousary, 2016, p. 252), about the same time that  
Abdul Rahim Muslimdost pledged his oath to Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi. Muslimdost had been a high-rank-
ing member of JDQS in the past before he joined TTP.52
During a public conference organized by JDQS in 
its Jalalabad office on 11 October 2016, the group dis-
tanced itself officially from Daesh in a move to refute 
the widespread public perception that they supported 
the Islamic State group materially. According to local 
respondents invited to the conference, the current 
leader of JDQS, Samiullah Najibi, stated that while it 
was true that members of Daesh were Salafis, it was 
not true that JDQS was supporting them with re-
cruits or equipment. To date, the party runs offices in 
Badakhshan and Nangarhar only. At the October con-
vention of JDQS, the organization announced that 
Rohullah would formally take over as acting head of 
JDQS from Samiullah and that JDQS would engage in 
the construction of more mosques, madrassas and 
orphanages.53  
The second leader of the Kunduz Madrassa, 
Taleem ul-Quran wa-l-Sunna, is said to have close  
relations with Kuwait, heading a Kuwaiti NGO that 
digs water wells and builds mosques in the country-
side. Although he was reported to have lashed out at 
Shias for being non-Muslims during one of his Friday 
sermons at a Kunduzi mosque, he was described as a 
rather non-militant person by most interviewees. 
Rahmati54 and the Kunduz chapter of JDQS under the 
leadership of his student and his counterpart are the 
patrons of numerous madrassas and mosques across 
Kunduz province, especially in Dasht-e Archi. Inter-
viewees traced the beginning of massive Salafi 
mosque and madrassa establishments across Dasht-e 
Archi, Imam Sahib and Chardara to the early Karzai 
government years (2002/04 onwards). 
52 \  In all likelihood, his relationship with Rohullah is not good after hav-
ing publically claimed in his book “Chains of Guantanamo” that Ro-
hullah was complicit in Jamil ur-Rahman’s killing in 1991 (Muslim-
dost was detained in Guantanamo from 2002 to 2005).
53 \  Interview in Jalalabad, 21 November 2016.
54 \  His own formal involvement with JDQS at this point of time is unclear. 
However, he is known to have been with JDQS in the past.
The JDQS, a successor organization to Jamil 
ur-Rahman’s Jamaʿat al-Daʿwa was properly regis-
tered as a political party in 2004. After Jamil ur-Rahman 
was killed in 1991, his nephew Haji Rohullah, aka  
Rohullah Najibi or Wakil Rohullah50, shared the  
Jamaʿat al-Daʿwa leadership in Nangarhar with  
Samiullah Najibi, a close friend of late Jamil ur-Rahman 
from Nangarhar’s Kot district. After Rohullah was  
arrested by US forces in 2002 and detained at Guanta-
namo from 2004 until 2008 for allegedly helping key 
al-Qaeda figures to escape Afghanistan in 2001, Sami-
ullah51 continued to head Jamaʿat al-Daʿwa alone and 
formed JDQS. In 2005, JDQS participated in the par-
liamentary and provincial council elections, winning 
one seat in parliament. JDQS key figures are allegedly 
involved in illegal resource extraction (especially  
precious stones) in Kunar and Nuristan (specifically 
Rohullah Najibi) and together with TTP control the 
Bajaur–Kunar–Nuristan corridor to channel fighters, 
equipment and goods across the Pakistan–Afghanistan 
border (Khousary, 2016, p. 253). JDQS and Rohullah 
himself are said to have close relations with Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait—inherited from Jamil ur-Rahman 
who had garnered massive support among Saudi and 
Gulf region Salafis for setting up the first Salafi state. 
In 2010, the military wing of JDQS joined the Taliban, 
swearing loyalty to Mullah Omar. One of the leader-
ship figures of JDQS, Mawlawi Abdul Qahir (allegedly 
the leading Daesh ideologue in the Afghanistan– 
Pakistan region), is said to have announced his alle-
giance to Daesh in Syria and Iraq in August 2014 
50 \  Today, besides leading JDQS, Rohullah is also head of the Kunar Shura 
in Nangarhar, i.e. representative of all the people from Kunar in Nan-
garhar. It would be insightful to look more in detail into the personal 
business and organizational network of Rohullah; he had—among 
others—apparently close relations to TTP, LeT and Arabs in Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait. Regarding his detention by the United States, Michael 
Semple (2010) of the Telegraph (UK) argues that Rohullah was the  
target of falsely leaked information about his putative links with ISI 
by his tribal opponents. According to other sources, including many in 
Afghan government, he is not linked with insurgent activities. After 
his release, Karzai met him and apologized for his detention. According 
to his own accounts, Rohullah was arrested when a civilian was killed 
by US forces and he went there to negotiate a solution to avoid this 
from happing again, but instead he was arrested along with the people 
who accompanied him.
51 \  Sheikh Samiullah has reportedly close links with the Salafi move-
ment in Pakistan and a visiting relationship with the Badhbeer  
Madrassa in Peshawar.
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ings to mobilize local Salafis and recruit students but 
he is reportedly also related to and keeps strong con-
nections with one of the key figures from Dasht-e 
Archi who joined Daesh and now resides in Syria. He 
stands for several ulama who traverse the Salafi land-
scape throughout Kunduz province and around 
whom the bridging between Salafi religious activity 
and militancy currently seems to evolve. It is not 
clear exactly how the Khorasan Shura connects with 
political Salafis, especially the Kunduz ulama of JDQS 
or whether the reported nightly meetings of some  
ulama with the armed Salafis (nezami) is part of a stra-
tegic plan. There is some indication that certain Kun-
duz Salafi madrassas had acted as recruiting institu-
tions for Daesh in the past. Now, with the Taliban 
exercising control, these madrassas have either been 
closed or are kept under strict control by the Taliban. 
However, the Taliban are not able to close or control 
the madrassas outside of their realm of influence, in 
particular in Kunduz city.
Among the Bajauris are many individuals who 
received stipends for studying in Saudi Arabia during 
the 1980s and 1990s, and who became ardent Salafis. 
Currently, according to one respondent, there are at 
least thirteen people living in Dasht-e Archi who 
graduated in religious studies in Saudi Arabia, mostly 
Medina.56 In other cases, students originally from 
Kunduz province settled in Saudi Arabia and some of 
them still return for regular visits. In one example, a 
native of Imam Sahib district of Kunduz province 
now occupies a senior position in the Hajj wa-Awqaf 
[Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments] Department of 
the Saudi government. He is said to visit Imam Sahib 
once a year and engages in charitable activities, such 
as funding for wells and mosque. It is thus evident 
that some of the cross-regional and cross-border 
links originate from or involve Kunduz.
The Naranj Bagh Madrassa in Jalalabad under 
the leadership of Mawlawi Ahmad Shah figures 
prominently in the Salafi landscape of eastern Afghan- 
istan. Ahmad Shah is said to be the most influential 
Salafi figure in Nangarhar, and the madrassa is sus-
pected to have links with Daesh, supplying money 
56 \  Interview with resident from Dasht-e Archi, Kabul, 28 October 2016.
Most of the Salafis in Kunduz and particularly in 
Dasht-e Archi are so-called ‘Bajauris’55. Through their 
socialization while living in Bajaur (FATA, Pakistan), 
but also through their genuine tribal links (as Safi, 
Salarzai, Mamund, Meshwani, etc.), they are very 
closely interlinked with Kunaris and the network of 
Jamil ur-Rahman from the past. The tribal relation-
ships can be traced back even to the first half of the 
20th century when Pashtun tribes from Kunar and 
Nangarhar were included in the government’s internal 
colonization policy that shifted individual families 
and sub-tribal sections to the northern areas, par-
ticularly the various districts of Kunduz. Many of the 
Bajauris who run above-listed madrassas were educated 
in two Bajauri Salafi seminaries, i.e. the Madrassa of 
Anayat Kalay near the station in Bajaur and the Ma-
drassa Jamil ur-Rahman in the so-called Toor camp 
area of Bajaur. The Salafi madrassas and mosques in 
Dasht-e Archi and Kunduz province seem to work 
under the umbrella of the main Salafi madrassa of 
Taleem ul-Quran-wa-l-Sunna in Kunduz city. Inter-
view data indicates that the Taliban are trying hard 
to shut down those madrassas that used to conduct 
military training for Taliban cadres but are now con-
sidered a threat to local Taliban control and rule  
because they form the primary recruiting pool for 
Salafi Taliban. 
Several mawlawis hailing from Dasht-e Archi 
Salafi madrassas are reportedly employed as teachers 
in Kunduz’ Teleem ul-Quran-wa-l-Sunna Madrassa. 
The research traced one particular mawlawi who—
having family relationships with one of the leading 
figures in JDQS and hailing from a traditional Salafi 
family in Kunduz—emerges as one of the central 
nodes in the radicalization landscape of Kunduz and 
Dasht-e Archi. This is for two reasons: He not only 
maintains active links with Salafi seminaries in 
Dasht-e Archi in the form of secretive nightly meet 
 
55 \  The designation ‘Bajauri/s’ is used as surrogate for tribal affiliation; 
however it is not in the narrow sense of resembling a tribe. Rather, the 
term designates families of different tribal backgrounds who had 
emigrated to Bajaur during the Soviet intervention and settled down 
in Bajaur or even neighbouring areas, such as in Malakand (Swat, Jan-
dol, Lower and Upper Dir) or Mohmand Agency and Peshawar/Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa Province, Pakistan.
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organizations, have been an important source of 
funding for various jihadi groups since the 1980s. 
Such practices continued through the years of Taliban 
rule and have continued continue to this day. For  
example, militant groups in Pakistan have established 
private welfare wings and resurfaced as charity  
organizations that avoid prosecution by regular 
name changes (e.g. Lashkar-e-Taiba became Jamaʿat 
ud Daʿwa in Pakistan). They generate considerable 
funds through regular fundraising campaigns during 
Ramadan and around the two Eid festivals (Rana, 
2009, p. 15). 
It is generally assumed that a lot of this funding 
was redirected from the Taliban towards Daesh after 
2014, while the overall level of donations declined  
following the withdrawal of international troops 
from Afghanistan. Nevertheless, money for building 
madrassas and mosques seems to exist in abundance. 
One mullah who was interviewed pointed out that, 
“The Salafis build a mosque within a year and provide 
a salary for the hired mullah,” insinuating that ordi-
narily the collection of money and the building of a 
mosque or madrassa would take much longer and pro-
gress gradually.59 He also explained that only 20 per 
cent of the Salafi madrassas would hire Afghan Salafis 
as religious instructors (mawlawis, mullahs); the re-
maining 80 per cent would come from Pakistan— 
especially Salafis from Bajaur, Orakzai, Khyber Pakh-
tunkhwa, most of whom received their education 
from the Ganj and Badbeer Madrassas. 
Many donors and heads of non-state charities are 
individuals situated primarily in Gulf Arab countries 
and Pakistan, but also abroad in the diaspora. These 
same states are simultaneously at the forefront of 
countermeasures against the financing of terrorism. 
For example, above-mentioned Sheikh Aminullah, as 
well as a son of Jalaluddin Haqqani, were arrested in 
Saudi Arabia while fundraising. The latter was handed 
over to Afghanistan where he is still in custody. This 
contradictory situation complicates international  
relations with states and individuals as they pursue 
entirely different policies. 
59 \  Interview with a madrassa representative in Jalalabad, Nangarhar, 
October 2016.
and with recruits.57 One ‘expert’ respondent with a 
Taliban background who was interviewed in Kabul58, 
described how the Naranj Bagh ulama had allegedly 
complained to him about the threefold pressures 
they are facing: from Daesh, the Afghan government 
and the Taliban. While Daesh are urging them to  
recruit and send fighters, the Taliban are threatening 
them on ‘sectarian’ grounds due to the differences 
between Salafi and Hanafi religious and ideological 
content. Moreover, government efforts to prohibit any 
links with insurgent groups are increasing, although 
an explicit policy to cut such connections through 
persecution is strikingly absent. This said, it must be 
stressed that there is no evidence of formal links  
between Naranj Bagh and Daesh, although indirect 
links do possibly exist, for example via former stu-
dents who joined the ranks of Daesh after graduation.
Financing 
As the analysis of some key figures above indicates, 
personal connections to donors and network relations 
are crucial for the procurement of financial resources. 
Translocal and domestic charities, NGOs, and business- 
men play a critical role in connecting donors and  
recipients of financial flows that support madrassas 
and mosques in Afghanistan. These types of funding 
have a long tradition, having first flourished in the 
1980s when resources were mobilized en masse for 
jihad. While the money would usually be collected  
for missionary activities (daʿwa) and relief purposes, 
e.g. food and basic provisions for refugee camps in  
Peshawar, a certain amount of the donations would 
go to training camps and armed groups. The line  
between humanitarian and military assistance is tra-
ditionally blurred (Benthall & Bellion-Jourdan, 2003, 
pp. 69–85). Local charities and donations at Eid and 
Friday prayers, quite similar to the pre-Christmas 
charity drives of Western churches and relief 
 
57 \  Recurrent attacks on the madrassa are connected with sectarian mo-
tives, e.g. the attack on 11 October 2016. See Osman (2016a). In a public 
statement, Ahmad Shah accused ‘enemies of tawhid (monotheism)’ to 
be behind the killing of his younger brother—Sheikh Rahmat Shah, 
also a preacher at Naranj Bagh Madrassa—while on his way home in 
February 2016.
58 \  Interview in Kabul, 23 October 2016.
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Bagh was targeted by a bomb in the Marko Bazaar in 
2013 when he was reportedly trying to take PKR 20 
million (about EUR 150,000) to Nazian district 
(Nangarhar). When the bomb hit him, the money 
was scattered everywhere, and people on the street 
grabbed whatever they could and escaped. In other 
interviews, local respondents pointed out that the 
government had arrested several people in Torkham 
who were transporting money from Pakistan to 
Achin. 
Local resource generation relies mainly on taxing 
valuables according to Islamic law. However, evidence 
from different research locations provides a heteroge-
neous picture of taxation practices, with differences 
depending on Daesh presence and the extent of actual 
consolidation of its rule. Thus, for example in Herat 
province’s Koshki Kohna and Obeh districts, respond-
ents insisted that self-proclaimed ‘Daesh’ did not tax 
locals and that they did not even ask locals for food. 
Daesh was reportedly only able to do this because 
they were understood to have access to other sources, 
including the marble mines in Koshki Kohna and 
coal mines in the local Bandi Sozak area, not to men-
tion their external funding. 
Until the organization’s exposure, Daesh (Salafi 
Taliban) in Kunduz and Takhar Province mainly oper-
ated under the Taliban umbrella, that is, Salafi Taliban 
financed and managed their activities with resources 
generated locally as Islamic Emirate (taxing wheat 
and other produce) or sent as such from the Taliban’s 
purported headquarters in Peshawar or Quetta.  
Madrassas and mosques in Kunduz and Takhar are 
funded by individuals who enjoy close relations with 
donors in Gulf Arab countries, through having studied 
in Saudi Arabia, or though having been granted resi-
dency in Arab countries or by networking while on 
visits in the 1980s in the context of jihad fundraising.61
61 \  Especially for Kunduz and the north of Afghanistan, ‘Daesh’ funding 
should be understood separate from funding of local Salafi madrassas, 
mosques and instructors (teachers, trainers) because we cannot make 
a clear-cut generalization to the effect that all Salafi religious institu-
tions are recruiting centers for Daesh. Rather, the relationship bet-
ween Salafi education and religious institutions, on the one hand, and 
Daesh (armed Salafis), on the other, needs further investigation.
Besides these conduits, the Afghan and Pakistani 
labour migrant community is also used for channel-
ling money from Gulf Arab countries for distribution 
to religious scholars in Salafi madrassas in FATA,  
Afghanistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. However, 
while some of the wealthier labour migrants may 
earn enough to make substantial contributions, the 
income of the average labour migrant is not high 
enough to transfer anything that would even com-
pare with the donations (zakat) of Gulf Arab sheikhs 
and charity organizations. 
Respondents also emphasized the role of NGOs in 
funding militant activities. For example, an NGO 
from a Gulf Arab country involved in constructing 
mosques and basic infrastructure in the refugee 
camps of Jalozo, Shamshato, Khazani and others in 
Peshawar was allegedly channelling the funding. The 
NGO has been active in Peshawar since the 1980s and 
has been sending locals to Saudi Arabia for religious 
education ever since. As mentioned above, there are 
several people in Dasht-e Archi alone who graduated 
from religious institutions in Saudi Arabia. They form 
part of a network that can access funds for madrassas, 
mosques and allegedly humanitarian work, such as 
well-digging and other activities. While the impor-
tance of NGOs in promoting Salafism, in general,  
deserves highlighting, a note of caution is necessary, 
because only a few NGOs from Gulf Arab countries, 
and maybe only certain individuals within them, are 
directly linked to militant extremism. 
Non-local funds destined for Daesh that are not 
raised locally are said to be transferred mainly in two 
ways: through money and value transfer services 
such as the hawala system60 or from person to person 
(cash couriers). From Pakistan, there are a few such 
hawala operators sending money to Afghanistan.  
Respondents pointed out, for example, that Mangal 
Bagh received money from the moneychangers 
(sarafs) in the Marko Bazaar of Ghanikhel/Shinwar 
district. Proof of this was that the treasurer of Mangal 
60 \  According to various estimates, 50 to 90 per cent of all transactions 
inside Afghanistan and across its borders are being conducted via mo-
ney or value transfer services operations. Pakistan and the United 
Arab Emirates are the main transaction centres for Afghanistan in 
this regard. See: Financial Action Task Force (2014, pp. 11, 15). 
MAKING SENSE OF DAESH IN AFGHANISTAN: A SOCIAL MOVEMENT PERSPECTIVE \ K. MIELKE & N. MISZAK
42 \ \ WORKING PAPER 6  \ 2017
In Kot district, Daesh fighters kidnapped ten tribal 
elders in June 2015 under the pretext of them having 
asked the government to send more ALP to the dis-
trict. They were in Daesh’s custody for 45 days in the 
Mamand area of Achin, and Daesh announced that  
it would only release them after payment of seven  
Kalashnikovs along with 28 magazines of bullets or 
PKR 100,000 (EUR 855).
Recruiting
Given the reported cruelties of Daesh in Nangarhar 
during its inception phase there, in particular the 
videos released by Daesh itself and related propaganda 
and counter-propaganda efforts, the subsequent  
recruitment of followers outside of Nangarhar has  
become a primary challenge for Daesh. The Kunar 
and Nuristan data show that Daesh, being aware of 
their bad and deterring reputation, reacted with a 
rather ‘delicate’—i.e. non-violent—approach to reach 
out to local communities. 
For example, in Kunar’s Nurgal district, Daesh 
‘envoys’ first appeared as animal traders to scope out 
the possible reaction of locals to an eventual appear-
ance of Daesh in their district. According to an inter-
viewee, locals only later understood who these animal 
traders were when they returned with the black flag 
of Daesh und directly addressed locals, asking them 
to join Daesh. In other districts of Kunar and 
Nuristan, a typical pattern was that individual former 
Taliban commanders aided Daesh’s local expansion 
after they had been away for some time and upon  
return had obviously been charged by Daesh with the 
task of recruitment in their districts (e.g. in Marawara, 
Shigal, Watapoor). Other reports indicate that many 
Daesh recruiters had joined because of monetary  
incentives and only a few for reasons of religious con-
viction. As a rule, communities were addressed by l 
etters to a district’s tribal leaders (maliks) in which 
they were asked to pledge allegiance to Daesh, or the 
malik was approached personally and provided with 
recruiting material (daʿwa-cards). Recruits them-
selves were encouraged to recruit in their communi-
ties for Daesh. Where possible, recruits were sent 
away for Daesh training after which they would be 
In Nangarhar, Kunar and Nuristan, Daesh takes 
taxes in the form of zakat and ʿushr on all valuables 
(livestock, agricultural produce, gold, silver and jewel-
lery) that are taxable under Islamic law. The Quran 
does not prescribe the rate directly, but it is derived 
from past rulings and opinions by religious scholars. 
In areas of Nangarhar where Daesh has control, it 
mainly levies taxes on wheat and livestock (sheep, 
goats, cattle). For sheep and goats, the rate of zakat is 
one animal for a herd of between 40 and 120 animals. 
It does not impose any tax on herds smaller than 40. 
The calculation for cattle is slightly different, the rate 
being calculated at one animal for a herd of 30 to 40 
animals. As is common in Islam, the agricultural 
(ʿushr) rate is ten per cent for crops from land irrigated 
without great effort, whereas for harvest yields from 
land needing a more labour-intensive infrastructure, 
it can be five per cent (Sato, 2000). Furthermore, inter-
views indicated that Daesh also has an in-kind ‘war 
tax’ by cutting trees and taking the wooden beams 
from houses whose inhabitants had links to the Afghan 
government. It also allows Daesh supporters and 
sympathizers to cultivate the land of those who have 
left the areas and are thus considered de facto disloyal 
to Daesh. 
In Kunar and Nuristan, respondents reported that, 
in areas under Daesh control, the group taxes timber 
and precious metals or minerals that are smuggled to 
Pakistan. Taxation on precious minerals and metals 
(rikaz) is governed by Islamic law and subjected to a 
rate of 20 per cent62 (Zysow, 2000). The tax arrangements 
for timber are not clear to the authors, but respondents 
stated that the tax is measured by the load a horse 
can carry. Here, a tax of PKR 1,500 (approx. EUR 1363) is 
levied per horse. 
Kidnapping has also become a source of income. 
Respondents reported several such instances where 
tribal elders were taken hostage and were later  
released against payment. In one case, the sum paid 
was PKR 500,000 (around EUR 4,270) for one person. 
62 \  According to Zysow (2000, p. 413), zakat on mines (maʿdin) and treasures 
(rikaz) is set differently by the various Islamic schools and even varies 
between Hanafi and other Sunni schools. While Shafiʿis assess zakat at 
the rate of 20 per cent, others use 2.5 per cent.
63 \  Currency converted with estimated mid-range exchange rate of 2016, 
i.e. rate of 13 July 2016.
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obligations of every Muslim, they were reported to 
fast two days a week, never to perform their prayers 
in a rush and much more. Sympathizers of Daesh 
painted a propagandistic picture of Daesh, stating 
they would not collect food from locals, not request 
taxes or cash but, instead, bring Islamic justice,  
resolve conflicts without asking for payment, provide 
security and put an end to robberies, killings and 
plunder. 
The process of voluntary ‘joining Daesh’ was  
reported by a respondent from Takhar:
If somebody wants to join Daesh, he has to be intro-
duced by a trustworthy person who is already known 
to Daesh or the Taliban. Complete information about 
the one willing to join is needed, i.e. taskeera [ID 
card], passport or some other identity document, and 
his friend needs to verify that the candidate is a loyal 
and trustworthy individual and ready for jihad. Only 
then will Daesh accept this person into its group.65  
As described in the previous chapter, the profes-
sional propaganda of Daesh in Iraq and Syria appealed 
to people from all walks of life. In Nangarhar, the FM 
radio run by Daesh was a valuable tool for spreading 
propaganda (see section 'Framing the caliphate at 
home'); in other parts of the country, video clips and 
songs were apparently strategically distributed 
through music centres (shops) at local bazaars and 
passed on via USB. For example, a music centre owner 
in Taloqan, Takhar province, stated that the Taliban 
and Daesh would provide him with all the clips and 
ask him to copy them (secretly/without the client 
asking for it) along with whatever the client had  
requested and paid for. 66   
As several examples from different regions (see 
section on 'Many Daeshs in Afghanistan) have shown, 
the appeal of joining Daesh and the effect of its prop-
aganda are not necessarily a matter of ideology.  
Instead, a more important motivation for switching 
to Daesh seems to be the prospect that affiliation 
with this new jihadi organization will yield local  
 
 
65 \  Interview conducted in Darqad district of Takhar, 6 September 2016
66 \  Interview with music shop owner in Taloqan bazaar, Takhar province, 
17 August 2016.
assigned to a Daesh leader in the district and partici-
pate in operations. In another case, from Sarkano dis-
trict, it was reported that a mullah recruited youths 
directly to the front lines in Batikot and Achin, luring 
them to join Daesh with promises of high rank and a 
good salary. 64
In the north and north-east of Afghanistan, 
Daesh’s covert recruitment strategy again seems to 
have been not to arouse suspicion of the Taliban lead-
ership. At times, this proved an extremely sensitive 
task, requiring a sure instinct given that Daesh was 
also targeting figures in the top Taliban leadership in 
its recruitment drive. For example, several interviewees 
reported how key actors of Daesh in Dasht-e Archi 
tried to recruit the commander of the Taliban reserve 
corps in Dasht-e Archi or the Taliban district governor 
of Khanabad, who was also a resident of Dasht-e Archi, 
in April 2016. In the latter case, however, the target  
already had family relations with Daesh supporters. 
The strategy of Daesh followers in Kunduz appears to 
have been to set up a secret network and to expand 
local support before challenging the Taliban openly 
and risking an escalation of large-scale violence 
among the jihadi factions. This strategy weakened  
after the fall of Kunduz and the Taliban’s expulsion 
and purges of Daesh sympathizers and followers 
among its ranks. 
In another version of the ‘soft’ approach to  
recruiting local followers, Daesh sympathizers and 
Salafi Taliban were reportedly distinguishing them-
selves from ordinary Taliban and jihadis by their  
appearance and manners. Interviewees admired their 
handsome looks (clean and smart), their fashionable 
clothes and modern equipment (computers, mobile 
phones and the latest weapons), and their language 
skills (Arabic) and education (computer literacy).  
Accounts described them as modern, civilized, hon-
ourable and respectful, yet uncompromising regard-
ing the rules and regulations dictated by Islam and 
their Salafi organization. Besides fulfilling the ordinary 
64 \  According to interview accounts, salaries were not immediately paid to 
any ‘follower’ of Daesh. Only those who graduated from one of the Daesh 
training centres would be entitled to a salary of PKR 50.000 (around 
Euro 425 in July 2016). In a region that lacks general employment and 
income opportunities, such a salary is deemed highly attractive.
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What is the lure of Daesh?
On the emotional level, one major appeal of Daesh 
stems from its ambition to establish an Islamic cali-
phate without borders as home of the Muslim com-
munity of believers (umma) and its initial successes in 
doing so. The interview data from Kunduz (see 'Many 
Daeshs in Afghanistan') is especially insightful in this 
regard. It illustrates the workings of Daesh (Raqqa)’s 
propaganda aimed at popularizing its aims and puta-
tive Islamic values. Propaganda has swept all areas of 
Afghanistan through the dissemination of trailers, 
songs and video clips that feature the preaching of 
Daesh followers, along with video clips of training, 
battles and songs via social media (facebook, twitter, 
real-time communication in chats, via vyber and 
skype) and flash devices (USBs). Videos and pictures 
seem to have particularly contributed to a wave of 
popularity among people of all walks of life, irrespective 
of whether the imitators (mostly in dress and clothing 
style) had a Salafi inclination or not. One could even 
claim that Daesh’s style partakes in global youth pop 
culture and gained popularity when the groups was 
making significant territorial gains in Iraq and Syria 
throughout 2013 and 2014.
The public discourse of Daesh in Iraq and Syria 
and Daesh in Afghanistan relies primarily on Islamic 
eschatology to legitimize itself and mobilize followers. 
Communities are approached with the message of the 
caliphate’s establishment (see 'Transformation of the 
jihadi landscape'—recruiting), stressing that the 
emergence and expansion of Daesh resembles the ful-
filment of a prophecy described in the Quran and/or 
hadiths. Alternatively, Daesh propaganda speaks of a 
hadith that mentions a group holding black banners 
which believers should join because it will appear 
near the time the Imam Mahdi will arrive.69 The 
69 \  As featured, for example, in one broadcast of the Daesh FM Radio The 
Voice of the Caliphate titled “Warning” on 7 May 2016. “The hadiths 
suggest that the Islamic caliphate will spread before the appearance of 
the Mehdi. ( . . .) We are the lashkar [tribal armed group] that is prophe-
sized to appear before the arrival of the Mehdi. We will fight for years 
with the hope of bringing about the caliphate. We will fight until the 
time when we have finished with all these non-Muslims across the 
world. And we will fight until the time when we will raise the black 
flag everywhere across the world.” Interestingly, several mawlawis in-
terviewed in the course of the research project mentioned the same 
hadith (in the holy book Meshkat) to legitimze their acquiescence  
towards Daesh propaganda because, according to them, it actually says 
something like “… in the last age of the world, people with long hair 
holding black banners will perform lengthy prayers. They will propa-
power and money at some point (moral and financial 
resources). Nevertheless, it is remarkable that—accord- 
ing to interview data—a considerable number of 
those who were ideologically motivated to switch 
from former Taliban and non-Salafis to Salafism and 
Daesh did so while in prison. Examples include late 
Daesh Khorasan deputy governor Abdul Rauf Khadim 
(Guantanamo detainee) and a local Taliban figure 
from Dasht-e Archi who had been jailed in Kunduz 
city for ten months. On another note, informed  
respondents also stated that the imprisoned wives of 
Uzbek foreign fighters would actively preach Salafism, 
for example in Kabul’s Pul-e Charki prison. 
Framing the caliphate at home:  
Shadow of violence and revolutionary 
social justice 
Your wounded and injured go to the hospitals in Pesha-
war, but mine are just dying at the edge of Spin Ghar67
With the focus on framing, this section analyzes 
the strategies with which Daesh in Afghanistan em-
ploys to shape opportunity structures and mobilize 
resources—in particular recruits and support, even if 
only tacit and passive—and the narratives it employs 
to legitimate itself as a superior jihadi option among 
its contenders in the increasingly fragmented politico- 
religious landscape of Afghanistan. The analysis relies 
largely on a content analysis of recorded radio broad-
casts by Daesh’s FM radio service, De Khalefat Ghag 
(Voice of the caliphate), aired in Nangarhar68 and  
includes print and online material used or issued by 
Daesh in Afghanistan (and Syria/Iraq). We shall first 
introduce the ambition articulated by Daesh, before 
looking into different legitimization narratives.
67 \  Daesh poetry addressing the Taliban. FM radiobroadcast “Da tseray 
suri ta” [Under the wild tree], 5 May 2016.
68 \  The radio went on air for the first time in October 2015. It was de-
stroyed twice by US drone strikes (on 1 February 2016, and 10 July 2016) 
and re-started airing first in May and recently in late October2016. For 
this study, recordings of Pashto broadcasts were made from 5–11 May 
2016, and Dari as well as Pashto broadcasts were covered from 30 May 
until 4 July 2016. In this second recording period, three days are miss-
ing however, because either the radio was not on air or the data collec-
tor was not able to record the broadcasts, i.e. 22–23 June; 1 July). In the 
latest broadcasting period, the Pashto programmes of 17 and 19–22 No-
vember 2016 were recorded. 
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declare Muslims in or from occupied and kafir coun-
tries to be brothers and call on them to reject nation- 
state thinking (watan) and ‘false patriotism’.
For example, if those Americans who are in Afghan- 
istan become Muslims and accept the Sharia com-
pletely, they will be our brothers according to Islamic 
Law. They should not go back to America, and if they 
have the ability, we may accept them as our com-
manders. But the idea of patriotism would mean you 
are not allowed to accept them because they are con-
sidered as foreigners. 72 
The allusion to the acceptance of foreign Muslims 
in leadership positions of the caliphate is subtle but 
most likely chosen to reconcile doubts among Afghan 
Daesh-followers about the Pakistani-origin leader of 
Daesh (ordinary people would not know anything 
about Khorasan Shura and that most of its members 
are also Pakistani citizens) or the role of foreign fight-
ers among the ranks of Daesh and its allies (IMU, 
Jundullah). 
A further cornerstone of Daesh’s ideology is the 
idea that infidels—‘occupying’ foreign forces—and 
their law need to be removed from Muslim lands at 
any cost. Another is the idea of raising future genera-
tions of followers purely in accordance with the 
Quran and Sunna (hadiths), not exposing them to any 
of the four schools of Muslim jurisprudence, let alone 
secular education. Secularism is called an illness and 
its allegedly spread via the common education system. 
It is said to be not only against Islam but is also 
viewed as a cover for false education and indoctrina-
tion of the future generation in the caliphate. 73 This has 
implications for the teaching of girls and curriculum 
development. Regular school education is seen as a 
risk and a starting point for girls to deviate from  
Islamic values (see section on women and parda below). 
72 \  Broadcast of short speech, 1 June 2016.
73 \  One programme also announces consequences: “… they should wait 
for the heavy explosions in schools and universities”. Broadcast “Mo-
mino Olasono Ta pegham, Mortadeno ta Akhtar” [Message to pious 
people and warning to those who have diverted from Islam], 3 June 
2016. In hindsight, this reads like a threat come true in the Kabul at-
tack on the American University of August 2016. However, even though 
there is a general rivalry between Daesh and Taliban to take responsi-
bility for different attacks, both were silent on this attack. It is unli-
kely that Daesh was behind it.
 significance of Khorasan is not clearly communicated 
and a reference to Khorasan in the hadith or Quran is 
contested by non-Salafi ulama. One mawlawi inter-
viewed for this study stated that there is a hadith 
(Meshkat book, part 2, Kitabul Fitan) that says “Imam 
Mehdi will appear in Khorasan”.70 Similarly, two re-
spondents said the hadith did not speak of a province 
(velayat) Khorasan, but that “violence will start from 
Khorasan…”, with one variation adding that “Dajal 
[the deceiver, devil] will appear in Khorasan with 
7,000 Jews behind him.”71 One interlocutor who had 
undergone religious higher education denied that 
Khorasan was mentioned in any hadith and had any 
significance in Islam, suggesting it is only referred to 
in history books. Miquel & Laurens' (2004) classic book 
on the history of Islam, refers to Khorasan as a region, 
not a political entity, including the lands between the 
Caspian Sea and India with Bukhara, Balkh, Samarkand, 
Nishapur and Merv as its major cities. Likewise, in his 
interview with the former Daesh propaganda maga-
zine Dabiq, Daesh governor of Khorasan, the late Hafiz 
Saeed, assigned Khorasan alone a geopolitical signifi-
cance, speaking of it as the gateway to conquering 
neighbouring lands that had once been Muslim and 
thus expanding the caliphate. In fact, Khorasan was 
only ever marginally addressed in the pages of Dabiq.
A Daesh scholar explained the borders of the cali-
phate in one of the De Khalifat Ghag’s radio broadcasts 
to include Spain, North  Africa, Indonesia, East Turke-
stan, arguing that their occupation by infidels (kafirs) 
justifies the pursuit of obligatory defensive jihad by 
every Muslim to liberate these lands from “kafir, mur-
tadeen [‘puppets’, lit. apostates], kufree nizams [laws of 
the nonbelievers], constitutions and secularism.” In 
the same speech, he also describes Pakistan and Saudi 
Arabia as occupied. Moving along in his litany, the 
speaker emphasizes that occupation should not only 
be seen in a territorial sense but, decisively, as the im-
plementation and rule of ‘law’ (constitution, religion) 
in every place. Under this definition, the scholar can 
 
gate the caliphate but you people should stay away from them.” Inter-
views with ulama representatives in Nangarhar, October 2016. 
70 \  Interview with mawlawi in Mamand area of Achin district, Nangarhar, 
October 2016.
71 \  Interview with mullah in Jalalabad City, October 2016.
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(hajj, ʿumra) and on ‘huge sins’, such as 66 types of 
shirk (idolatry and polytheism). The content of these 
books is not outright extremist or Salafi; for example, 
one of the sins mentioned in the “Book on huge sins” 
is to call Muslims infidel—which runs counter to the 
takfiri approach usually expected from hardline fol-
lowers of Salafism. 
The FM radio service is an important propaganda 
tool for Daesh in Nangarhar and its neighbouring  
areas (districts of Kunar and supposedly areas across 
the border in Pakistan). It became increasingly popular 
in and beyond the areas controlled by Daesh, as people 
began to discuss the content of its programmes in 
the provincial capital Jalalabad and in other districts 
of the province. Some respondents explained that the 
radio channel was highly effective in building 
Daesh’s popularity since it ‘explained everything’,  
including their own actions and those of others with 
reference to the Quran or the hadiths. The defining 
feature of the propaganda transmitted via the FM  
radio service is its attempt to indoctrinate without 
offering any logic or reason. It recalls one of Hannah 
Arendt’s definitions of totalitarian propaganda as the 
art and ability to establish power without having the 
means to do so.77 In this respect, the speeches and in-
terviews, for example with late Daesh leader Hafiz 
Saeed, demonstrate totalitarian qualities (according 
to Arendt, 2006) because they pick selected elements 
of Salafi ideology and Daesh advances to construct a 
fictive world that does not correspond to ‘reality’.  
The radio broadcast seven days a week and in-
cluded a daily output of one hour of Pashto and 30 
minutes of Dari programming.78 There have been no 
live broadcasts, and all programmes were pre-recorded. 
At times, breaking news was announced to make the 
programme appear more dynamic. The pre-recording 
was likely due to security concerns of the presenters. 
With regard to the programme schedule, the The Voice 
of the Caliphate broadcasts included a number of 
77 \  “Totalitäre Propaganda hat ihr Ziel nicht erreicht, wenn sie überzeugt, 
sondern wenn sie organisiert. Sie ist die Kunst der Machtbildung ohne 
den Besitz der Machtmittel“ (Arendt, 2006, p. 762).
78 \  Local media reports suggested that the radio station featured pro-
gramme sections also in other languages, e.g. Pashai, English, Arabic, 
Uzbek and Urdu. However, this was not encountered in the programmes 
recorded for this research and could not otherwise be followed up.
The reasoning in another radio broadcast highlights 
the mixing of concerns about women’s education and 
putative Islamic values: 
So if a girl sits in school for 12 years and is exposed 
to all these pictures [of faculty, coeducation, female 
parliamentarians], she will be ready to accept coedu-
cation in the university if not at school. So a girl goes 
for 12 years to school, then she is ready to allow her 
daughter to attend university. When she graduates 
from the university she receives a scholarship and 
then goes to America, the UK or some other country. 
They go there and they do not dress in accordance 
with Islam because they are half-naked. 74 
Interviews showed that Daesh has indeed closed 
schools for both, boys and girls in the districts of 
Nangarhar where it has control. However, this seems 
to be more due to fighting. For, at least in their radio 
broadcasts, they fiercely reject the allegation of being 
against education and knowledge.75 Yet, it seems that 
the type of education they have in mind is a mix of 
Quranic and Sunna/hadith studies on the one hand 
and Arabic subjects on the other. The radio broadcasts 
mention that Daesh has already developed its own 
curriculum that is being taught with specially com-
piled books. 
In the course of the survey informing this Paper, 
the research team was able to detect four books that 
Daesh is reportedly using for school education in 
Nangarhar. Of these four books, three are printed and 
published by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endow-
ment, Daʿwa and Guidance of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia (in 2003, 2011, 2010).76 They instruct pupils on 
how to perform prayers, on questions of pilgrimage 
74 \  Broadcast “Momini mermani” [Pious Women], 20 June 2016.
75 \  Fragments of an emotional speech aired on 6 June 2016 highlight that 
functional professions are deemed desirable; “You say the caliphate 
has closed the door of the schools, you say they are the enemy of edu-
cation and knowledge. No never! We do not want to or let our children 
acquire the ideas of the infidels [kafir]. Come and see what kind of edu-
cation we are giving our children. My son will be an independent mul-
lah not the slave of the kafir. My kid will be an intelligent mujahid doc-
tor, not to serve the kafir; my sweet child will be a mujahid engineer, 
not an engineer who adopts the ideas of the East or West.”
76 \  According to the Saudi Arabian government website, this ministry is 
responsible for Islamic affairs other than the hajj (pilgrimage). “ 
ncluded in its remit are the building and maintenance of mosques 
throughout the Kingdom, as well as the administration of land held by 
religious trust.” See http://www.saudinf.com/main/c6q.htm.
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extremely violent and oppressive. So Daesh in  
Afghanistan now employs a range of legitimization 
strategies to counter propaganda and to reshape  
unfavourable local opinions about Daesh actions. The 
Voice of the Caliphate serves as a major tool in these 
efforts and airs several programmes designed to  
reject hostile propaganda by locals through the voice 
of other locals.
Besides features that seek to present reports 
about Daesh violence as propaganda, Daesh has also 
been trying to counter the widespread belief among 
Afghans that the main motivation for people to join 
Daesh lies in material benefits, as reflected in the 
widespread rumours about the wealth of Daesh and 
its ability to offer salaries as high as US $ 500 to 600 
per month. Thus, in one broadcast, a number of Daesh 
fighters are interviewed about their motivations for 
joining Daesh with the bottom line being that nearly 
all of them stated that they had joined after carefully 
studying the Islamic State’s messages and actions 
and embracing the essence of its teachings, i.e. the 
duty to do jihad and establish the caliphate. The mes-
sage is intended to distinguish Daesh from other jihadi 
organizations and to counter the idea that the Daesh 
fighters are essentially mercenaries who could shift 
their loyalty to the highest bidder at any time. 
Daesh’s legitimization strategy relies largely on 
othering and boundary drawing vis-à-vis declared 
enemies. The main bogymen targeted by Daesh prop-
aganda can be listed as follows: first and foremost the 
CIA, the Pakistan Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) ser-
vice, followed by the Afghan Taliban and the Afghan 
murtad (‘puppet’, lit. apostate) government, Saudi Arabia, 
Iran, all Shias, the political parties (tanzim), Lashkar- 
e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, anti-Daesh media and 
ulama, as well as pro-government forces of every kind 
(condemned as being in the pocket of the CIA), such 
as the tribal uprising units, arbakees (tribal militia), 
the ANA and more. Americans and foreigners, in gen-
eral, come under blanket criticism and are all branded 
as enemies. Radio speakers also denounce wider ideas, 
such as ‘secularism, communism, nationalism, patri-
otism, and democracy’, and institutions such as NGOs, 
parliaments and constitutions, etc. 
standard features, such as religious teachings on the 
Quran, the hadiths and prohibitions, poetry, specific 
programmes targeting women, special programmes 
for schoolchildren, and speeches from Daesh’s late 
leader Hafiz Saeed and the then spokesperson for 
Daesh in Iraq and Syria, al-Adnani.  A few minutes 
(4–10) were usually devoted to local and international 
news with a news bulletin called Khalefat Ghag 
Khabari Gary (News hour of The Voice of the Caliphate). 
The news as such was usually kept brief, but the 
items were complemented by pre-recorded interviews 
with Daesh commanders and fighters from different 
districts of Nangarhar where they gave an account of 
their progress in the battlefields. The broadcasts  
recorded for this study show that the focus gradually 
shifted over the course of 2016 towards more news 
from Afghanistan. The new emphasis on local issues 
aimed to demonstrate the battlefield strength of 
Daesh against the Taliban, foreigners and ANSF in 
Nangarhar. Attacks—such as the killing of Afghan 
Parliamentarian Shirwali Wardak on 7 June 2016 in 
Kabul or the attack on the private FM radio Enekas 
and TV channel Afghan Cable on 9 June 2016 in Jalala-
bad—were embellished as great successes and ex-
ploited for propaganda purposes. News from outside 
of Afghanistan and particularly the Daesh core areas 
in the Middle East was shared without further expla-
nations or interviews. Exceptions were made, however, 
for news about major Daesh attacks in the West. For 
example, the attack carried out by Omar Mateen in 
an Orlando LGBT nightclub that killed 49 people on 
12 June 2016, was discussed disproportionately. It fitted 
the ideological frame because the victims were not 
only members of the LGBT community, but the attack 
was carried out by a Muslim US national and took 
many lives.      
Stepping outside the ‘shadow of violence’
Research on irregular armed groups (Schlichte, 
2009; Jung & Schlichte, 2016) has highlighted how 
any such group with the ambition to establish local 
rule faces the challenge of legitimizing itself beyond 
the execution of brute force (‘shadow of violence’). 
The primary challenge Daesh faces in its expansion 
is the perception among locals that it has been  
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(Arabic: rafidah) in Khorasan and whether military 
and security operations are conducted against them. 
He answers:
There have been Rāfidah in Khurāsān, sadly, for a 
long time, and they are far from our areas of control. 
We have fought them and we regularly conduct oper-
ations against them, such as the operation conduct-
ed in the beginning of Muharram in the city of Kabul. 
We likewise conducted a major operation in Karachi 
against the Ismā’īlī sect in which 48 of the evil Rāfi-
dah were killed [citation appears as original typeset]. 
(Interview with: The wali of Khurasan, 2016, p. 53) 
While this comes from Daesh in Iraq and Syria, 
Daesh’s radio service—in the recordings that could be 
obtained during the research period (see footnote 67 
above)—is conspicuously silent when it comes to  
explicit anti-Hazara (Afghan Shias) rhetoric, although 
anti-Shia attitudes are explicitly expressed in the  
abstract.80 After the Taliban had consoled the families 
of the victims of the Kabul attack of 23 July 2016,  
referring to the Hazara as brothers, a Daesh mufti  
reportedly issued a fatwa castigating the Taliban for 
this response. As of yet, inter-sectarian differences  
between Sunni and Shia are not the primary driver of 
support for Daesh in Afghanistan. Instead, intra- 
sectarian (i.e. intra-Sunni) fault lines seem to be 
deeper than those between Shia and Sunni. One  
dimension of the warfare raging between Taliban and 
Daesh throughout 2016 was the targeted assassinations 
of religious scholars of both sides. Despite the violently 
anti-Shia rhetoric by Daesh in Iraq and Syria, the  
recent attacks on Shia shrines and mosques as well 
as on the Hazaras’ TUTAP protests in July 2016 in  
Kabul (for which Daesh claimed responsibility) are 
not rooted in the same political grievances as in Iraq 
and Syria.
Besides the hostility towards Taliban and Shia, 
the members of three other institutions—the ulama, 
80 \  However, this might be because the major attacks on Shiites—the 
TUTAP protestors on 23 July, and the shrine visitors on 11 October 
2016—took place when the radio was off air. Likewise, the suicide 
bombing in the Shia mosque in Kabul of 21 November 2016 was not 
reflected in the recordings until 22 November 2016 (the last day of  
recording for this research). However, the story was possibly picked up 
later, given that no live and real breaking news would enter any pro-
gramme on the same or even the next day.
Of particular relevance for the intra-Afghanistan 
power dynamics is the foe image of the Afghan Taliban, 
referred to as the ‘nationalist Taliban movement’. In 
an interview with the Daesh magazine Dabiq, Hafiz 
Saeed states “… they rule by tribal customs and judge 
affairs in accordance with the desires and traditions 
of people, traditions opposing the Islamic Sharī’ah 
[citation appears as original typeset]” (Interview 
with: The wali of Khurasan, 2016, pp. 49–50). Asked 
about the late Taliban leader Akhtar Mansoor’s relation- 
ship with Pakistani intelligence, he alludes to the  
existence of “strong and deep ties” (p. 50), claiming 
the Taliban reside in Islamabad, Peshawar and Quetta. 
Saeed goes on to state that, “The war between us and 
the Taliban carries on” (p. 50), and he makes a reference 
to the Zabul incident in November 2015 in which he 
condemns the killing of the Uzbek brothers’ “defence- 
less women and children” (p. 51). Furthermore, he  
decries the Taliban’s role in the opium economy, 
There is no doubt that the nationalist Taliban move-
ment has permitted farmers and merchants to grow 
and sell opium. Rather, the matter has reached the 
point that the movement itself harvests opium, and 
even worse than that is, that the Taliban themselves 
transport opium and heroin in their personal vehicles, 
charging a fee to the sellers and the addicts! They 
also take a 10% cut as well as taxes from them. 
Akhtar Mansour himself is considered as being from 
the major dealers of these narcotics [citation appears 
as original typeset]. (Interview with: The wali of 
Khurasan, 2016, p. 51.) 
Daesh in Iraq and Syria, as well as Daesh Khorasan, 
have frequently accused the late Taliban leader Man-
soor of being an agent of the ISI and the movement 
as such to be working for the ISI. Another issue taken 
up against the Taliban is their explicit non-sectarian-
ism79, or ‘softness’, against Daesh’s other major enemy, 
the Shias. Salafism is fiercely anti-Shia and considers 
Shias to be non-Muslims. In the Dabiq interview, 
Hafiz Saeed is asked about the presence of Shias  
79 \  How serious this anti-sectarian attitude of the Taliban must be can 
be gleaned from one of the dispatches of Osman (2016a, p. 8); he writes, 
“AAN knows of generous funding offers to Taliban/Emiratis from Arab 
Gulf to embark on anti-Iran and anti-Shia projects in Afghanistan” but 
the Taliban reportedly consistently turned such offers down. 
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Daesh propaganda deliberately targets women 
with the promise of the rights they are entitled to ac-
cording to the Quran—rights they have been deprived 
of allegedly because of local customs and tradition 
(‘culture’) and Western influences. In an introduction 
to the women’s programme, for example, Daesh pre-
sents itself as advocate of women’s rights, saying that 
local cultural values such as Pashtunwali were denying 
women their rights. The transcript is given here in 
full because it illustrates the worldview espoused by 
Daesh, which is in complete contradiction to its 
treatment of women in practice (see 'Transformation 
of the jihadi landscape, Nangarhar): 
Our Muslims are also unaware of Islam and behave 
towards women like non-Muslims. For example, 
women do not receive their inheritance share of any 
property. Women do not receive their bride price. 
They do not have the right to participate in decision- 
making processes. There is even the idea that a woman 
does not have the right to eat with her husband. And 
she cannot talk in front of men, even about her needs. 
Women cannot buy or sell anything. When a woman 
dies, she is part of the inheritance of her husband’s 
family. Who a woman is married to is decided by 
male family members without asking the woman 
herself. The women are completely deprived of the 
rights that are given to them by Islam. They are like 
slaves and have to work hard. If someone is soft with 
his wife, it is considered a fault (. . .). They are ex-
changed and sold like animals. If a husband pressur-
izes his wife, she does not have the right to object. 
Women are hidden from public view by parda. This 
kind of cruelty to women comes from society. In ad-
dition, the enemies of Islam, European researchers/
Orientalists (mustashriqen), and others seek to use 
women as a means against Islam by involving them 
in un-Islamic activities, such as employment in 
NGOs, encouraging them to go out of their houses, 
deceiving them with the name of civil society. In other 
cases, women are encouraged to sit with men in 
parliament or other shuras. They are encouraged to 
travel abroad on scholarships and take part in other 
kinds of trips to make them ignorant. So Daesh has 
Afghan government forces and the media—are specif-
ically targeted as part of a counter-propaganda effort. 
The media is presented as having introduced ‘an 
American form of Islam’ by claiming it was ‘real Islam’. 
Daesh’s warning follows suit: “…if they do not stop 
their enmity with the Islamic caliphate, then the 
next attack will be very heavy”.81  ANA officers (‘serv-
ants of the kafir’) and the lower ranks are addressed in 
an emotional speech and asked why dozens of Af-
ghan forces were escaping and joining the caliphate 
despite all the perks they receive as members of the 
ANSF. The speaker says, 
Hey, ANA fighters, I know you are deceived by your 
commanders with promises. But tell me the truth; 
have you never wondered who the mujahidin of the 
caliphate are? Now you know that the leaders of the 
Emirate [Taliban] are the labourers of the ISI. You 
are the kids of the Americans, and the Emirate is the 
grandkid of the Americans. ( . . .) This country is the 
earth of our Allah, playing with our heads. Anyone 
playing against this law of Sharia will be killed.82  
The Islamic scholars (ulama) are provoked in the 
radio broadcasts with the question of why they con-
tinue to live in areas under control of kafir and do not 
migrate to the area of the Islamic caliphate. The radio 
presenters are suggesting here that those ulama who 
do not make this decision (although they “live very 
close”) cannot be ‘true’ ulama and are possibly just too 
complacent to give up their wealth and status. 
Many programmes of The Voice of the Caliphate  
exploit local values and norms for legitimation pur-
poses. For instance, Daesh recognizes the importance 
and status of poetry in Afghan society and espouses 
poets and their works in its propaganda. 83 Moreover, 
rather than seeking to root the legitimacy of Daesh 
purely in religious sources, programmes court the lis-
tener by claiming Daesh’s high respect for social and 
cultural values. This might include the convening of 
a Jirga for conflict resolution or exhortations for ap-
propriate conduct towards women.  
81 \  Broadcast of 8 June 2016.
82 \  Broadcast of 10 June 2016
83 \  The longest programmes on The Voice of the Caliphate—sometimes up 
to 50 minutes—are devoted to Daesh-oriented Pashto poetry. The verse 
at the beginning of 'Framing the caliphate at home' is exemplary for 
this type of messaging.
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merely following their personal interests rather than 
truly representing their local community (see below). 
It is a typical pattern in Daesh propaganda that such 
blatant contradictions are never resolved or no attempt 
is made to address them. This aspect is very much in 
line with the above findings concerning the parochial 
totalitarian outlook of Daesh’s propaganda. 
Women are just one group of several that Daesh 
claims to look after. Other groups in need of support 
are ordinary men, ‘poor farmers’, sharecroppers and 
all those who are being ‘deceived’ by tribal/local leaders. 
This, again, is reflected in the radio broadcasts and 
informs the presenters’ narrative strategies. The 
broadcasts target listeners who already live in or near 
areas controlled by Daesh as well as those who are as 
yet outside its realm in a bid to convince them to join 
Daesh. Thus, Daesh presents itself as an organization 
that takes care of its followers and fighters if only 
they “come to live in the territory of the caliphate 
where they can enjoy all the benefits of the Islamic 
caliphate”.85  
One of Daesh’s main propaganda messages is the 
abolition of all social and status/power differences 
among its followers. As one Kunduz respondent stat-
ed, they have the idea that all people are becoming 
one, all other groups will be eliminated.”86 In a radio 
speech, this message is elaborated:
This is the pure soil of the caliphate. (. . .) Here, there 
is no discrimination based on tribes, languages or 
regions. Yes, here, no-one is superior, neither Arab to 
non-Arab (ʿajam), nor Black or White. But those are 
superior who have honesty and virtue. Here, com-
mander (amir) and poor person (faqir) are standing 
in the same queue to get their rights. (. . .) This is the 
Islamic caliphate. Here, people of different tribes,  
colours, nations, and areas came together under the 
shadow of the black flag and live in peace.87 
It is never articulated to which existing grievanc-
es this ideological paradigm responds. Obviously, so-
cial and socio-economic inequalities are alluded to, 
85 \  Interviewees reported land and property allocations to fighters and 
their families who arrived in the districts under Daesh control.
86 \  Interview, Kunduz, September 2016.
87 \  Radio broadcast of 9 May 2016.
a thought for you that the Prophet Mohammad in-
troduced 1,400 years ago. Its purpose is to liberate 
you from the cruelties of so-called Muslim honour 
and to protect you from being used by the Western 
invaders against Islam. So in the following lesson, 
you will learn about women’s rights. The Islamic  
caliphate will give you these rights; you are entitled 
to any right of Allah. So listen to the programme, 
and we ask all those women who live in areas under 
government control to join in the life in the lands of 
Daesh.84      
The lesson following this radio broadcast is  
devoted to explaining parda—the social norm of phys-
ical and social exclusion of females in society beyond 
their core family. Wherever women meet men who 
are not their brothers, sons or husbands, parda is vio-
lated. According to the presenter, the main causes for 
violating parda lies in cultural practices that predom-
inate in the rural areas and areas of Western influence. 
Such practices are, he claims, propagated by the Afghan 
government or civil society, mainly in urban areas. As 
mentioned above, in the section speaking on educa-
tion, regular schools are seen as a starting point for 
removing parda, even in the countryside. Daesh  
believes that even where no co-education is practised, 
regular school-educated girls will stop observing  
parda by the time they enrol in university. 
It is striking how Daesh exploits social and cultural 
norms to delegitimize the Afghan government and 
vague Western influences, on the one hand, while 
condemning cultural practices stemming from ‘folk 
Islam’ and Pashtunwali, on the other hand. They argue 
that women have been deprived of the rights the 
Quran foresees for them because of impure cultural 
deviations in Islamic society, most tangible in Pash-
tunwali. However, they do not explain how a woman 
observing strict parda can then take part in decision- 
making processes, obtain an education, stand up for 
her interests and ‘speak in front of men’. Another 
such contradiction is the way they allude to the nec-
essary respect for elders but also blame elders for mis-
guiding local communities and accuse them of 
84 \  Broadcast titled “Mominee Mermani” [Practical pious women],  
9 May 2016.
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took thousands of dollars to encourage people to 
stand against Daesh, while at the same time living in 
Kabul or other places now that they have destroyed 
the local people and communities.” 
To sum up, by portraying itself as the force antici-
pated in the primary religious sources (Quran and/or 
hadith) that will establish the caliphate according to 
prophecy, Daesh provides a master frame that intro-
duces a new jihadi narrative to its Afghan audience. 
This narrative communicated for example through 
the broadcasts of its FM radio De Khalefat Ghag is per-
suasive to some. The radio broadcasts reportedly enjoy 
high popularity beyond the areas of its local rule and 
resonate with certain segments of the population. On 
some issues, the narrative appears to be more persua-
sive than alternative frames provided by the govern-
ment, other jihadi groups or independent ulama. The 
radio is thus an efficient vehicle to persuade the larger 
public—if not to join as fighters—to sympathize with 
Daesh’s goals and create identification with its political 
vision. Daesh uses intimidating language for its  
declared enemies (media, ANSF, Taliban of the Islamic 
Emirate) or deviants (ulama, tribal elders) to impress 
its audience. It frames its enemies in terms of geo- 
political and moral categories as puppets of foreign 
regimes, Pakistan and the United States, or drug dealers 
transgressing Islamic land and with a corrupting  
influence on society. Moreover, it uses examples of 
spectacular violence in its broadcasts, such as the 
US-bombing in an LGBT-nightclub, as opportunity to 
reconfirm its agenda.
The empirical evidence in this section also points 
to a number of contradictions or tensions between 
what Daesh communicates through the radio broad-
casts of its FM radio De Khalefat Ghag and what Daesh 
communicates through its direct interactions with 
the local population. One tension includes the actual 
treatment of and violence against women versus its 
claim to be an advocate of women’s rights true to 
Sharia. Another example is their expressed attitude 
on education which contradicts the fact that schools 
in the territory under Daesh rule were not operating 
while holding out the prospect that these will be 
overcome and no longer exist in the Islamic caliphate. 
From the radio, two types of social justice topics can be 
gleaned. One is the access to resources (redistribution 
and access to services); the other is the abandoning 
of the malik (tribal/local leader) system. Both aim to 
convince listeners of Daesh’s pro-poor social activities 
and win people’s hearts and minds. Regarding access 
to resources, one of the programmes reports on the 
redistribution of wheat—collected as zakat (Islamic 
tax)—to the poor. Interviews with receivers of zakat 
focus on the neediest people and transmit two main 
messages: First, it is subtly agreed that wheat as a 
permissible (halal) alternative to poppy crops brings 
the same monetary gain; second, that paying the  
agricultural tax (ʿushr) of 10 per cent of the harvest is 
a matter of course and honour—it is not collected by 
force. 
A separate discussion88 serves to suggest that  
traditional local leaders (maliks) cannot be trusted  
because they are not honest and have links with  
intelligence agencies, receiving money from the latter. 
A religious scholar invited to speak claims that maliks 
are liars and that people are always disadvantaged 
and occur losses because of the maliks’ decisions. 
Through their links with intelligence and international 
agendas, maliks do not act in the interest of ordinary 
people; and whoever obeys a malik’s decisions will 
lose his higher level of belief (iman). The assertion is 
that a malik’s conflict resolution practices have 
proved detrimental. The malik tend to decide in favour 
of a bribe-giver, so the two conflict parties will later 
start fighting, thus creating long-lasting enmities as 
a result of which both sides will lose their houses, 
property and honour. Further on in the programme, 
the religious scholar asks a rhetorical question: “How 
long do you still want to be deceived by these maliks? 
You know them. They are not from some other place; 
they are from this area,” which could be read as an 
invitation to take action against any malik or as legit-
imation for Daesh’s use of brute force against tribal 
leaders. The presenter adds, “They are the maliks who 
88 \  Broadcast, “Discussion” with two guests from Shinwar district on the 
tribal Uprising Forces, 11 June 2016.
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This account of a highly uneven presence— 
differentiated further between presence, appearance 
and symbolism—and non-simultaneous evolution 
highlights the substantial impact of locally derived 
opportunity structures. Thus, the propaganda of 
Daesh in Syria and Iraq that had led to an initial pop-
ularizing of Daesh in Afghanistan is crucial but insuf-
ficient to understand the emergence of Daesh in dif-
ferent locations. Instead, the ‘weakness’ of tribal, 
government and/or Taliban structures have proven 
crucial in Nangarhar for Daesh’s expansion. Similarly, 
in the west, it was leadership struggles among the 
Taliban that allowed Daesh to be proclaimed. Regarding 
the emergence of Daesh in Afghanistan, it is striking 
that the assumed leadership and command centre of 
Daesh in Afghanistan—the Khorasan Shura headed by 
the late Hafiz Saeed—obviously does not play a signif-
icant role in the question of how Daesh fares locally.89 
Moreover, neither does Daesh in Syria and Iraq seem 
to be of importance for local affairs in Afghanistan; 
nor does the death of Hafiz Saeed resulting from a 
drone strike on 26 July 2016 and the (non-)appoint-
ment of his successor seem to have had an impact on 
locally observed dynamics of Daesh in Afghanistan.
The section 'Transformation of the jihadi land-
scape' highlighted how the current Salafi ‘turn’ has 
evolved out of long-term cultural, social and religious 
transformations in the Afghanistan–Pakistan border-
land. It is important to recognize that Salafism did 
not arise with Daesh in the region but has roots that 
are much older than those of Salafi ideas coming 
from the Najd on the Arabian Peninsula. We have 
shown how Daesh in Afghanistan built on socialization 
and radicalization in Wahhabi-financed institutions 
as well as personnel from existing armed groups 
which led to a growing influence of Salafism. The latter 
does not represent a unified and coherent political 
89 \  It is likely that this phenomenon can be ascribed to the research pro-
ject’s bottom-up approach (in contrast, for example, to Giustozzi & 
Mangal, 2016, whose data seems to be largely from insider and intelli-
gence sources) and thus may signify a limitation of their research. 
This, however, does not explain that the Daesh-radio The Voice of the 
Caliphate is also largely silent on the governance structure of Daesh. 
Only one of the recorded broadcasts is devoted to the administrative 
bureaucratic structure of Daesh in Iraq and Syria, not Daesh in Afgha-
nistan. Radio broadcast of 19 November 2016.
at the time of data collection. Daesh prohibits opium 
poppy and hashish cultivation and regularly refers to 
the Taliban as drug dealers but respondents suggest 
that some of the narcotics confiscated were sold by 
traders close to Daesh on markets in Tirah Valley. 
Daesh is also walking a tight line between addressing 
local issues and culture (e.g. Pashtunwali) and the 
need to impose Islamic Law as they see fit. 
Emerging picture: 
What does this tell us about Daesh’s 
lifecycle in Afghanistan?
The section'Many Daeshs in Afghanistan' showed 
that Daesh is not a homogenous entity but a complex 
phenomenon that manifests itself in different forms 
across Afghanistan, depending on the particular local 
political dynamics, historical path dependencies and 
the conditions and context under which respondents 
describe and interpret its appearance. Only in Nan-
garhar, and to a lesser extent in Kunar province, does 
Daesh exhibit a clear ambition of statehood and has 
set up government-like institutions such as courts, 
prisons and a basic bureaucratic administration. In 
other areas of Afghanistan, this is not the case. In 
north-eastern Afghanistan’s Kunduz, Takhar and 
Badakhshan provinces, Daesh was described as a covert 
presence rooted among armed and militant Salafis 
(nezami Salafiyyan) who had fought under the umbrella 
of the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate before the emergence 
of Daesh. In western Afghanistan, especially southern 
Herat and Farah, Daesh was described as an opportu-
nity structure used by local strongmen and linked to 
rifts within the Taliban. In Jawzjan and Faryab, it was 
linked to the opportunism of local strongmen in Jun-
besh and Jamiat. Further, the growing popularity of 
Salafi ideas among Taliban who recently established 
a broader presence in the north, and the presence of 
foreign fighters have played a role in the ‘appearance’ 
of Daesh in these two provinces. There, and in Sar-e 
Pul, Balkh and Ghor, a vague threat perception of 
Daesh (‘Daesh are coming’) was being used by local 
officials to either seek security empowerment from 
government authorities or to distract from the failure 
of the local government to maintain local order and 
security in their area of responsibility. 
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2016, Taliban and Daesh engaged in warfare as well as 
targeted assassinations, one dimension of which is 
the reciprocated killing of religious scholars. As yet, 
inter-sectarian differences between Sunni and Shia 
are not the primary driver of support for Daesh in 
Afghanistan. 
As Afghanistan mostly lacks this inter-sectarian 
dimension it would be a gross misreading to attribute 
Daesh’s emergence to Sunni oppression by Shiites on 
the local or national level. Nonetheless, the flow of 
Hazaras living in Iran to Syria to fight for the Assad 
regime as part of the Afghan Shia Fatemiyoun Brigade 
has been widely publicized in videos, which spread 
quickly through social media in Afghanistan and 
have led to strongly critical reactions by Sunnis, who 
have come to see the Assad regime as violent repres-
sors of their coreligionists. Such critical reactions 
need to be seen against the backdrop of a more general 
increasing assertiveness of Shias in Afghanistan’s 
public space, including the display of religious sym-
bols—for example the black, red and green flags com-
memorating the Imam’s Hussein or Ali—brought 
back from Iran by returning Afghan refugees. Such 
symbols displayed in the public space of Shia-domi-
nated neighbourhoods are a reminder to Sunnis of a 
growing cultural influence of Iran in Afghanistan. 
While this has not led to widespread sectarian violence, 
the potential of a growing feeling of resentment by 
Sunnis against Shias in Afghanistan should not be 
underestimated. The recent targeting of Shia symbols 
and Hazaras in cities like Kabul and Mazar-e Sharif 
also indicates a diversification of Daesh’s activities, 
now comprising rural and urban areas (Jalalabad,  
Kabul, Kunduz).
The lack of clear-cut direct or hierarchical rela-
tions with Daesh in Iraq and Syria, the dominant role 
played by regional Salafi networks for funding, and 
the weak order and response structures within Af-
ghanistan are all factors that suggest the phenome-
non of Daesh in Afghanistan is not likely to disappear 
along with Daesh in Iraq and Syria. The emergence 
and presence of Daesh in Afghanistan and the 
formation but is composed of different factions  
resulting from rivalries between and the fragmenta-
tion of various jihadist groups. Thus, Daesh merely 
mobilized locally existing currents of Salafi persuasion, 
which is in stark contrast to the idea of a Daesh head-
quarters in Raqqa exporting Jihadi Salafism to its 
proclaimed province. 
Indeed, we saw in the resource mobilization sec-
tion above that funding for mosques, madrassas and 
charities etc. takes place largely through traditional 
channels, that is, by jihadi fund raisers visiting the 
Gulf Arab countries or the latter’sp donors allocating 
money to charities and NGOs working in Afghanistan. 
From this perspective, the role of Gulf Arab countries 
and Saudi Arabia in supporting Daesh in Afghanistan–
Pakistan is much more significant than in the case of 
Daesh Raqqa. Taken together, these factors do not in-
dicate strong order and command structures between 
a potent Daesh central command headquarters, as in 
Raqqa (Syria), and a client organization, branch or 
franchise, as Daesh Khorasan is normally perceived. 
Nor do they allow us to conclude that inside Afghani-
stan a consolidated organizational structure exists. 
Except for training activities, which interviewees 
unanimously stated would take place in Nangarhar 
districts90 (or previously also in North Waziristan,  
Pakistan), there is little evidence of a central and 
Khorasan-wide coordination of Daesh’s activities in 
the areas studied. Human mobility between Nangarhar 
and Syria and Iraq seems to be limited, and not in the 
thousands as Giustozzi & Mangal (2016a, p. 5) suggest.
Finally, framing narratives in Nangarhar differ 
from those in Iraq and Syria, where, for example, an-
ti-Shia sentiments form a cornerstone of Salafi 
thought. Although Jihadi-Salafism formed in the 
context of the Afghan wars and ‘travelled’ to Iraq and 
Syria via al-Qaeda to become the Islamic Caliphate’s 
central doctrine, sectarianism has not played a simi-
larly crucial role in Afghanistan compared with the 
Middle East (or Pakistan). In Afghanistan, intra-sec-
tarian (i.e. intra-Sunni) fault lines seem to be more 
dominant than between Shia and Sunni. Throughout 
90 \  For example, interviews in Dasht-e Archi suggest that approximately 
70 people from Dasht-e Archi underwent training at one of Daesh’s 
training camps in Mamand, Spin Ghar and Achin.
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combination of Salafism with violent, militarized 
jihadism is not simply an extension of Daesh in Syria 
and Iraq. The actions and modus operandi of violent 
extremist groups against or outside Taliban and  
Afghan government control is not necessarily con-
trolled from Raqqa. Local groups can find inspiration 
without being closely integrated or coordinated by a 
central leadership structure, which also means that 
Daesh in Afghanistan is likely to survive the fall of 
Mosul and Raqqa. Jihadi-Salafism in its local mani-
festation is mainly financed and supported by Gulf 
Arab patrons and will continue to shape Afghan society 
even if Daesh itself should perish or rebrand itself 
under a different name and with different symbolism 
after the fall of Daesh in Iraq and Syria. The ongoing 
increasing Salafization of Afghan society and increas-
ing signs that quietist Salafis are becoming politicized 
and mobilizing for offensive jihad points to the possi-
bility that the ‘coming’ insurgency wave will be more 
inspired by Salafi (radical) thought, signifying a break 
with previous insurgent dynamics, in particular with 
the insurgency of the Taliban of the Islamic Emirate. 
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structures. Our identification of a new jihadi narrative 
as a master frame makes it clear that Jihadi Salafism 
deserves much greater attention as an ideology in the 
Afghan context than it has so far received. 
In this analysis we have employed theoretical 
strands from the corpus of social movement theory 
in an effort to make sense of Daesh in Afghanistan. 
By focussing on political opportunity structures,  
coalition building, resource mobilization (including 
identity and networks) and framing we are able to 
show how different types of mobilization and long-
term conflicts merge in the manifold representations 
of Daesh in Afghanistan. We have built on existing 
approaches of terrorism, peace, civil war and security 
studies and added a crucial perspective from conten-
tious politics and social movement studies, basing 
our analysis on the latter’s theoretical underpin-
nings and taking a grassroots approach to qualitative 
empirical research. This perspective has allowed us 
not only to focus on relations and interactions 
among various actors in the Afghan–Pakistan region 
and their translocal networks. We have also gained 
vital insights from the implicit constructivist approach 
of recent social movement theorizing with its em-
phasis on the role of identity. This has enabled us to 
analyze the claims, values and ideas which inform 
the aspiration of Daesh followers to realize a utopian 
political order rooted in the idea of the caliphate. It 
underpins the grievance narrative. In this sense, our 
analysis complements existing conventional ap-
proaches to comprehending Daesh, for example, 
those representatives of the ‘wave’ theories who in-
terpret the latest manifestations of terrorist waves 
and the emergence of terrorist groups as an outcome 
of political movement processes but do not analyse 
the dynamics of transformation as such. 
The social movement lens has proven heuristically 
fruitful by providing a multi-angled contextualization 
of existing explanations of the emergence, structure 
and organization of Daesh. 
The manifestations of Daesh across Afghanistan 
and its socio-sectarian and political background in 
the context of the Afghanistan–Pakistan region clearly 
distinguish it from Daesh in Iraq and Syria and justify 
the view of Daesh in Afghanistan as a unique ‘pheno- 
menon’. As such it escapes several conventional cate-
gories usually used to describe Daesh (terror organi-
zation vs. territorial entity with statehood markers), 
and its interpretation is multi-faceted: It features  
elements of a franchise of Daesh in Iraq and Syria (at 
least from the perspective of Daesh’s global head-
quarters in Raqqa); it can be read as an insurgency 
playing the role of a local client obedient to a powerful 
global patron, but also as a mutation of older forms of 
terrorism with statehood aspirations; and it can be 
understood as a ‘majority margin’ phenomenon or a 
revolt from the margin, symptomatic of the relative 
marginalization and perceived deprivation of most 
people across the world. Yet Daesh in Afghanistan 
must also be understood as a process—that is, in a 
state of ‘becoming’ characterized by expanding and 
contracting territorial gains and influence, in partic- 
ular as part of the creeping Salfization. Daesh’s regional 
manifestations are a product of underlying dynamics, 
including longue duree developments like the internal 
colonization by Pashtuns, path dependencies from 
jihad politics and exile trajectories since the early 
1980s. From another perspective, given the imitation 
of the Islamic Caliphate’s symbolism, Daesh in Afgha- 
nistan can also be seen as a performance. 
Our research has highlighted the power of local 
agendas and related incentives, such as financial sup-
port, as key factors in understanding Daesh’s initial 
attractiveness for many Afghans. This illustrates that 
Daesh in Afghanistan is not a neglegible phenomenon 
but has to be taken serious – not only for its putative 
potency and the new quality of its violence, but as a 
continuation of much longer trends of religious and 
societal transformations in the region. In this sense, 
Daesh in Afghanistan can no longer be regarded as 
a surprising or exceptional phenomenon. Rather,  
tactics, ideology and framing change with the wider 
socio-political environment and available opportunity 
Conclusion
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halal: permissible 
haram: forbidden 
hawala: informal money transfer system which is 
based on networks of trusted traders and family as 
well as regional affiliations. Although the hawala  
system operates openly, it is considered to be outside 
of the traditional field of financial businesses and 
therefore is not part of the Islamic Banking system  
ijtihad (A.): independent reasoning on the sources of 
Islam in order to form legal/jurisprudential opinion 
iman: belief (in Islam)  
jirga: assembly which serves as an institution for  
decision-making and enforcement of Pashtun tribal 
norms/laws in Pashtun tribal society 
khawarij (A.): sect, which had its roots in the first fitna 
(division) in early Islam and became the first move-
ment to make radical use of the takfir concept. Today, 
Salafis and militant Islamists are labeled as khawarij 
by those who oppose their ideas in order to stress the 
heretical and deviant character of their teachings. 
kuffar (A., plural of kafir): persons who are designated 
as unbelievers
madrassa: religious school
malik/ khan: the original Arabic meaning is “king”, in 
its Pashto variant the term is commonly used to 
identify a chieftain position (‘tribal elder’) which has 
its roots in the tribal structure and is not religiously 
legitimized 
manteqa: area, village, valley, neighbourhood, home
Glossary of local and Arabic terms91
ʿaqida (A.): creed, doctrines dealing with the principles 
of faith, a certain perspective of (a group of) Muslims 
on essentials of Islam
ʿushr: tenth in Islamic law, not strictly defined term, 
elaborated by Islamic law as a tax on agricultural  
produce and commercial activities, regarded as a 
component of zakat
amir al-muʾminin (A.): “Commander of the faithful”—
the term amir encompasses some form of authority/
legitimacy but is not necessarily linked to the title of 
Caliph
arbakee (Pa.): tribal militia
baʿya (A.): pledge of allegiance to a ruler
bidʿa (A.): heretical innovation in religious matters
daʿwa: proselytizing, refers to both Muslims and 
non-Muslims 
eid: most high-ranking feast in Islam, fast breaking at 
the end of Ramadan (Eid al-Fitr)
fatwa: non-binding, legal opinion in Islamic 
jurisprudence
fiqh (A.): generic term for the multiple sectors and 
components of Islamic jurisprudence
hadith/s (A.): the Prophets teachings, sayings, actions 
and traditions which are matched to the Prophet. The 
acknowledged authenticity and therefore the corpus 
of the hadiths varies in Islam  
hajj: pilgrimage, one of the five pillars of Islam
91 \ If not otherwise indicated – A. = Arabic, Pa.= Pashto – local terms 
have the indicated meaning as depicted in all local languages, i.e. in 
Dari, Pashto, and Arabic
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siyasi: political
sunna (A.): corpus of hadiths, as such one of the two 
most important sources (Quran and Sunna) in Islamic 
theology 
takfir (A.): excommunication of fellow Muslims and 
declaring them to be outside of Islam
taqlid (A.): following legal opinions derived by reli-
gious authorities (without knowledge of the process 
of reasoning by the person who practices taqlid)
tarbiya (A.): education, for quietist Salafis training/
cultivation in religious knowledge in order to get 
closer to the core of ʿaqida
tawhid (A.): the Oneness of God, foundation to the  
Islamic system of belief and central to the Salafi  
doctrinal corpus 
tazkiyya (A.): purification of the soul to be capable of 
serving Allah solely; tazkiyya is closely linked to the 
concept of nafs (lit. soul, desires by the human ego)
ulama: Islamic religious scholars and clerics as 
institution 
umma: community of all Muslim people (disregarding 
borders and ethnic boundaries)
wali: governor of a province
watan: home country; refers to the meaning of 
“homeland” or “nation” is strongly connected to the 
idea of a modern state or statehood
wilayat (A.)/velayat: administrative division, ‘province’ 
in Afghanistan 
zakat: alms, one of the five pillars of Islam and there-
fore an obligation
mullah/ mawlawi: Islamic clerics or religiously trained 
persons. Usually, no formalized assignment exists, 
therefore purview, significance and validity of this 
title is often vague in many regions. A mullah is often 
the head of a mosque; a mawlawi has higher religious 
education.
murtad (A.): apostate
mustashriqen (Pa.): orientalist  
nezami (Pa.): military or pertaining military, also 
‘armed’
nikah (A.): Islamic marriage 
nizam (A.): system, regulation, man-made law with no 
link to Islam or Sharia
parda: social norm of physical and social exclusion of 
females in society beyond their core family
pashtunwali (Pa.): orally passed on code of tribal Pash-
tun social norms and “way of living”, tribal Pashtun 
law (tribal customary law of Pashtuns)
raf ul-yaddain (Pa.): raising hands during prayer
rafida (A., collective plural): derogatory term for the 
Shia by Salafi and partly non-Salafi people. Derives 
from the rejection of three of the four righteous  
Caliphs (Abu Bakr, Umar ibn al-Khattab, Uthman ibn 
Affan) by followers of the Shia creed
rikaz (A.): form of zakat, levied for mined natural  
resources (precious stones etc.)
saraf: money changer, hawala dealer
shirk (A.): equal to polytheism, opposite of tawhid
shura: council, literally “consultation”, ill-defined body 
for joint decision-making in Islamic history, men-
tioned in the Quran
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ALP Afghan Local Police ALP
ANA Afghan National Army ANA
ANP Afghan National Police ANP
ANSF Afghanistan National Security Forces ANSF
CIA Central Intelligence Agency (USA)  CIA
FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas FATA
IED Improvized explosive device IED
IJMES International Journal of Middle East Studies IJMES
IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan IMU
ISI Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan) ISI
JDQS Jamʿat al-Daʿwa ila al-Quran wa-l-Sunna JDQS
LeT Lashkar-e-Taiba LeT
LGBT Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender LGBT
NGO Non-governmental organization NGO
TTP Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan TTP
TUTAP Turkmenistan–Uzbekistan–Tajikistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan (electricity project) TUTAP
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